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Abstract  
 
 
How and where did mass mobilization for radical demands emerge in the process of the 
2010/11 Tunisian revolution? And how can this inform theories of revolution, especially 
considering conditions of hegemony? These questions were addressed using secondary and 
archival sources as well as an event catalogue to identify time periods, localities and social 
groups for ethnographic study, leading to a focus on subaltern social groups, primarily in the 
provincial interior, where eight months of fieldwork and over one hundred open, narrative 
interviews were conducted. The thesis argues that provincial subalterns responded to their 
hegemonic disincorporation and increased policing during the Ben Ali regime by developing 
new forms of politics and resistance. Entailing interactions with political activists and 
unionists as well as significant levels of self-activity, this process furnished local solidarities, 
defensive logics, and principally economic-corporate claims which drove mobilization in the 
Tunisian interior during the first three weeks of the revolution. For the people there, 
indiscriminate violence and killings caused a collapse of existing hegemony, leading them to 
re-interpret their struggle in revolutionary terms by drawing on local histories of revolt. This 
revolutionary praxis of subaltern social groups and the radical demands they articulated 
pushed UGTT leaders and coastal middle-classes to turn against Ben Ali, thus creating 
national-level revolutionary mobilization. From this it is concluded that scholarship on the 
Tunisian revolution has assigned undue weight to organized and activist agencies while 
largely ignoring subaltern self-activity. It also suggests that Tunisian studies had overplayed 
the social and regional reach of the Ben Ali era hegemonic formation. The conclusion that 
revolutionary praxis developed among disincorporated subaltern groups in Tunisia further 
intervenes in studies of subaltern politics which have tended to posit everyday politics, 
hidden resistance, and defensive mobilization as a certain ceiling to subaltern self-activity. 
Addressing critical theories of revolution, the thesis concludes that self-change through 
revolutionary praxis appears possible in the context of a contemporary hegemonic 
formation, pointing to potentials for subaltern self-emancipation. Absent significant (organic) 
intellectual labor and organizational resources, however, revolutionary transformation will 
likely be limited by persistent forms of domination, counter-revolutionary forces and 
hegemonic ideas.  
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I. Introduction  
 
I am seeking to rescue the poor […] from the enormous condescension of posterity. […] Their 
insurrectionary conspiracies may have been foolhardy. But they lived through these times of 
acute social disturbance, and we did not. Their aspirations were valid in terms of their own 
experience. (Thompson, 1963, pp. 12–3) 
We demand at least that history does us justice, that people say: “Thank you, sons of 
Kasserine. Thank you, sons of Thala, of Hay Ennour, of Hay Ezzouhour.” The least of things, 
thanksgivings. Because we liberated you. We ended your exile. We allowed you to live freely 
in your country. (Choukri Slougui, unemployed youth, Kasserine) 
 
The motivation of this thesis is to understand the role of subaltern politics in the revolution 
of 2010/11 which ended the rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. It builds on the finding 
that we know astoundingly little about how “ordinary” men and women, and particularly 
those at the margins of society, featured in this momentous social and political change. Their 
agency, struggles, and aspirations are acknowledged only in passing by most scholars and 
have not yet been made the focus of much empirical research. Interest tends to be devoted 
instead to those elements that are held to have been more decisive: the agency of powerful 
elites, of opposition groups and networks who mounted a challenge to them, notably trade 
unionists and other activists, and the processes of social, economic, cultural, and pollical 
change which play into, or are held to explain, these agencies. Taking inspiration from the 
work of thinkers like E.P. Thompson and Antonio Gramsci, the approach of this thesis is a 
different one. It seeks, in reference to Thompson’s afore-quoted words, to give testimony to 
the agency of people whom scholarship all too often excludes from history as the record of 
“what mattered”. With Gramsci, the thesis understands people who are thus excluded as 
being part of subaltern social groups. The theoretical framework in chapter three defines this 
concept in more detail, but subaltern social groups can provisionally be understood as 
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encompassing workers, peasants, and the urban and rural poor, but also women, the 
unemployed, and various minorities. In this broad sense, then, subalterns are those who are 
not middle-class men, social elites, or otherwise privileged groups, but are in a subordinate 
social, economic, and cultural position. Among subalterns in Tunisia thus understood, the 
thesis focusses on young, marginalized men coming from provincial and popular quarter 
backgrounds who, unlike members of organized groups foregrounded in the scholarship on 
the Tunisian revolution, had little prior involvement in politics.1  
The foregoing appear as good reasons to expect that, parallel to their marginalized position 
in society, independent initiative of subalterns did not have much influence on the 
development of the revolution. And yet, the statement of Choukri Slougui that is quoted 
above, a young unemployed man from the remote city of Kasserine in the Centre-West of 
Tunisia, suggests that subalterns do not share such an assessment. Indeed, Choukri states in 
no uncertain terms that he believes the actions of people like him – young, marginalized men 
in provincial regions of the country – had been decisive in the making of the Tunisian 
revolution. How can that be? How did members of subaltern groups develop such a profound 
sense of historical agency? In other words, might their role in the revolution indeed have 
been a significant one? Rather than seeing statements like Choukri’s as expressing an inflated 
sense of self-importance, hurt masculine pride, or something similar, the path chosen here 
is to keep open and explore such questions. To do so, the thesis presents a historical narrative 
 
1 When I use the term subaltern (social groups) without further qualification, it refers to the above 
provisional understanding as a social position of (intersecting) marginalization and subordination (see 
chapter three). When indicated, I use “subaltern” in a narrower sense to designate the young, mostly 
unemployed men without prior involvement in politics who are the main protagonists of the thesis. 
From their experience, I sometimes generalize to speak about Tunisian subalterns in the first sense. 
Relatedly, I mainly use the term “politics” to refer to its more formally organized manifestations from 
which these young men – but not all subalterns – were or felt excluded. Political activism is understood 
as participation in parties, the trade-union, and civil society organizations that interact with and seek 
to influence public authorities, the government, or policy decisions on the national or supra-local level. 
If usage of these terms departs from the above, it is indicated through an epithet. Finally, and while 
some of the activists who feature in the thesis come from a subaltern background, they are sometimes 
distinguished from subalterns because of the level of access which they have to politics. This pertains 
particularly to most trade unionists due to the degree of state-domination, clientelism, and material 
rewards within union structures (see political context section below). 
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that seeks to understand how young men like Choukri came to engage in the struggle which 
brought down Ben Ali despite their lack of experience with formal political activism. It 
describes how their lifeworlds gave rise not just to grievances and reasons to do so but also 
provided them with their own knowledge and logics that allowed them to mobilize 
independently as well as in interaction with other social groups – subaltern and otherwise – 
in the context of the revolution. 
The thesis puts this independent initiative by diverse members of subaltern social groups 
center stage. It is understood in terms of subaltern self-activity, which, with Gramsci, is 
agency that is ‘not the result of any systematic educational activity on the part of an already 
conscious leading group,’ but which is informed by ‘everyday experience illuminated by […] 
the traditional popular conception of the world’ (1971, pp. 198–9). In other words, it is 
subaltern agency that is self-directed rather than due to the leadership of other social groups. 
At the same time, it is not autonomous but draws its intention and purpose from subaltern 
experience of the world and their interpretations based on popular forms of knowledge. It is 
historically and culturally embedded in conditions which, as chapter three discusses, will 
largely be understood through the lens of hegemony. Through these latter aspects, it can be 
appreciated as spontaneous not in the sense of being unthinking or otherwise the opposite 
of a rationally organized agency (Snow and Moss, 2014), but in a Gramscian meaning in which 
‘the "most spontaneous" movement […] is simply […one where] elements of "conscious 
leadership" cannot be checked, have left no reliable document’ (1971, p. 196). This paucity 
of historical documentation distinguishes subaltern self-activity from the agency of more 
formally organized groups and easily leads to an evaluation of its lacking efficacy. To develop 
a richer understanding and against a silencing of subaltern experience, we need to seize on 
‘every trace of [their] independent initiative’ to allow us to see their role as ‘protagonist[s] 
of a real and effective historical drama’ (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 55, 130). The thesis follows this 
Gramscian imperative to uncover traces of subaltern self-activity that help us understand 
12 
 
their historical agency. It does so mainly by drawing on sources of oral history in which 
members of diverse social groups recount their lived experience of the Tunisian revolution.  
Based on this original ethnographic evidence, the thesis argues that subaltern self-activity 
contributed centrally to the development of the revolution in Tunisia. Members of subaltern 
social groups will be shown to have engaged in a broad range of activity under Ben Ali through 
which they resisted conditions of their own marginalization. Some unfolded in interaction 
with more formally organized agencies such as trade unionists of the Union Générale 
Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), while others had no discernible relationship with them. Based 
on these experiences, subalterns in the regions of the Tunisian interior mobilized from mid-
December 2010 onwards, interacting with and at times supported by local activists. However, 
it was the self-activity mostly of young, unemployed men in these provincial settings which 
transformed struggles directed against socio-economic marginalization and police 
oppression into mass mobilization around revolutionary demands. In the course of their own 
struggle, rather than through the leadership by other social groups, subalterns made the 
decisive passage from demanding improvements of their particular conditions to seeking the 
overthrow of the political regime. Through this, the thesis argues, their self-activity came to 
constitute the main social force to which diverse social groups reacted in ways that ultimately 
led to the creation of a revolutionary situation in the country. In other words, members of 
subaltern social groups were indeed key protagonists in the historical drama of the 
revolution. Thus, the first main contribution of this thesis is to provide a historical narrative 
that details the important role played by subaltern self-activity in the context of the Tunisian 
revolution. This adds, and partially sits as a corrective, to a scholarship which has thus far not 
devoted significant empirical attention to their agency.  
Drawing on a perspective that emphasizes dynamics of learning and development in struggle, 
the thesis makes a second main contribution that pertains to our theoretical understanding 
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of subaltern politics in the context of revolution. It shows that such a perspective can help us 
grasp how subalterns identified and overcame broader structures of their subordination, as 
well as where they were unable to do so, and thus illuminates the possibilities and limitations 
of subaltern self-emancipation under conditions of hegemony. The thesis argues that we can 
understand crucial transformations of localized and defensive mobilizations as resulting from 
dynamics of learning and development in struggle. Members of subaltern groups drew on 
the knowledge which they had gained in resisting forms of hegemony and domination to 
expand their mobilization and develop it into local revolts. Through this, they created 
qualitatively different situations in which not just them, but a broader cross-section of the 
population gained new experiences, notably entailing exposure to extreme repression by the 
regime. This led people in the rebelling communities to reinterpret their situation by drawing 
on popular notions of resistance to unjust rule and develop new conceptions that 
fundamentally put into question the legitimacy of the regime. When they rearticulated the 
purpose of their collective struggle as wanting to bring down that regime, a process of 
popular learning in struggle had given rise to revolutionary praxis. However, this “situated” 
learning also meant that revolutionary demands remained under-specified and were not 
developed beyond expressing an opposition to the existing regime. Driven mainly by 
subaltern self-activity and not commanding significant intellectual and organizational 
resources of its own, popular forces were unable to construct detailed conceptions for the 
transformation of society, let alone a sustained project for bringing about such changes. By 
analyzing them through a context understood in terms of hegemony, the thesis contributes 
a theoretically grounded understanding of these achievements and limitations of subaltern 
self-emancipation in the Tunisian revolution.  
To develop these arguments, the thesis is structured as follows. The remaining two sections 
of this introduction clarify key terms used in the thesis and provide a brief overview of the 
Tunisian political context including a timeline of main events in the revolution. Chapter two 
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then reviews the literature on the Tunisian revolution to identify to what extent it has 
addressed the role of subaltern social groups. The chapter finds that the scholarship has not 
devoted significant attention to the question how subaltern agency might have contributed 
to creating a revolutionary situation in Tunisia and identifies a subaltern politics perspective 
as a suitable theoretical framework for addressing this gap in the literature. The following 
chapter elaborates this theoretical framework by drawing on the thought of Antonio Gramsci 
and perspectives of learning in struggle developed by other critical scholars. The chapter also 
describes how the research project of the thesis developed and discusses the methods used 
in the empirical research, its limitations, ethical considerations, and reflections regarding my 
own positionality. This concludes the introductory part of the thesis. 
The main part of the thesis is divided into four chapters that analyze the empirical material. 
Chapter four of the thesis begins by discussing the lifeworlds prior to the revolution of the 
young men who were my key subaltern interlocutors and the activities with which they 
responded to the conditions they faced. The latter will be understood primarily in terms of 
hegemonic contractions that led to their economic disincorporation as well as to an increased 
policing of their everyday lives. The chapter details the forms of subaltern politics in which 
they engaged under Ben Ali and provides the historical context for understanding the self-
activity of my interlocutors in the revolution. The next chapter then details the development 
of mobilization by diverse members of subaltern groups in several localities of the Tunisian 
interior over the first three weeks following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 
December 2010. It shows that the struggles of the young men in these localities, while 
bearing many similarities, being mutually reinforcing to some extent, and interacting with 
organized activist agencies, were not uniform but had important local causes and purposes. 
Indeed, it was based on these localized struggles that their self-activity developed into forms 
of revolt which then created greater unity both between and within localities, giving rise, 
among others, to new forms of solidarity.  
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Chapter six provides the climax of the historical narrative. It argues that the new situation 
created by the self-activity of the youth enabled people in the rebelling localities of the 
Tunisian interior to break free of the strictures posed by hegemony and unite in a struggle 
for the purpose of overthrowing the regime. Here, mass mobilization around radical 
demands for the end of the regime occurred for the first time, thus creating a revolutionary 
situation on the local level. The last empirical chapter argues that these developments 
gradually caused parts of the UGTT leadership to turn against the regime and call for strikes 
which eventually led to a revolutionary situation on the national level. The chapter suggests 
that this increased role of the union was concomitant to a moderation in demands to which 
members of subaltern social groups responded by occupying the central government square 
in Tunis. Here, they managed to develop important specifications of revolutionary goals and 
push through their realization. However, these did not entail conceptions and strategies for 
deeper transformation of Tunisian society and subalterns eventually ceded the stage of 
national politics to an electoral and constitution-drafting process. The final chapter of the 
thesis concludes that members of subaltern social groups played a key role in the Tunisian 
revolution but that the degree to which they were able to achieve self-emancipation was 
limited by their own weaknesses in leadership and organization that ultimately gave counter-
revolutionary forces the upper hand. 
 
Definitions of Key Terms  
Any study of the developments that led to the overthrow of Ben Ali and the establishment 
of a democratic system in Tunisia necessarily confronts the question whether they can be 
defined as revolution. The purpose of this thesis is not to contribute to the research on this 
question but to understand the role of subaltern social groups in these developments, 
irrespective of whether they are conclusively considered as a revolution. As such, this section 
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will only briefly discuss the scholarly debate in order to define the usage of this terminology 
in the scope of this thesis. As the foregoing already suggested, the thesis refers to the events 
of 2010/11 in Tunisia as a revolution. The immediate reason for this choice is that it reflects 
the language used by my subaltern interlocutors. Most notably, they considered their actions 
as revolutionary ones. Since the thesis is concerned with the actions by members of subaltern 
social groups and the degree to which they contributed to the historical events in Tunisia, 
answering these questions arguably hinges on trying to understand how my interlocutors 
experienced and interpreted them. Because of this perspective, and since the thesis 
principally works with sources of oral history, using a different terminology would lead to 
constant contradiction of my interlocutors and thus to a tension that would preclude 
precisely the kind of historical understanding which this thesis strives for. While the thesis 
thus adopts the designation of revolution in accordance with the language of my 
interlocutors, the following offers a brief review of scholarly discussions and clarifies 
definitions of key concepts around revolution as they will be used here.  
The debate on what constitutes a revolution has a long history in the social sciences. A 
definition frequently referred to as authoritative is given by Skocpol who holds that what she 
terms social revolutions are marked by ‘the coincidence of societal structural change with 
class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation’ (1979, p. 4). She 
uses this to distinguish them from revolts that do not cause such structural change and from 
her definition of political revolutions that ‘transform state structures but not social 
structures, and […] are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict’ (ibid). Tilly agrees 
that transformative changes are a necessary feature of revolutions, but defines such 
revolutionary outcomes more broadly as those cases in which ‘a transfer of power over the 
state occurs such that a largely new group of people begins to rule’ (2008, p. 126). According 
to him, this is to be distinguished from a revolutionary situation which precedes these 
changes. He holds that, ‘in a revolutionary situation, at least two centers of power emerge, 
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each of them commanding significant coercive force and each of them claiming exclusive 
control of the state. […And] a full revolution combines [these] two elements: a revolutionary 
situation and a revolutionary outcome’ (ibid). Drawing on Trotsky, Tilly specifies his 
understanding of revolutionary situations in terms of multiple sovereignty which he holds is 
precipitated by three factors: ‘the appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, 
advancing exclusive alternative claims to the control over the government […] commitment 
to those claims by a significant segment of the subject population […and] incapacity or 
unwillingness of the agents of the government to suppress the alternative coalition’ (Tilly, 
1978, p. 200). Others hold that we need to understand the ‘changes that develop before the 
overthrow of the old regime […as:] 1. elite defection and the formation of opposition, 2. 
polarization and coalition building, 3. mass mobilization’ (Goldstone, 2009, p. 20). 
The scholarship has offered various explanations for the occurrence of these revolutionary 
situations and outcomes (for a review see e.g. Goldstone, 2001; Lawson, 2016). Some have 
argued that populations left behind by processes of economic modernization develop 
grievances which are sufficient to account for the emergence of revolutionary mobilization 
(Gurr, 1970). Others discussed a broader constellation of structural developments and macro 
conditions that lead to the formation of coalitions between peasants and bourgeoisie 
(Moore, 1966), state crisis through war and divisions in the ruling elite (Skocpol, 1979), or a 
weakening of its legitimacy as well as intra-elite competition (Goldstone, 1991). What has 
been referred to as the “fourth wave” of theories on revolution has sought to add to such 
structural factors of state weakness an analysis of ‘leadership, ideology, and processes of 
identification with revolutionary movements as key elements in the production of revolution’ 
(Goldstone, 2001, p. 139). This scholarship emphasizes that revolution needs to be 
understood in processual terms. As such, Lawson holds that ‘revolutions are sequences of 
events that attain their significance as they are threaded together in and through time’ and 
this means that ‘all explanations are “case-specific”—revolutions are particular assemblages 
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that combine in historically discrete ways (Lawson, 2016, pp. 111–2). He thus argues against 
generally applicable models for explaining revolutions. Still, Goldstone (2013, pp. 16–25) 
finds that revolutionary situations are necessarily precipitated by an “unstable equilibrium” 
in which conditions of fiscal crisis, elite divisions, new forms of exclusion, popular grievances, 
and favorable international relations combine to create social instability as the fundamental 
cause of revolution. 
With these conceptions of revolution, scholars have argued that the 2011 wave of 
mobilization in the Arabic-speaking world are best understood as ‘non-violent, political 
revolutions […that are] distinct from their predecessors’ (Allinson, 2019, p. 143). By contrast, 
Lawson holds that they ‘share a familiar revolutionary heritage […] within the framework 
established by the 1989 negotiated revolutions that ousted state socialism in Central and 
Eastern Europe’ (2015, p. 466). Other scholars agree that they can be understood as political 
revolutions that were similar to the transformations after the fall of the Soviet Union in that 
they featured unarmed movements against dictatorship and for democracy (della Porta, 
2014a, 2016; Ritter, 2015). However, most regional experts have opted for a more cautious 
definition, calling them the “Arab uprisings”, and pointing to a lack in terms of social, political, 
and economic transformation, the success of counter-revolutionary movements, and limits 
in terms of the aspirations of popular mobilization (e.g. Achcar, 2013, 2016; Chalcraft, 2015; 
Gerges, 2015). In line with these scholars, I will use the term Arab uprisings to refer to the 
2011 episodes of contentious mobilization in the Middle East and North Africa. Looking more 
specifically at Egypt and Tunisia, Bayat made an important contribution. He argues that the 
novelty of the developments there was that they featured a ‘profound disjunction between 
two key dimensions of revolution: movement and change’, adding that they ‘had a character 
of their own, marked by a mix of revolutionary movements and reformist change’ which he 
terms “refolution” (2017, p. 154). Bayat thus draws on the distinction between revolutionary 
situation and outcomes discussed above and holds that, while not in terms of the latter, we 
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can understand developments in Tunisia as having featured the kind of mobilization that 
characterizes the former.    
To a certain extent, I follow Bayat’s distinction between revolution as movement and as 
change, as well as the understanding of the latter in Tunisia in terms of reform. While the 
thesis also discusses the reformist trajectory which Tunisia took, its principal concern is with 
the phenomenon of revolution as movement. Indeed, this is closest to the sense in which my 
interlocutors used the term revolution to designate the mass mobilization for the overthrow 
of Ben Ali which they engaged in. In this thesis, then, the developments in Tunisia are 
discussed as revolution only in so far as they refer to what I will call revolutionary mass 
mobilization. Thus, and in agreement with Bayat’s overall evaluation of revolutionary 
mobilization and outcome taken together as “refolution”, my usage of the term is not meant 
to designate that the transformation of Tunisian society corresponded to the above 
definitions of revolution. Certainly, they did not come up to the level of a social revolution 
according to Skocpol, and even the criterion of a transfer of power to Tilly’s “coalitions of 
contenders” appears unmet. Indeed, the absence of revolutionary forces capable or willing 
to govern instead of the old regimes is exactly what leads Bayat to conclude that we need to 
speak about reformist rather than revolutionary outcomes. However, this raises the 
question, in turn, of how to understand the notion of a revolutionary situation which, with 
Tilly’s above definition, is often conceptualized as the emergence precisely of a rivalling group 
ready to take power.  
How, then, can we conceptualize a situation which features revolutionary mobilization but 
does not entail a coherent movement that seeks to take state power? I hold that such 
conditions are best understood with Gramsci as a “crisis of authority” which can emerge 
when ‘huge masses […] have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain 
activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, 
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add up to a revolution’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210). In the context of this thesis, the term 
revolutionary situation will be used to refer to this Gramscian definition for a crisis of 
authority. Such a situation does not include a coherent movement that ‘seeks to control the 
state […and] aims (among other things) to transform more or less fundamentally the national 
society’ (Goodwin, 2001, p. 10), and is thus different from Tilly’s above notion of “multiple 
sovereignty”. Rather, a revolutionary situation is understood here to exist once masses begin 
to mobilize for revolutionary demands. In other words, it is defined for the purposes of this 
thesis as the occurrence of revolutionary mass mobilization. Finally, the term revolutionary 
process is used here to designate the series of events in which such a situation is created, 
sustained, and eventually ended. With these specifications, the principal research questions 
of the thesis are: How was a revolutionary situation created in Tunisia? And what was the 
role of subaltern social groups in revolutionary mass mobilization? In order to contextualize 
the discussion in the thesis, the following section provides a brief overview of historical 
conditions in Tunisia leading up to the revolution. 
 
Political Context 
Prior to the Arab uprisings of 2011, Tunisia received relatively scant attention in the 
Anglophone academy. A small country of just over 11 million inhabitants located at the 
crossroads between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, it featured little of the natural 
resource wealth, entanglement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or history of military coups and 
ideological conflict that drew scholarly attention to other states of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. Indeed, it has been argued that, ‘politically, Tunisia remained an 
inconspicuous island of calm in troubled seas prior to December, 2010’ (Alexander, 2016, p. 
1). This appeared to be the case certainly as far as significant episodes of popular politics and 
mobilization are concerned. In his survey history on Popular Politics in the Making of the 
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Modern Middle East, Chalcraft (2016), for instance, makes reference to Tunisia mainly for 
comparative purposes. He remarks that ‘where state centralization was less violent, and 
where it took more “national” forms, such as in Tunisia in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, protests against central power were less marked’ (ibid, p. 151). This is similar to 
Tripp (2013, pp. 150–1) who discusses Tunisia outside of the dynamics of the Arab uprisings 
only regarding UGTT-organized protests against IMF and World Bank-imposed reforms in 
1977-78 as well as the Bread Riots which broke out for similar reasons in the south of the 
country over the winter of 1983/84. By contrast, Beinin and Vairel’s (2013) volume on social 
movements and mobilization in the MENA do not discuss the country before the Arab 
uprisings at all. Scholarly attention was mirrored in the media. Outside of the Francophone 
press, few international news outlets even had journalists in the country (Jebnoun, 2012, p. 
60). It is probably not too big an exaggeration to say that Tunisia was considered relatively 
dull by many international observers. 
To some extent, this record had been set in the comparatively “uneventful” process of 
Tunisian independence from colonial rule. Whereas other countries in the MENA region went 
through prolonged periods of armed conflict and popular mobilization, Tunisia was able to 
achieve what some have called a “negotiated independence” (Willis, 2012). Pressure by 
armed insurrection in neighboring Algeria forced the French to focus their resources on this 
more valuable colonial possession and allowed Habib Bourguiba, leader of the main Tunisian 
movement for independence, the Neo Destour party, to negotiate a withdrawal of French 
colonial forces in 1956 (ibid, p. 30). Bourguiba, a lawyer from the coastal city of Monastir who 
had studied in Paris, chiefly determined the strategy of the party. It drew its membership 
largely from the new urban middle-class which had grown under colonial rule, shared ‘a 
modern, secular upbringing […,and] were mostly employed in modern strata of the labor 
market, be it in the new liberal professions or in the emerging public sector’ (Erdle, 2010, p. 
56). In line with the interests and values of his own class background and support base, 
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Bourguiba championed social modernization and orientation towards Europe. He was 
challenged by Salah Ben Youssef who sought to take over the leadership of the Neo Destour 
and favored closer ties with the Arab world, notably Nasser’s Egypt. The rivalry resulted in an 
armed conflict in which the Youssefists took to guerrilla-style campaigns in the rural regions 
of the country’s interior that formed the core of their support base and which cost the lives 
of over a thousand Tunisians, around twice as many as the struggle against the French (Willis, 
2012, p. 40). Bourguiba, with the support of UGTT militants as well as French forces, emerged 
victorious and became the first president of independent Tunisia in 1957 whereas Ben 
Youssef fled to Egypt.  
With these developments, two important patterns of political developments in Tunisia would 
be set. The first was that Bourguiba established an authoritarian style of rule based on the 
Neo Destour as the single state party and followed his strategy of economic and social 
modernization as well as foreign policy and cultural orientation towards Europe rather than 
the Arab world (Camau and Geisser, 2003). Stylizing himself as the “supreme combatant” of 
the independence struggle and “father of the nation” he built a strong leader cult around 
himself. In his own words: ‘I have created a nation largely around myself, around my person, 
and I wish to see that nation strengthen itself around the state, which should endure’ (Habib 
Bourguiba, quoted in Murphy, 1999, p. vi). Bourguiba established a system in which ‘formal 
institutions or mechanisms designed to allow ordinary Tunisians to participate in the 
decision-making process were kept to a minimum in favour of a form of authoritarian 
paternalism that sought to guide Tunisia along a “correct path”’ (Alexander, 2016, p. 71). For 
some time, Bourguiba was judged successful as Tunisia experienced stable economic growth 
rates, increased living standards and levels of education, and improved women’s rights. In 
lieu of electoral politics, political inclusion was achieved in two ways. The Neo Destour itself 
as well as UGTT were set up as the two main channels of interaction between political elites 
and the population. The former was turned into a mass party, and ‘the UGTT, the only other 
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organization with nationalist credentials and organizational power to rival the Neo-Destour, 
became an integral element of Bourguiba’s support coalition’ (Warkotsch, 2015, p. 69). This 
strong role of the single national labor union became the second feature of Tunisian politics 
established under Bourguiba.  
The function of UGTT in post-independence Tunisia has been described as a “transmission 
belt” that aided in the implementation of economic policy and relayed popular demands to 
the central government through its grassroots structures (Yousfi, 2015a). In addition, most 
of the Bourguiba era developmentalist programs had its origin in UGTT, especially when its 
powerful secretary general Ahmed Ben Salah was made super minister of finance, planning 
and economics in 1961. Adopting a classical import substitution regime, these programs 
included modernization (and partially collectivization) of agricultural production as well as 
industrialization through state-led investment and the creation of public companies 
(Murphy, 1999). An expanding state administration provided further employment 
opportunities in the public sector, befitting the swelling number of university graduates 
which policies for increasing access to higher education produced. While the experiment with 
“Tunisian socialism” proved relatively short-lived and Ben Salah was dismissed in September 
1969, his legacy lingered as the state remained heavily involved in the economy throughout 
the Bourguiba period (e.g. the state investment ratio stayed above 50%), and subsequent 
economic liberalization was limited (ibid). UGTT also played an important role as a 
mechanism for job allocation in the public sector where it flanked the official bureaucracy 
and entry examinations. These channels and policies provided opportunities for upward 
social mobility which benefitted broad segments of the population and reduced economic 
inequality, including between coast and interior. Scholars have argued that, ‘under President 
Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s single-party system was authoritarian enough to provide stability 
while remaining open to new constituencies and responsive to new concerns[…, and] the 
government pursued a pro-Western policy abroad and a pragmatic development strategy’ 
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(ibid, p. 2). With the noted exceptions of UGTT’s influence and pro-Western policy, the 
Tunisian system thus bore important parallels to the “populist authoritarianism” set up in 
numerous countries of the MENA region in which lack of political rights were accepted by 
many for the benefit of economic development and redistribution (Hinnebusch, 2006).   
Indeed, like many of those systems, the Bourguiba regime faced a series of challenges when, 
in the 1970s and 80s, accelerating foreign debt forced the country to seek assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that were tied to programs of structural adjustment 
in economic policy. While growth remained high in Tunisia over the 1970S, averaging 7% 
annually, state-investments were increasingly debt-funded and, over the period of 1970-
1985, Tunisia’s long-term debt increased roughly tenfold, reaching over 60% of GDP (Murphy, 
1999, pp. 84–5). It was on the back of these developments, and under conditions imposed 
by the IMF, that the regime embarked on a program of economic liberalization and austerity 
measures. As the state withdrew from its redistributive role and tightened its authoritarian 
rule (Bourguiba was declared president for life in 1975), the union leadership decided to 
engage in a long struggle for greater autonomy from the regime and finally, after a period of 
increased sectoral strikes, called the first national strike on 26 January 1978 since 
independence (Yousfi, 2018, pp. 14–5). Bourguiba used the army to repress revolts that had 
erupted in several cities, leaving 200 people dead according to some estimates (Tripp, 2013, 
p. 150), and plunging UGTT into a deep crisis as many of its leaders were arrested (Yousfi, 
2015a). Having managed to put down the uprising, the regime continued the shift in 
economic policy.  
When a cut of subsidies on basic staples including bread and flour was announced in 
December 1983, large parts of the country’s rural and southern regions rose in revolt, leading 
to the Tunisian bread riots of 1984, although this time a domesticated union leadership 
meant that only grassroots trade unionists were involved (Yousfi, 2018, p. 17). Indeed, and 
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while the Islamist MTI movement had been growing over previous years, these ‘riots were 
spontaneous expressions of discontent from below, independent of the organizational 
efforts of political forces […as] neither the UGTT, nor the MTI had a role in their organization’ 
(Warkotsch, 2015, p. 83). As with the general strike before, Bourguiba relied on the military 
to confront the riots which only ended when he revoked the price hikes in one of his last 
public speeches. In parallel, the regime moved decisively to reign in the union which had 
continued its own strike actions. In January 1986, UGTT headquarters were invaded, its 
unruly leadership arrested, and replaced by regime loyalists in a special union congress in 
1987 (Bellin, 2002, pp. 112–3). By the mid-1980s, then, the Bourguiba regime had become 
visibly unstable and corporatist integration through UGTT had been weakened. In this 
context, army general Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had first been made head of national security 
to combat the union, general social unrest, as well as the growing Islamist threat. After being 
promoted to Prime Minister in October 1987, he seized power in a bloodless coup d’état the 
following month.  
The growing opposition against Bourguiba and the fact that Ben Ali managed to give his 
seizure of power a legal veneer resulted in strong initial support for the new president (Erdle, 
2010). Indeed, Ben Ali appears to have succeeded in pacifying the social and political unrest 
which had been building over the previous decade. He dissolved the presidency for life, 
rescinded economic hardship measures, freed union leaders and Islamist prisoners, and 
presented himself as a champion of democratization and economic reform. The central 
measure in establishing his rule was the 1988 National Pact which bound together all political 
parties in the country under a renewed pledge of unity (Anderson, 1991). The pact 
acknowledged an Islamic heritage against Bourguiba’s staunch secularism, guaranteed 
periodic, free elections, protection of human rights and basic liberties, and promised a fair 
distributing of economic benefits, while emphasizing the need for solidarity, collective effort, 
and responsibility of all Tunisians.  Scholars have argued that, through ‘the National Pact, Ben 
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Ali recreated the image of an organic corporatist state, reinvigorating the role of national 
organizations as partners with the state, […and established] the theme that […] the problems 
of the country had stemmed from abuse of power under Bourguiba’ (Murphy, 1999, pp. 174–
5). In creating this appearance, the pact bought Ben Ali enough time and maneuvering room 
to solidify his rule.   
Promises of democratic opening were retraced after a comparatively strong showing of 
Islamist candidates winning 17% of the vote in the 1989 parliamentary elections which gave 
a pretext to crush the movement, leading to thousands of arrests and its de facto 
dismantlement by the early 1990s (Warkotsch, 2015, p. 90). The secular opposition, shocked 
by its own weak results in the elections, supported the crackdown, and Ben Ali succeeded in 
exploiting fears of an Islamist takeover among elites to legitimize a severe intensification of 
policing during much of his rule while he continued to rhetorically endorse their agendas for 
political reform. He also curbed opposition within the Neo Destour, which he renamed the 
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (Constitutional Democratic Rally, RCD), and 
that was effectively turned from a party for mass-inclusion into a system of patronage that 
created dependencies which solidified his personal hold on power (Hibou, 2006). After Ben 
Ali had consolidated his position, the 1990s witnessed a tightening of political space for all 
political actors and an increase in policing that turned Tunisia into a veritable “security state” 
(Sadiki, 2002). An important element in ensuring the stability of this system was the regime’s 
changed approach towards UGTT. Under the terms of the National Pact, the union was given 
a new role as a partner in a newly established collective bargaining system with the national 
employer’s association which served to fundamentally shift its tactics from strikes to 
negotiations. As a leading scholar on UGTT noted, the result was that ‘”associative 
participation” subdued the fighting spirit of the union movement that had developed in the 
1970s; key social objectives were brushed aside as the parties worked together to meet 
competitiveness targets’ (Yousfi, 2018, p. 23). In parallel, Ben Ali continued policies of co-
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optation by stacking the union leadership with RCD members and from the union congress 
of 1994 onwards, the UGTT secretary general was effectively a regime appointee.2   
Aside from neutralizing the organized political opposition and contestation out of the trade 
union movement, the most important element for the stability of the Ben Ali regime came 
from its comparative success in stabilizing the economy. Centered around the promotion of 
an export-oriented growth model in line with Washington-consensus economic policies, 
macroeconomic indicators improved as inflation and the budget deficit were reduced (Yousfi, 
2018, pp. 21–2). Indeed, ‘the government’s policies generated one of the most impressive 
records in the Middle East and North Africa […and,] by the mid-1990s, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and most Western governments hailed Tunisia as one 
of the best exemplars of structural economic reform’ (Alexander, 2016, p. 3). This 
development was also reported by Tunisian authorities to have benefitted the poor. 
According to official statistics, ‘Tunisia succeeded in cutting the overall poverty rate by about 
80 percent’ in the two decades leading up to the year 2000, while achieving stable growth 
rates above 4% in 1995-2000 (Ayadi et al., 2005). Other scholars have argued that the 
benefits of economic growth were overwhelmingly allocated to an increasingly small 
support-base of the regime among the coastal middle-classes and business elites, leading to 
increasing inequalities that affected people in the marginalized regions of the country’s 
interior particularly severely (Warkotsch, 2015). In this sense, Tunisia seemed to be following 
a regional pattern whereby populist authoritarian regimes, in the wake of neoliberal 
economic reforms and the reduction of social provision through the state, secured their rule 
through a system of “crony capitalism” that primarily benefitted social elites (Hinnebusch, 
2006). Indeed, while Ben Ali had seemingly managed to subdue organized politics and 
 
2 While my broad definition of subaltern social groups includes workers, it is due to the degree of state 
domination over UGTT discussed here that trade unionists in Tunisia cannot tout court be understood 
as subalterns – even if, as the below shows, some continued to advocate subaltern causes. 
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opposition to his rule, unrest of economically marginalized groups began to show again in 
the late 2000 in the interior of the country.  
The revolt that erupted in the center-south region of Gafsa in 2008 constituted the most 
important episode of popular mobilization in the country since the 1984 bread riots and has 
been regarded by the scholarship as the main precursor event of the revolution (e.g. Allal 
and Geisser, 2011a; Hmed, 2015). At the heart of it were grievances of the local population 
around general economic marginalization and corrupt hiring practices of the main regional 
employer, the state-owned Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa (CPG) (Chouikha and 
Geisser, 2010; Geisser and Gobe, 2007). After the annual recruiting for new CPG employees 
left most of the local candidates unemployed and with the few available jobs reportedly given 
to applicants with ties to RCD, people from the town of Redeyyef in January 2008 mounted 
a protest campaign with the support of their local UGTT branch. Protests spread to several 
other towns in what is known as the Gafsa mining basin and lasted for several months. Over 
this period, the regime imposed a literal siege on the dissenting towns and largely succeeded 
in keeping the events out of the heavily controlled national media and most ordinary citizens 
remained unaware of the events for months. By that time, the regime had managed to 
forcefully put down the local uprising, leading to the death of three protesters and the arrest 
of its charismatic trade unionist leaders in June 2008 (Allal, 2010). While major episodes of 
popular protest had been absent in Ben Ali’s Tunisia for almost twenty years, the events of 
Gafsa were followed in the summer of 2010 by riots in the city of Ben Guerdane at the border 
with Libya, showing that discontent was once more brewing in the marginalized regions of 
the country.  
What became apparent through the involvement in the Gafsa revolt of local union structures 
was that UGTT continued to harbor militant tendencies in its grassroots structures that were 
ready to support local struggles (Yousfi, 2015a). These were significantly smaller 
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mobilizations than the wave of labor uprisings involving industrial workers all over the 
country that the official union leadership had endorsed in the 1970s and 80s (Beinin, 2015; 
Feltrin, 2018a). Indeed, scholars have argued that what became visible in the later Ben Ali 
years was a pervasive divide between “two UGTTs”: a leadership loyal to the regime and base 
structures in which more radical activists were to some extent able to continue a minimum 
of opposition activities (Camau and Geisser, 2003). To a certain extent, this was said to have 
been in continuity with a function of the union since Tunisian independence by which it had 
provided a space for the expression of critique to the regime and of political tendencies that 
were not represented, first in the single party, and then in the RCD. Indeed, this role of the 
union has been characterized as a “refuge” for opposition politics both under Ben Ali and 
before (Yousfi, 2015a). In the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, scholars identified more 
signs that opposition and resistance had not altogether disappeared under Ben Ali. This 
literature will be discussed in the following chapter since it has more direct bearing on the 
questions of how a revolutionary situation was created in Tunisia, and what the role of 
subaltern social groups was in this process. 
In terms of the broader political context since independence, however, it appeared that the 
system of political containment set up by Ben Ali was effective compared, for instance, to the 
period of strikes and mobilization that had spelled the end of Bourguiba. As such, some 
scholars held that, since ‘the mid-1990s […] the rowdiness was gone. The government deftly 
hijacked the opposition’s democratic rhetoric while it waged open war against anyone who 
dared to criticize the president and the ruling party […and, thus,] Tunisian politics had lapsed 
into another period of theoretical irrelevance’ (Alexander, 2016, p. 3). Others agreed that 
Ben Ali had created conditions under which Tunisian society suffered a “political death” 
(Camau and Geisser, 2003). Mass consent was also argued to have been achieved by 
regulating access to the spoils of comparatively strong economic growth via the regime’s 
influence over the political economy that created conditions of dependency and surveillance 
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through a dense network of regulations, debt, and a still sizeable welfare state (Hibou, 2006). 
As such, the preeminent sociologist working on the Ben Ali regime, Beatrice Hibou, 
summarized that the regime had managed to elicit “voluntary servitude” from ‘the vast 
majority of the population – not to say almost all if it’ (Hibou, 2011a, pp. 9, 211). To reiterate, 
these dynamics were complemented by a particularly intense form of securitization in which 
the security apparatus became the primary mechanism for governing Tunisians (Ismail, 
2003), making Tunisia one of the most oppressive states in the MENA (Black, 2010). 
In this context, the sequence of events that unfolded over the 29 days from 17 December 
2010 to 14 January 2011 when they culminated in the flight of Ben Ali from the country came 
as a major surprise to observers of Tunisia. Protests first erupted in the city of Sidi Bouzid 
following the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi, a young local fruit vendor. 
Confrontations between several hundred protesters and security forces were first reported 
in Sidi Bouzid the following day, Saturday 18 December, and the regime sent additional police 
forces to quell the unrest on Sunday. The local confrontations continued and on 24 December 
the first reported protest events occurred in some of the smaller towns of the Sidi Bouzid 
region, while in neighboring Kasserine a group of lawyers staged a demonstration (ICG, 2011, 
pp. 4–5). As in Gafsa two years earlier, local trade unionists got involved in the protests in 
Sidi Bouzid. They succeeded to spread information about the local events, especially in 
international and online media, whereas the heavily controlled domestic news sources did 
not report on the unrest. By the end of December, the regime announced development 
measures for the Sidi Bouzid area and Ben Ali gave a televised speech on 28 December in 
which he denounced the unrest. A protest by several hundred had taken place in Tunis the 
day before in front of the UGTT headquarters and lawyers organized a demonstration in 
solidarity with Sidi Bouzid, but the capital otherwise remained calm. 
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Developments accelerated after the beginning of the new year. On 3 January, student protest 
occurred in the town of Thala and three days later lawyers went on strike across the country. 
On 7 January, the regime moved to arrest bloggers and cyber-activists who had been 
spreading news about the unrest online and Al-Jazeera reported a national uprising (Ryan, 
2011). Protest dynamics escalated when police forces killed up to 50 people during three 
days of heavy crackdown on protesters in Kasserine and Thala between 8 and 10 January, 
followed by a sudden withdrawal of security forces from that region (ICG, 2011, p. 5). The 
regime tried to maintain a socio-economic reading of the protest and Ben Ali gave a second 
televised speech on 10 January in which he promised to create 300,000 new jobs over two 
years but also continued to condemn the mobilization which he claimed was instigated by 
foreign forces (Randeree, 2011).  
Subsequent to these events, cracks emerged within the national UGTT that had been loyal to 
the regime up until that point and on 12 January the first mass protests occurred in Sfax, 
Tunisia’s second city, when the regional union leadership there called for a general strike 
(ICG, 2011, p. 6). Confrontations with security forces had spread to the capital’s popular 
quarters the night before, but it was not until UGTT called for a general strike on 14 January 
that the streets of Tunis swelled with crowds. As thousands gathered in front of the Ministry 
of Interior on the capital’s main Avenue Bourguiba and shouted for his departure from the 
country, Ben Ali fled the country in the afternoon hours of that day (Kirkpatrick, 2011). The 
following chapter opens the discussion of the thesis by reviewing the scholarship that has 
sought to explain these rapid developments, placing special attention on the extent to which 
it has discussed the role of subaltern social groups. 
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II. Reviewing Scholarship on the Tunisian Revolution 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the Tunisian revolution and seeks to identify a suitable 
theoretical framework for the thesis. As the introduction set out, the first concern of this 
thesis is with the question of how a revolutionary situation was created in Tunisia. Thus, and 
following the distinction introduced by Bayat (2017), the focus is on “revolution as 
movement”, or on revolutionary mass mobilization (RMM), rather than “revolution as 
outcome” in terms of social and political transformations. Second, the thesis is concerned 
with the role of subaltern social groups in creating and shaping the revolutionary situation. 
The chapter proceeds in four sections. Section one discusses studies which seek to explain 
the Tunisian revolution through anterior causal factors. They are subjected to a critique from 
arguments for more processual accounts of revolutions. Section two reviews contributions 
which avowedly or implicitly take on board those critiques. It finds that they explain the 
creation of RMM primarily through the leadership of activist groups or dissolve agency into 
transformative events. They do not devote much empirical or theoretical attention to the 
agency of subalterns without prior engagement in politics and are subject to challenges on 
their empirical foundations. Section three then turns to studies drawing on critical theories 
of revolution and subaltern studies. It finds that they address the challenges faced by other 
studies. While they provide significant insights on the role of subaltern social groups in 
revolutionary processes and thus suggest a subaltern studies framework for this thesis, the 
scholarship in this paradigm does not offer detailed investigation of the creation of RMM in 
Tunisia. The chapter concludes by finding that explanations for the emergence of RMM in 
Tunisia are subject to theoretical challenges and are often weakly grounded in empirical 
research, while the role of subaltern social groups in the Tunisian revolution is left under-
researched, thus constituting a significant gap in the scholarship which this thesis addresses.   
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Arguments on Causal Anteriorities  
This section reviews studies which attempt to explain the Tunisian revolution through what 
can be classified as primarily structural factors as well as a set of anterior developments that 
produced a mobilizing potential. One cluster of studies comes from the comparative study of 
authoritarianism and is based largely on a “transitology” framework of democratization. It 
discusses structural weaknesses in the existing regimes to explain the Arab uprisings more 
broadly, including the Tunisian revolution. One of its main findings is that only authoritarian 
regimes termed “sultanistic”, understood as combining weak bureaucratization and strongly 
personalistic rulership, succumbed to uprisings (Stepan and Linz, 2013). Scholarship in this 
paradigm tends to attribute the weakness of such regimes primarily to the configuration of 
the security apparatus, focussing particularly on explaining breakdowns of elite coalitions in 
the form of defections in the military. Regarding Tunisia, defections in the armed forces are 
variously held to have resulted from a military leadership alienated by the regime (Barany, 
2011; Goldstone, 2011), its degree of professional-bureaucratic rather than patrimonial 
organization (Bellin, 2012; Burns, 2018), dissenting junior officers (Nassif, 2015), or a 
combination thereof (Brooks, 2013). Some explain the relevance of these factors in turn 
through decision-making of officers at critical junctures (Gallopin, 2019), while others see 
military defection as an expression of an overall lack of repressive capacity which is explained 
through the absence of oil-rents and hereditary regime succession (Brownlee et al., 2013, 
2015, chap. 2). Given their focus on macro factors and an assumed decisiveness of 
disembedded state structures and elite agencies, studies under this paradigm offer only 
limited insights into the questions that animate this thesis. 
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Employing variants of modernization theory and political economy perspectives,3 other 
scholars have focused on identifying structural developments which they hold gave rise to 
the grievances and dissent that fueled the Arab uprisings. These studies tend to foreground 
neoliberal economic developments and regime policy choices. More broadly, they identify a 
regime type termed “post-populist authoritarianism” which excluded growing numbers from 
state benefits and economic opportunities (Hinnebusch, 2015). For the case of Tunisia, 
studies in this vein discuss increasing socio-economic marginalization subsequent to the 
breakdown of a social contract which traditionally incorporated broad segments of society 
through the distribution of economic benefits (Achy, 2015). Others found that the fiscal 
policies of Western countries after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 led to increased 
inflation (Farha, 2014), and that privatization in the economy was coupled with extreme 
corruption, especially in the inner circle of the president (Gherib, 2012). Moreover, failed 
developmental strategies produced inequalities between coast and interior as well as high 
youth unemployment (Achy, 2011; Alexander, 2011). According to some, this was 
exacerbated by an export-oriented agricultural policy which worked to the detriment of 
subsistence farming that had previously served as a safety net for unemployed youth in the 
interior regions (Gana, 2013a).  
In an important comprehensive assessment, Hibou (2011b) finds that the failure to 
economically integrate the youth, particularly of the interior regions, and the subsequent 
increased policing of their discontent, violated the moral economy established previously by 
the authoritarian social compact. Some have stressed that these unemployed youth were not 
only regionally concentrated but, due to a concomitant expansion of university enrolment, 
 
3 Not all studies referenced here explicitly draw on modernization theory or political economy, the 
most notable exception being those discussing new technologies and social media. However, their 
underlying argumentative structure still corresponds to the logic of these theoretical paradigms. 
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increasingly highly-educated (Blavier, 2016; Campante and Chor, 2012). Beissinger et al. 
summarize the gist of these arguments in finding that 
Ben Ali 's […] policies, exacerbated two significant inequalities in Tunisian society: one age-based, as 
job creation did not keep pace with population growth, and one spatial, between the capital and the 
regional periphery [, …so that] the unemployed were overwhelmingly young and spatially 
concentrated in peripheral areas, including the Center-West region […] where a third of the population 
lived below the poverty line (2015, pp. 13, 16).  
Other scholars drawing on a critical political economy perspective have stressed the role of 
the working classes and labor movements as well as of new technologies in the Arab 
uprisings. Such perspectives hold that ‘the balance of class forces, [… especially prior] 
organization and consciousness of workers and their participation in the revolutions’ were 
decisive (Allinson, 2015, p. 295). Indeed, several important studies have singled out the 
differing degrees of working-class organization as the key explanatory factor for popular 
mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt (Beinin, 2015, 2016), stressing ‘the fact that Tunisia had the 
strongest working class in the Arab world’ (Feltrin, 2018b, p. 44). As such, Beinin concludes 
that the ‘most important conclusion to be drawn from Egypt and Tunisia is that class 
continues to matter […and that] Tunisia's advantage over Egypt was the existence of the 
UGTT’ (2014, pp. 43, 45).  
Kindred arguments can be found in Gilbert Achcar’s work. However, he holds that in Tunisia 
the labor movement was insufficient to account for RMM (2013, chap. 4), and that ‘“cyber-
activism” played a crucial role in bringing about a “scale shift” in the struggle and 
transforming it into a general uprising’ (ibid., p. 133). Other scholars have explored this 
combination of economic developments with the spread of new technologies and social 
media (Honwana, 2011, 2013; Rivetti, 2015). While most of the studies reviewed thus far 
foreground structural causes, including economic and technological changes, and grievances 
as the main explanations for the Tunisian revolution, the accounts discussed last also touch 
on the development of oppositional politics. The studies which will be reviewed next can be 
36 
 
characterized as explaining the revolution through such dissent-formation in the political and 
cultural fields.  
The explanatory structure of studies emphasizing opposition politics is that various kinds of 
dissent pre-dating the revolution add up to ‘a cumulative process of learning and resistance’ 
(Ayeb, 2011, p. 475) which fashioned ‘the networks or informal connections between 
activists of which the Tunisian revolution is the product’ (Hibou and Khiari, 2011, p. 33). Gana 
argues that this dissent was underpinned by a tradition of “cultural critique” in Tunisia which, 
in ‘the months leading up to the revolution [, … became] more and more adventurous, vocal, 
and direct, particularly on YouTube and Facebook which circulated, among other things, 
explosive hip hop videos’ (2013b, p. 19, also 2014). Some have echoed the importance of a 
resistance culture in rap music for inspiring youth protesters (Bouzouita, 2013; Ovshieva, 
2013), while others have claimed that more traditional poetry, and especially the legacy of 
Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi, Tunisia’s poet of resistance against French colonialism galvanized 
protesters in the revolution (Elbousty, 2013; Omri, 2012; Rice and Hamdy, 2016).  
Allal and Pierret’s (2013) edited volume discusses the emergence of the Arab uprisings 
through the lens of “dissenting communities”, with their contributors singling out, in the case 
of Tunisia, football fans, cyber activists and lawyers. Gobe has further developed his analysis 
on the lawyers and claims that they had become particularly vocal in their criticism of the 
regime (2016), while others have added the importance of resistance to land-appropriation 
by farmers, especially in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid (Gana, 2013a, pp. 64–6). An emphasis 
is put by scholars on almost a decade of resistance and dissent-formation among youth who 
were socially “degraded” [déclasser] by being excluded from state benefits and who 
expressed frustration with corruption, unemployment and regional as well as generational 
cleavages (Allal and Geisser, 2011b). This had found its most notable expression in the 2008 
revolt in the Gafsa mining basin (Allal, 2010; Allal and Bennafla, 2011; Chouikha and Gobe, 
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2009; Gobe, 2010), which is almost unanimously seen by the scholars cited in this section as 
the key precursor movement to the revolutionary mobilization. These developments, then, 
in combination with increasing cyber-activism, were said to have constituted an ‘extra-
institutional and informal continuation of oppositional politics under Ben Ali’ (Chomiak, 2011, 
p. 75). Some have argued that these prior experiences of protest and resistance, together 
with everyday forms of politicization, ‘accumulated within the minds of individuals […], 
becoming a leitmotif for their subsequent engagement in the "revolution"’ (Allal, 2012a, p. 
62). Finally, Ayari has claimed that ‘a prior semantic framing in terms of a “struggle for 
dignity” […] has allowed for the alliance between the different social categories of Tunisian 
society’ (2011, p. 209). This framing, he holds, was an “unintended effect” of previous 
struggles, notably by the communist party and the revolt in the Gafsa mining basin (ibid., pp. 
213-5), to the effect that ‘from the start of the social riots and violent clashes in Sidi Bouzid 
[…] requests in terms of work and bread [were] already transcended’ (ibid., p. 215). 
The scholarship reviewed in this section discusses numerous elements of a possible 
explanation for the Tunisian revolution, thus addressing the first research question on the 
emergence of RMM. First, more structuralist accounts have identified a complex set of 
grievances ranging from weaknesses of the regime, including rampant corruption, clientelism 
and an increasingly unstable “authoritarian social compact” which excluded increasing 
numbers from state benefits. Moreover, important economic misalignments led to growing 
inequalities between rich and poor as well as between coastal and interior regions, and to 
spiraling youth unemployment, breaking the link between educational attainment and social 
mobility held up by the regime as a key promise. All of these are important factors which this 
thesis will continue to discuss. However, claiming that they sufficiently explain mobilization, 
let alone revolution, entails a certain “spasmodic” conception of human agency whereby 
people cannot but respond to (a sufficiently large degree of) structural changes (and 
concomitant grievances) by rebelling. Such arguments have been subjected to critique for 
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ignoring that mobilization, though building on grievances, is a process requiring mobilizing 
activities and ideas, viz. products of human agency, as well as resources to succeed (e.g. 
McAdam, 1982; McAdam et al., 2001; Opp, 2009; Snow and Benford, 1988; Tarrow, 1994; 
Tilly, 1978). In other words, short of wanting to claim that the factors discussed above had 
already created ‘a revolutionary situation that needed only a “spark” to ignite it’ (Owen, 
2014, p. 257), they do not explain RMM. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, causal 
anteriorities are treated as necessary but insufficient conditions of RMM in Tunisia. 
Consequently, and while they have featured as workers, unemployed, rappers, and more, 
the agency of members of subaltern groups in creating RMM, too, is left unaccounted for by 
this scholarship, relegating them to a status of aggrieved communities surging into action.  
The case is somewhat different regarding accounts which focus on the political pre-history 
of the revolution. They point to important activities of various groups in Tunisian society 
including cyber-activists, lawyers, grassroots trade unionists, and members of political 
opposition parties. Particularly pertinent for this thesis, they also noted previous acts of 
resistance by members of subaltern groups, such as small-scale farmers and the young 
unemployed, many of whom were residents of the interior of the country. These accounts, 
as well as more structuralist perspectives on “working class power”, thus discuss groups 
which would become active in the revolution and effectively argue for the development not 
just of reasons for but a capacity to mobilize. Their argumentative structure takes that an 
accumulation of struggles explains the revolutionary process because the amount of 
experience gathered, and attendant mobilizing capacity built, had reached a point of 
sufficiency. Therefore, scholars employing this perspective hold that the summary of these 
developments had, at least with hindsight, made the Tunisian revolution “almost pre-
announced” (Ayari et al., 2011). While these accounts discuss developments that were vital 
to the revolution, they also face significant challenges.  
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On the one hand, they struggle to account for which groups and dynamics contributed to this 
accumulation, what concrete tactics participants adopted in 2010/11 based on this 
experience, or how and where learning occurred – on the level of individuals or of 
organizations, for instance? On the other hand, the argument is not so different from 
structuralist accounts in the sense that here, too, sufficient explanation of the revolutionary 
situation is claimed based on causal antecedents. Hence, it risks falling into historical 
determinism and does not leave room for the many ways in which people acted creatively, 
learned in the process of struggle, and came up with innovative ways of challenging the 
regime in power. Such accounts cannot explain how key challenges were overcome in the 
revolutionary process – notably how localized, sectorized, and largely socio-economic 
protests spread and unified different social groups, and how radical political demands were 
articulated.  
Against such arguments, a growing number of scholars have made the case that explanation 
based on causal antecedents cannot account for the emergence and development of 
revolutionary situations (Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2012; Kurzman, 2004a, 2012) or, 
more broadly, many other instances of social and political transformation (Jasper and 
Duyvendak, 2015; Sewell, 2005). A central claim here is that certain situations are sufficiently 
different from “normal times” to require specific empirical and theoretical analysis (della 
Porta, 2016). Scholars differ in their assessment of whether there is an ontic discontinuity 
that does not allow for the application of social-scientific modes of causal explanation 
(Kurzman, 2004b), if a mode of theoretical explanation specific to those situations of crisis is 
required (Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2012; Dobry, 1986), or if one needs an altogether 
different approach in social theory that accords greater space to agency and structural 
transformation (Jasper and Duyvendak, 2015; Sewell, 2005). While these contributions are 
substantially different, a notion common to all of them is that the situations under question, 
whether revolutionary ones or a broader category of transformative events, entail much 
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greater latitude for agency than usual, as they are marked by conditions in which social 
structure becomes less binding and orienting – a condition variously conceptualized as 
uncertainty (Kurzman, 2004b), de-structure (Sewell, 1992), structural fluidity (Bennani-
Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2012), or the intensification of strategic action dilemmas (Jasper and 
Duyvendak, 2015). As proponents of one perspective summarize, ‘revolutions and other 
political outcomes must be traced through micro-level, cultural, and strategic interactions, 
because initial conditions are never enough’ (Jasper and Volpi, 2017a, p. 25).  
For the purposes of this thesis, these interventions are taken as arguments in support of the 
claim that causal antecedents, while providing important conditions of possibility for 
revolutionary situations, do not offer sufficient explanation for them, including in the Tunisia 
case. Moreover, these approaches, by emphasizing the importance of protest experience 
including by participants without prior engagement in activism, also appear to make space 
for an analysis of the role played by members of subaltern groups in revolutionary situations 
and social transformation. Finally, these interventions share an insistence that research 
seeking to explore these situations requires empirical, and where possible ethnographic, 
work that can understand and account for the “lived experience” of those who participated 
in them. The following section looks at a literature that seeks to develop such “processual” 
or “eventful” accounts of the Tunisian revolution.  
 
Processual and Transformation Perspectives 
This section reviews studies that deal with the revolutionary process in Tunisia. They explore 
in detail how RMM was created, addressing issues such as how the geographical spread of, 
diversity of participants in, and the increasing politicization of protest were brought about. 
Some have a comparative lens, but many are single case studies. The contributions discussed 
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in this section are theoretically diverse, but most draw either on a variant of Social Movement 
Theory (SMT),4 Strategic Interactionism Perspectives (SIP), or on the French Sociology of 
Revolutionary Situations (SRS), which takes its main inspiration from Dobry (1983, 1986). The 
section discerns two main explanatory patterns. One, less developed, looks at dynamics of 
various social groups’ politicization in the later stages of the revolutionary process, mostly by 
emphasizing “transformative events” (Sewell, 2005).  
Another pattern, more dominant in the scholarship, asserts that the initial protests in Sidi 
Bouzid and its environs established two key transformations and dynamics which, through 
their subsequent intensification and extensification, explain the emergence of RMM. First, a 
strategic representation, mostly by cyber-activists, of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
and subsequent events bridged cleavages and convinced previously uninvolved people to 
join protests. Second, initial events are claimed to have activated networks of activists, 
mostly grassroots trade unionists, who organized further protests which, in turn, led to an 
increase in base pressure that gradually drew regional and then national UGTT structures 
into the struggle. In what follows, this second pattern is treated first, as it emerged earlier 
and partially influences later accounts.  
Some scholars arguing along this latter line hold that, though the ‘majority of protesters were 
youth form the popular quarters’ (Allal and Geisser, 2011b, p. 64), UGTT, first on the level of 
local union members and ultimately through its national leadership, supported, protected, 
connected, and politicized the mobilization in 2010-11 sufficiently to create RMM in Tunisia 
(ibid., pp. 66-7). Such accounts claim that UGTT’s gradual assumption of a leadership role in 
 
4 While some hold that SMT is an inherently structuralist perspective that is incapable of developing 
agentic and processual explanations (e.g. Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Jasper, 2010; Kurzman, 2004b), 
the contributions reviewed in this section coming from an SMT perspective draw on elements of it 
such as emotions, framing, and collective identity which proponents of the SIP take on board (Jasper 
and Duyvendak, 2015; Jasper and Volpi, 2017b). Moreover, it appears difficult to argue that, at least 
in its later iterations (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011; McAdam et al., 2001), SMT is not full of dynamics 
and processes. 
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the struggle as well as the convergence of the diverse opposition forces were sufficient to 
create a revolutionary coalition which bridged existing social divides (Alexander, 2011; Ly 
Netterstrøm, 2016; O’Brien, 2015; Penner-Angrist, 2013). Some submit that this was 
achieved by a vanguard of radical trade unionists and activists from the banned communist 
party (del Panta, 2019). Others, noting the origin of unrest in popular quarters, hold that it 
was chiefly cyber-activists who, by diffusing shocking images of the 8 to 9 January violence in 
Kasserine, managed to connect and politicize previously largely isolated, socio-economic 
protests (Chouikha and Gobe, 2011). Such arguments stress that cyber-activism led to 
improved information flows during the Tunisian revolution compared to previous episodes 
of contestation (Axford, 2011; Chomiak and Entelis, 2011; Wulf et al., 2013). Others have 
emphasized the intersection of social and new satellite media, most notably Al Jazeera, in 
diffusing information during the revolution (Rane and Salem, 2012).  
A notable issue in these studies is that their claims for the leadership role of the respective 
activist communities which they foreground are only weakly grounded in empirical research. 
Indeed, none of them are based on detailed ethnographic study. Their accounts are thus 
problematic, seeing as “processual” and “eventful” arguments on the development of 
revolutionary situations need to be developed based on understanding the lived experience 
of participants. This is not necessarily helped by combining the arguments to claim that revolt 
was transformed into a national revolution through tactics of mobilization contributed by 
UGTT activists, alongside the framing of the struggle in terms of dignity by cyber activists 
(Zemni, 2015a). Indeed, there are no more than three main studies to date using 
ethnographic research to establish claims on how exactly activists purportedly organized, 
spread, and politicized protest during the revolutionary process in Tunisia. Given the 
centrality of these studies, they will now be reviewed in greater detail.  
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Arguments on the efficacy of the cyber-activist community are developed empirically in Lim’s 
much-cited study (2013). Her key claim is that cyber-activists successfully bridged social 
divides and facilitated street protests because they spread ‘dramatic visual evidence that 
turned a local incident into a spectacle […and produced] a master narrative that culturally 
and politically resonated with the entire population’ (ibid, p. 921). She takes this to answer 
her central question: Why did protests spread across Tunisia in the revolution when they had 
remained localized to Gafsa two years earlier? The protagonist in this account is a distant 
cousin of Mohamed Bouazizi. He ‘skillfully amplified the burning body story by […] adding 
these two ingredients – a university graduate and a slap – […] convince[ing] the country that 
the uprising in Sidi Bouzid was a fight for justice […thus] distancing it from the notion of 
“bread riots” […which] was very important in mobilizing Tunisians, especially the urban 
middle-class youth in more affluent regions’ (ibid, pp. 927-8). Lim notes that the diffusion of 
this “master frame” relied on a “hybrid network” combining social media, satellite TV, and 
mobile phones. As cyber-activists connected these infrastructures, information flowed freely 
and ‘had a direct influence on the proliferation of protests. As information travelled from one 
place to another, Sidi Bouzid's struggle for justice, freedom, and dignity journeyed with it […] 
reproducing the protests’ (ibid, p. 936).  
This key account was amplified by Breuer et al. (2015) who contributed their own fieldwork 
and claim that cyber-activists from Tunis broke the media blackout by travelling to the 
interior and providing on-the-ground coverage of events.5 They similarly hold that the 
"emotional mobilization" through images of regime atrocities ‘led to the formation of a 
national collective identity supportive of protest […which] facilitated a large “cycle of 
protest”’ (ibid, pp. 766). From a theoretical standpoint, these arguments on diffusion raise 
questions about the leader-centrism and voluntarism of “framing entrepreneurs” to whose 
 
5 According to my own interviews, the information which the Tunis cyber-activist community diffused 
was overwhelmingly sourced online, while only two of its members travelled to the interior before 14 
January. 
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“smart ideas” others cannot help but respond with protest, as well as elements of 
technological determinism and a certain “hydraulic” notion of how ideas travel which these 
arguments entail (see Chalcraft, 2017 for a critique along these lines). Empirically, it is worth 
noting that the above studies are based on two (Lim, 2013) and four (Breuer et al., 2015) 
interviews with cyber-activists only – alongside social media data, for which it is hard to 
establish who read it and what effect it had outside the online community. This is hardly 
enough to support claims that it was their activity which convinced the entire country to 
engage in revolutionary struggle.  
The empirical basis of arguments on the efficacy of radical union members is somewhat 
stronger. Here, the key reference is the contribution by Hmed (2012) who provides an 
ethnographic account of “lived experience” during the first days of the revolution. He begins 
by showing that initial demonstrations in the city of Sidi Bouzid were marked by a separation 
between night-time “riots” of economically marginalized “neighborhood youth” and largely 
peaceful daytime demonstrations of “precarious middle classes” which involved ‘members 
of the banned political parties involved in local chapters of the sole union [UGTT]’ (ibid, p. 
37). It is the linking of these two groups which he holds explains the “local revolutionary 
process”. He claims that, though youth brought in crucial knowledge of their quarters for 
fighting the police, local trade unionists provided two tactics that were vital to guarding ‘the 
movement from being surrounded and geographically confined’ (ibid, p. 39), and which they 
had learned from the uprising in the Gafsa mining basin.  
The first tactic was to organize more demonstrations in Sidi Bouzid as well as to convince 
contacts in other local union branches to do the same. This, Hmed claims, citing a trade 
unionist in Menzel Bouzaiane, led to the first confrontations between youth and security 
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forces in that town during which two protesters died (ibid, p. 40).6 The second tactic, for 
which he draws on testimony by several local union members, was to “politicize Bouazizi’s 
suicide” by linking it to the region’s dire socio-economic situation – thus “generating an 
event” – and to diffuse this narrative through the media (ibid, pp. 40-42). This, he claims, was 
done by committees of activists, whose members coordinated with the youth and ‘discreetly 
instigated protests in which […they made] the connection between social and political 
demands’ by supplying slogans and tactics of mobilization (ibid, pp. 45-48). Thus, Hmed’s 
argument is that grassroots trade unionists provided effective leadership to a nascent 
revolutionary movement by organizing, spreading, and politicizing protest, as well as by 
forging the crucial link between night-time “riots” by subaltern youth and more middle-class 
protests during the day. It merits pointing out that he corroborates these key activities only 
through interviews with trade unionists and one with the same cousin of Mohamed Bouazizi 
who featured in the above accounts on cyber-activists.   
Hmed’s study strongly influenced the literature on the Tunisian revolution and is, together 
with the work of pre-eminent UGTT scholar Hèla Yousfi, the principal source referenced by 
scholars claiming an organizing and leadership role for trade union activists prior to the Sfax 
general strike. Yousfi makes the broader claim that ‘in the absence of a leadership […] trade 
unionists furnished the physical, organizational, and political resources that permitted the 
progressive transformation of a spontaneous uprising into a revolutionary process’ (2015a, 
p. 96). While she agrees that they did not “start the movement”, the overall function of the 
trade unionists in the revolutionary process is described by her as “framing” (encadrement), 
which she defines as ‘the politicization of the movement, the coordination between the 
different groups of actors […] and the mediation with the different union and political 
authorities’ (ibid, p. 63). Aside from her own interviews with UGTT members and leaders, she 
 
6 It merits noting that this claim, that trade unionists managed to spread protests from Sidi Bouzid to 
other locations, is the most frequently cited finding of the study, and is backed only by a single 
interview. It will be contested in this thesis since I was unable to confirm it in my own interviews.  
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references Hmed (2012) to support her claims, holding ‘union dynamics that initiated at Sidi 
Bouzid spread to other regions (Yousfi, 2015b, p. 324).  
She also holds that it was only after the killings in Thala and Kasserine that the situation 
reached “a point of no return”, as mounting base pressures finally swayed the members of 
the UGTT executive committee to decide, on 11 January, that constituent union branches 
could call for regional general strikes (2015a, pp. 71–3). She quotes the UGTT deputy 
secretary general, who stated that ‘following the repression in Kasserine, we broke away 
from the social partnership state of mind and clearly moved to the political level’ (2015b, p. 
325). Based on the arguments of Hmed and Yousfi, scholars have come to assign a pivotal 
overall role to UGTT in the revolutionary process. This chimes with findings on the weakness 
of other civil society and opposition groups under Ben Ali (Camau and Geisser, 2003; Hibou, 
2011a; Hudáková, 2019), meaning that there was simply “no other force available”.7 
However, this explanation for the creation of RMM – especially in light of the weakness of 
others – entails very strong claims on what local trade unionists and the resources they 
commanded were able to achieve. Finally, the studies empirically corroborating these claims 
do so only through interviews with trade unionists, disallowing for conclusive assessment of 
whether subalterns without prior activist experience would confirm their leadership role. 
A different explanatory pattern is found in those perspectives which place less emphasis on 
leadership through activist agencies but foreground “transformative events” instead. This is 
the case for della Porta’s two major studies (2014a, 2016) comparing the Arab uprisings to 
democratization in Eastern Europe and aiming ‘to understand the specific mechanisms of 
eventful democratization’ (2014a, p. 23). She characterizes events as situations in which 
 
7 This was quite different from the situation in Egypt where scholars have shown that the fall of 
Mubarak was preceded by a “decade of protest” in the course of which various opposition movements 
that came to play an important role in the revolutionary process there took shape, built mobilizing 
capacity, and bridged divides by engaging in joint mobilizations, some of which will be discussed below 
(see e.g. Abdelrahman, 2013, 2015; Clarke, 2011; El-Ghobashy, 2012; Mahmood, 2012; Shehata, 2012; 
Shorbagy, 2007; Singerman, 2013). 
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‘structural constraints are, if not overcome, at least weakened by the very capacity of 
mobilization to quickly transform relations [… so that] the event is strongly constitutive of 
identities’ (ibid, pp. 19, 63). Della Porta (2016) identifies three sets of cognitive, emotional, 
and relational mechanisms that produce these effects, specifying them as “framing in action” 
based on ideas about participatory and deliberative democracy, “emotional prefiguration” 
that reduces fear and creates a sense of empowerment, and “time intensification” that leads 
to an accelerated formation of individual and organizational ties (ibid, pp. 22-23).  
In the Tunisian case, she holds that a unifying cognitive framing resulted from an 
accumulation of opposition-cooperation prior to the revolutionary process (ibid, pp. 296-8), 
but gives prominence to emotional shifts through moral shocks during the latter. She claims 
that moral shocks produced by the killing of demonstrators, especially in Kasserine, marked 
a “point of no return” that, in turn, created momentum and helped to overcome fear. In this 
way, protests were radicalized, politicized and drew in new groups, especially youth in the 
capital (ibid, pp. 275-6, 300-1). Finally, she briefly mentions that time was intensified in street 
battles as well as through “revolutionary euphoria” (ibid, p. 305). Thus, her explanation for 
the radicalization and spread of protests in Tunisia is based primarily on emotional dynamics. 
Specifically, she draws on an argument developed in her case studies on Eastern Europe (ibid, 
pp. 117-27), whereby repression ‘backfired, producing anger rather than fear’ which, 
alongside outrage and hope, ‘contributed to fuel rebellion, up to the breakdown of the 
regimes’ (ibid, p. 118). However, she does not provide empirical details on how these 
emotional mechanisms led to RMM in Tunisia.  
Other scholars have embarked on developing the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings 
(Jasper and Volpi, 2017b) by drawing on the emerging Strategic Interactionist Perspective 
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(SIP).8 A detailed study of cases in North Africa including Tunisia from an SIP is found in Volpi 
(2016), who states that he ‘places the protest event, as a potentially “transformative event”, 
first in the causal narrative’ (ibid, p. 14). He underlines that, protest spreading from the city 
of Sidi Bouzid to surrounding areas over the first ten days of the revolutionary process were 
“un-revolutionary” as they did not entail challenges to the regime, remaining focused instead 
on socio-economic demands (ibid, pp. 77-79). He submits that a revolutionary situation only 
emerged in the first two weeks of January when security forces deployed lethal force against 
socio-economic protests in the governorates of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, and the national 
UGTT began to openly criticize the regime’s tactics (ibid, p. 100). Based on these 
developments, he claims that the decisive transformation was brought about when ‘new 
media […] facilitated the emergence of a new discourse about “revolution” that formalized 
and advertised the transformative nature of these protests’, concluding that ‘the increased 
level of material and discursive confrontation between the protesters and the regime led to 
a qualitative shift in the articulation of the protest’ (ibid, p. 101).  
Volpi’s main explanation, then, is not so much in terms of agency but of an efficacy of 
contingent sets of interactions that make a transformative event, which in turn produces 
information that, if spread, also spreads its “transformative nature”. Indeed, for Volpi, ‘it is 
not so much that actors create revolutions, as that revolutions create actors’ (ibid, p. 16). 
Others have echoed this claim, stating that overall conditions of fluidity and innovation 
during the revolutionary process led to a “collective psychological transformation”, so that it 
is ‘not the revolutionaries who make the revolution, but the inverse’ (Hmed, 2011, p. 17). 
However, neither account provides empirical detail or theoretically founded arguments as to 
 
8 While this major edited volume does not contain an empirical study of Tunisia, one of the 
contributors does underline the importance of emotional dynamics for the case of Egypt 
(Khosrokhavar, 2017). 
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how the transformative power of these events came about – or indeed how it worked itself 
out to produce revolutionary consciousness.  
Only loosely fitting with the perspective of “eventfulness”, Allal (2012a, 2012b, 2013) traces 
how experiences of resistance and protest on the level of individuals and small groups prior 
to the revolution shaped their engagement in the revolutionary process. While his arguments 
are thus principally in terms of causal anteriorities, he also searches for transformations 
during the revolutionary process. He finds that, for a middle-class former RCD member, ‘the 
photos […] of the mutilated bodies of young men brutalized during the events in Thala and 
Kasserine on January 8 and 9, 2011, were what ultimately pushed her to turn to collective 
protest’ (Allal, 2013, p. 195). He also looks at ‘categories of the subaltern population’ (Allal, 
2012a, p. 66), including the participation of youth from two popular quarters in Tunis. 
Building on their experience of police violence, often at football matches, and drawing on 
informal networks of friendships as well as forging new links with neighboring quarters, Allal 
discusses how these youth battled with the police, came to “hold the quarter”, and establish 
themselves as “real men” and “revolutionaries” in the process (2012b, 2012a). However, he 
does not detail how this constituted the crucial “transition to politics” (passage au politique) 
of those youth who were lacking prior activist experience. Instead, he concludes that ‘social 
interaction at the neighborhood and family-level, the (inter)play between generations, the 
memories of past protests, and/or the experience of police repression all constitute […] 
mainsprings of engagement in the "Revolution"’ (Allal, 2012a, p. 76). While these are 
important factors and his are the only ethnographic studies investigating the participation of 
subaltern youth in the revolution, he ultimately does not conceptualize or offer much detail 
on how their agency contributed to transformative dynamics in the revolutionary process.  
Finally, by far the most comprehensive chronicle of the events in Tunisia between 17 
December 2010 and the flight of Ben Ali is Salmon’s (2016) study of the 29 jours de revolution 
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(29 days of revolution). Salmon discusses events between 3 and 11 January in Kasserine, 
Regueb, and Thala at length as the passage from “revolt to uprising” (ibid, pp. 191-219). In 
his concluding chapter, he also echoes the claim that the bloody repression of protests there 
centrally facilitated the decision of the regional UGTT in Sfax to call for a general strike (ibid, 
p. 299). Deciding consciously to stay on the side of descriptive historiography, however, he 
holds with Foucault that the actions of those who risked their lives in the protests in the 
interior were “finally inexplicable” (ibid, pp. 218-9). Still, his study provides important insights 
into phases of the revolutionary process which empirical research has thus far largely 
sidelined. In so doing, he adds to the narrative attention which several earlier publications 
by Tunisian researchers had sought to draw to the events in Kasserine, Regueb, and Thala 
(Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; Aloui, 2012; Guessoumi, 2012). 
The scholarship developing a “processual” or “eventful” account of the Tunisian revolution 
can be said to make two overarching arguments, assigning transformative developments, 
first, to the agency of various groups of activists or, second, to protest events. The first 
account holds that activists, having learnt from previous struggles, most notably the 2008 
revolt in the Gafsa mining basin, established dynamics of mobilization which succeeded in 
turning local, class-divided, and socio-economic protests into RMM. Two explanatory 
pathways are offered: either local grassroots trade unionists or the online activities of local 
and Tunis-based activists worked successfully to connect and politicize initial protests. They 
then managed to spread those protests to new localities and social groups by ways of a 
“gradual capture of UGTT” or “a resonant framing and diffusion of information”, respectively. 
While contingent events and factors are added along these pathways, the explanatory 
account in both cases is firmly in terms of a leadership role played by groups of activists. 
Crucially, the relevant dynamics were established by those activists over the first days of 
protest in Sidi Bouzid, so that developments later in the revolutionary process are taken to 
be brought about by an extensification of those dynamics – reaching new localities and social 
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groups – while leading simultaneously to their intensification – providing more “base 
pressure” (UGTT argument) or “shocking information” (cyber-activist argument). Given the 
importance of these arguments in the literature, their relatively thin ethnographic basis 
deserves scrutiny as they establish their key claims based on interviews with members of the 
respective activist groups alone. Thus, they leave unexplored whether those allegedly led by 
them, notably diverse members of subaltern groups, would concur with such an analysis.  
The second group of accounts gives prominence to events later in the revolutionary process, 
most notably those of 8 and 9 January in Kasserine, Regueb, and Thala. Here, it is held that 
political radicalization and the spread of protest to the coastal cities was precipitated by the 
“moral shocks” and “revolutionary discourses in the media” which these events produced 
through the extreme violence they entailed. Problematically, transformative effects and 
creativity seem to disappear altogether into “the event” as we do not learn how those events 
were, in turn, brought about through human agency. Moreover, these accounts do not 
provide empirically grounded arguments for how such transformative effects materialized, 
ultimately relegating them to relatively abstract dynamics of emotions and the diffusion of 
information. Thus, while it provides plenty of indication that events later in the revolutionary 
process mattered, the scholarship to date does not develop empirically grounded arguments 
for how this might have been the case. The noted exception are the massacres of Thala and 
Kasserine which are held to have been relevant as a final swaying of UGTT leaders. 
Finally, and particularly pertinent to this thesis, diverse members of subaltern groups not 
already involved in politics figure, at best, as youth making their own “transition to politics” 
late in the revolutionary process (Allal, 2012b). In the main, however, they are held to 
become relevant beyond their own “riots” only once they have been stitched into “the 
people” through the leadership of activists or the transformative force of events beyond their 
control. In other words, the agency and experience of subalterns, particularly those living 
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outside of Sidi Bouzid or Tunis, are taken to merely “fuel” a revolutionary process already set 
in motion, but do not contribute identifiable transformative agency and dynamics of their 
own. Thus, they become once more ‘”those that history passed by" […] in favor of "big 
history" - that of the "big men”’ (Allal, 2012a, p. 76), even if in the accounts reviewed here, 
subaltern self-activity and experience must give way not just to “big” union leaders and 
military officers, but to more “medium-sized” activists and events. The scholarship reviewed 
thus far, then, leaves largely unexplored the role of subaltern social groups in the 
revolutionary process in general, and particularly between the initial protests in Sidi Bouzid 
and the 12 January general strike in Sfax.  
 
Critical Perspectives on Subaltern Politics 
Are we to conclude from this that members of subaltern social groups – outside a handful of 
grassroots trade unionists – did not contribute significant agency to the creation of a 
revolutionary situation in Tunisia? In the chapter so far, we have heard of “riots” that 
developed independently of mobilization by activists in the popular quarters of provincial 
cities as well as in the capital. Some mentioned that members of subaltern groups fought the 
police, contributing knowledge of their urban terrain and experiences with clashes from 
football matches, or small-scale networks of friends that aided in their mobilization. But with 
the exception of Allal (2012b) we do not learn much about the lifeworlds of subalterns or the 
ways in which they moved from resistance to national politics during the revolution. In the 
above accounts, their agency does not figure in any of the crucial transformations which 
turned localized, sectorized, and socio-economic protests into RMM. A “transition to politics” 
by the masses as a necessary element of RMM is held to be subject to outside intervention 
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in their lives, either through the agency of activists or through depersonalized events.9 The 
contribution by members of subaltern groups, it appears, was to supply bodies – living ones 
to create masses to be led, or dead ones providing moral shocks. But what about the socio-
cultural fabric of their lives, their aspirations, as well as their experiences, actions and (dare 
we say) critical agency before and during the revolutionary process? Did none of it matter? 
To approach these questions, this section reviews a final group of studies which specifically 
seek to explore the role of subaltern politics in the Arab uprisings. This scholarship is 
informed by diverse, but mostly critical perspectives ranging from Marxist and most notably 
Gramscian to postcolonial and poststructuralist theory. Most focus on Egypt, but the 
contributions by Bayat and Tripp which will be reviewed first also investigate Tunisia.  
Asef Bayat, adding to earlier work on a “post-Islamist turn” (1996, 2007), contributed 
significantly to the study of subaltern politics in the Middle East through a series of 
publications which he summarized in Life as Politics (2010). He argues that the “political 
street” of the Arab world allows ‘the relatively new subaltern of the neoliberal city’ to engage 
in what he conceptualizes as “nonmovements”, ‘the collective actions of noncollective 
actors’ (ibid, pp. 12, 14). These are non-ideologically driven practices of everyday life 
common to millions of subalterns who remain fragmented and do not typically involve 
protest, thus remaining “quiet” (ibid, pp. 19-20). The effect of nonmovements is twofold. If 
left undisturbed, they progressively and quietly “encroach” on resources such as public space 
or urban services for economic benefit and for attaining degrees of cultural and political 
autonomy ‘in a quest for an informal life’ (ibid, pp. 56-59). However, when their cumulative 
advances are threatened, subalterns activate “passive networks” ‘established by a tacit 
recognition of their common identity […in] real and virtual space’ which allow for collective 
 
9 The exception is, again, the studies by Allal (2012b, 2012a). However, he only investigates this for the 
cases of two popular quarters in Tunis where he pinpoints the decisive “transition to politics” to the 
moment when, on 13 January, the young men he studies developed the revolutionary ambition to 
“take the quarter” (from the police), and thus after the creation, with the 12 January general strike in 
Sfax, of RMM on a national level. 
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resistance (ibid, p. 63). Thus, ‘what mediates between passive networks and possible 
collective action is a common threat’ (ibid, p. 24). Bayat, makes clear that Middle Eastern 
subalterns were far from politically insignificant, as their “street politics” frequently force 
responses from authorities. Moreover, in larger and possibly revolutionary episodes of 
contention, ‘nonmovements […] burst collectively into the open once they [find] a political 
opportunity’ (ibid, p. 250). The latter, he holds, is typically produced by the agency of more 
middle-class groups in conjuncture with international factors (2010, chaps. 12, 13).  
In his interventions on the Arab uprisings, Bayat focusses on understanding their particular 
form which he defined as ‘“refo-lutions”, that is ‘revolutionary movements that wished to 
compel the incumbent regimes to reform themselves’ (Bayat, 2013a). To this end, he 
introduced the distinction between “revolution as movement” and “revolution as change” 
and submits that a scholarly focus on the former had ‘served to obscure […] a key anomaly 
of these revolutions: they enjoyed enormous social prestige, but lacked administrative 
authority; they achieved a remarkable degree of hegemony, but did not actually rule’ (Bayat, 
2013b). In Revolution without Revolutionaries (2017), his main purpose is to explain those 
outcomes, attributing them to the lack of a revolutionary leadership and ideology under 
conditions of neoliberal hegemony. He also engages in a discussion of subalterns in the 
revolutionary process by suggesting that it was primarily “neoliberal urbanity” which led to 
the ‘formation of dissent, the raw material for the Arab uprisings’ (ibid, p. 96). In this context, 
subalterns formed passive networks that facilitated their collective resistance, so that 
‘squares represent the spatial locus and political form of subaltern struggle in the Arab 
revolutions’ (ibid, p. 112).  
In Tunisia, he points out that subalterns formed ‘innumerable small […] cliques (shillas) 
[…which] generated alternative norms and narratives’, giving the example of ‘unemployed 
youth who […] carried out subversive actions against the police and local authorities’ (ibid, 
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pp. 140-1). Noting in addition resistance by workers, farmers, and bloggers, Bayat finds that 
‘these largely disparate voices and practices seemed to coalesce [… forming] the backbone 
of what came to be known as the Arab Spring’ (ibid, p. 143). The chapter discussing Radical 
Impulses of the Social states that ‘young activists of the new Arab public played a critical role 
in initiating the uprisings […but] subaltern acts of claim making in the social domain 
radicalized those otherwise nonradical revolutions’ (ibid, p. 179). However, he discusses such 
dynamics of subaltern self-activity exclusively for the period after the fall of Ben Ali, leaving 
the contribution of their self-activity for the creation of RMM in Tunisia unexplored.10 
While the discussion of Egypt in this chapter similarly focuses more on dynamics after the fall 
of Mubarak (2017, chap. 9), it provides more detail on RMM and the role of subalterns in it. 
Here, Bayat reiterates his earlier position on the mediational role of the middle-classes for 
bringing subalterns into larger episodes of mobilization. The account follows that in an earlier 
article in which he suggested that subalterns ‘avoid direct involvement in large-scale 
uprisings, the nature of which they do not comprehend, [however] the "middle-class poor" 
[…] tend to engage in and lead others to these broader revolts’ (Bayat, 2015, p. S31). He 
develops this claim by discussing events in Cairo, where 
the very poor preferred to stay away […] For them, revolution was too abstract to capture its dynamics. 
They would rather get engaged in the local struggles that they found manageable and meaningful […It 
was] the "middle-class poor" […who] linked the local struggles of their dispossessed parents, relatives, 
and neighbors to the […] cyberspace, associational activism, and the main streets. […Still,] when the 
police retreated and disappeared from the public arenas on January 28, the "revolution was over for 
the poor". (ibid, p. S37) 
 
10 Indeed, the book is much richer in ethnographic detail on Egypt than it is on Tunisia. This is 
understandable since most of Bayat’s previous research was on Iran and Egypt. However, this leads 
him at times to transpose explanations well-grounded in the Egyptian case to the Tunisian revolution, 
as exemplified in the claim on the role of youth activists and urbanity. While his contributions are 
highly suggestive, he leaves the central question of this thesis on the role of subaltern self-activity in 
creating RMM largely unexplored for the case of Tunisia.  
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In Bayat’s work, then, we find rich arguments on the interplay of subaltern self-activity and 
politics. Emphasizing nonmovements and neoliberal urbanity, his contributions are 
suggestive for thinking about how the lifeworlds, experiences and capacity of subalterns 
played into the revolutionary processes in Tunisia and Egypt. However, and partially owing 
to his focus on “revolution as change”, he leaves largely unaddressed the central question of 
concern to this thesis, namely how their self-activity contributed to the creation of RMM in 
Tunisia. Giving a suggestive pointer, he notes that one may want to explore how ‘protesters 
became “revolutionary” mainly when they experienced the power of mass protest 
[…inducing] a sudden shift in consciousness’ (Bayat, 2017, p. 165).  
This latter aspect is given more prominence by Tripp. His (2013) detailed study of the Middle 
East grounds subaltern politics in resistance against systems of exclusion from the colonial 
period to the present, discussing, aside from more organized forms of industrial activism and 
armed movements, resistance in “everyday” practices of economic life, urban space, and 
gender, as well as in cultural forms through conceptions of history and the arts. He finds that, 
while ‘not hav[ing] an explicitly political aim’, such dispersed forms of everyday resistance 
may ‘feed into […] more general and public politics of contention’ (ibid, pp. 10, 312). Building 
on this work, he proposes that the Arab uprisings can be understood as a “performative 
politics” where ‘resistance followed the capillary forms of power itself […and for which] the 
ground had long been prepared […] by years of quiet encroachment and not so quiet 
resistance’  (2014, pp. 135, 137).  
The decisive difference to those prior forms of resistance came about, according to Tripp, 
when people drew on these experiences to ‘form an activist public, re-appropriating public 
space’ (ibid, p. 140). Tripp holds that it was physical co-presence in urban space and joint 
performance of acts of resistance which led to “self-discovery” of this activist and rights-
bearing public as ‘a new kind of political actor’, making it an act of “self-constitution” (ibid, 
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p. 141). However, he concludes that, while this assertion of a ‘common political identity as 
citizens’ temporarily overcame existing forms of difference (ibid, p. 148), the leaderless way 
in which it came about meant that this achievement was difficult to sustain. Substantiating 
his arguments further for the case of the Tunisia, Tripp (2015) traces the lineages of artistic 
and urban forms of resistance prior to the revolution. He finds that these dynamics created 
“radical ideas” which, together with ‘bodily performances and engagement became marked 
features of the Tunisian revolution, helping […] in the construction of public space and the 
emerging consciousness of the public' (ibid., p. 14). In Tripp, we thus find a highly inspiring 
account of how the self-activity of joint resistance – without mediation by activists or leaders 
– led to the “self-constitution” of a collective subject. For the earlier stages of the Tunisian 
revolutionary process, however, we may wonder about the centrality he assigns to urban 
space in bringing about these developments.    
Adopting a similar urban focus, Ismail submits contra Bayat that ‘the political agency of 
subaltern forces is not merely reactive […but builds on] everyday forms of organization and 
modes of governance […that] furnish mobilizational resources, and generate shared 
understandings and feelings that constitute the oppositional subject’ (Ismail, 2013, p. 878). 
She draws on her earlier studies where she found that such “oppositional subjects” were 
formed in the popular quarters of Cairo. This resulted from neoliberal governmentality, 
experienced by urban subalterns above all in the form of forceful and arbitrary policing, 
giving rise not only to a deep sense of humiliation undermining notions of masculinity, 
especially among the youth, but simultaneously producing resisting subjects (Ismail, 2006, 
2011). Hence, she holds that, for those groups, engagement in the revolution was essentially 
one “against the police”, leading her to conclude that  ‘the collective subject of the revolution 
was constituted in the coming together of social forces and individuals formed as 
oppositional subjects in interaction with the police’ (Ismail, 2012, p. 458). In this process, 
‘territorialized and localized […] resistance [of the popular quarters was…] articulated with 
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the national project of transformation’ (Ismail, 2013, p. 873). She provides ethnographic 
description for how the experience in battling the police which football ultras contributed 
was important to the success of the revolutionary mobilization (see also Dorsey, 2012; 
Gunning and Baron, 2014, pp. 174–81). Although her argument rests on an anterior 
formation of collective subjects and is tied to an urban context, her contributions are highly 
suggestive for understanding the role of Tunisian subalterns in creating RMM. This pertains, 
for instance, to how confrontations between young men from subaltern groups and the 
police may have contributed to a revolutionary transformation of the struggle.    
De Smet also analyses the role of subaltern social groups in the Egyptian revolution, although, 
in a more classical Marxist sense, he holds that it is the proletariat which ‘transcends its 
economic outlook and develops into a political force’ (De Smet, 2012, p. 142). He proposes 
that by looking at the ‘development of subaltern self-determination, self-consciousness, and 
self-organization […we can understand the revolutionary situation as] an explosive and 
salient moment within a protracted, molecular process of "economic" strikes and "political" 
protests that stretched back to the early 2000s’ (De Smet, 2014, p. 12). Centre-stage in this 
process is what he terms ‘dialectical pedagogy: a continuous exchange between 
“intellectuals” and the “masses”’ (De Smet, 2012, p. 142).11 Such a process, he claims, had 
mostly unfolded in Egypt prior to the revolution through a series of strike actions resisting 
neoliberal economic development in the context of which ‘intellectuals […] offered the 
emerging worker Subject […] forms of assistance […and] enabled workers to imagine 
themselves as a coherent working class’ (ibid, p. 149). While demands had remained socio-
economic in kind, it was through ‘the “school” of revolutionary insurrection […in which] the 
 
11 De Smet develops a complex combination of the pedagogical theories of Vygotsky with the 
Gramscian concept of organic intellectuals to conceive of this as a drawn-out process of “proletarian 
sociogenesis” that is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to review (cp. De Smet, 2015, chaps. 4, 
5).  
59 
 
worker Subject participated […that] political and economic protests and their Subjectivities 
became entwined’ (ibid, p. 152).  
Here, a new form of dialectical pedagogy unfolded in the context of the Tahrir occupation, in 
which ‘intellectuals [were] giving leadership and direction to the movement’ and occupiers 
‘began to discover themselves as “the people” […] which pointed toward a development in 
the[ir] consciousness […,] the formation of a popular will […,and] of the national-popular 
subject’ (De Smet, 2015, pp. 339, 342). For de Smet, then, it was through this double process 
of dialectical pedagogy involving “learning from activity” facilitated through “solidarity and 
assistance” provided by intellectuals that, first, a collective worker subject and, then, a 
national-popular one was created in Egypt in the contexts of a decade of labor struggles and 
the occupation of Tahrir square, respectively. Drawing on Luxemburg, this latter phase is also 
understood by him and his collaborators in terms of a “mass strike”, involving in the Tunisian 
context ‘the organizational work of local Union militants […and] a preponderant role of the 
lawyers [which together], were important in reframing the demands for economic justice and 
opportunities into larger questions of political freedom’ (Zemni et al., 2013, pp. 900–1). This 
emphasis on “situated learning in struggle” in the moment of the “mass strike” is evocative 
for thinking towards a more transformative subaltern engagement in revolutionary 
processes. However, the grounding of this perspective in an anterior formation of a “worker 
subject” and the necessity of intellectuals makes these contributions less fruitful for 
understanding the Tunisian case. 
Chalcraft builds on his earlier work on popular and labor history as well as questions of 
hegemonic formation in the Middle East (2005, 2009; Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007) and 
proposes a focus on subaltern social groups in the Arab uprisings. Looking at Egypt, he finds 
that ‘educated youth, the labour movement, and [formally organized groups…] have 
attracted more than their fair share of scholarly attention’, suggesting instead to explore 
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‘popular politics in Egypt’s uprising [, …particularly] the vital role played by the urban poor’ 
(Chalcraft, 2014, p. 155). He understands the historical context as a “slow-burning crisis of 
hegemony” produced by foreign-policy failures of the regime, a thinning-out of its 
antiimperialist legitimacy, an increasing cooperation of opposition forces, and an erosion of 
social protections through neoliberalism. Leading to a ‘concomitant increase in collective 
action’, this constituted ‘dominance without hegemony – a situation in which coercion 
outweighed consent’ and where there was ‘a clear sense that Egyptians were holding the 
regime responsible for their problems’ (ibid, pp. 162, 165, 167). He points out that, in these 
“enabling conditions”, an initial call for protest by activists led to a spontaneous uprising 
which, although facilitated by their horizontalist organizing, took everyone by surprise since 
‘what was decisive in the dynamics of the situation was precisely the unruly collective action 
of those who moved for the first time’ (ibid, p. 172). Tracing violations of their moral economy 
and their everyday modes of resistance, he finds that subalterns ‘turned their hitherto 
unsung plight of survivalism, inflation, stifled aspirations, male honour, police violence, and 
official corruption and indifference into the basis for, and origin of, a major political and 
historical change’ (ibid, p. 174). He concludes that their participation, inspired by the example 
of Tunisia and given an initial opening by the activists, as well as the experience they 
contributed were essential to the success of the uprising as ‘it is difficult to see how the 
barrier of fear could have been broken, the police degraded, and the army neutralized 
without it’ (ibid, p. 174).  
Elsewhere, Chalcraft argues that ‘coordination amid spontaneity’ in the Egyptian uprising was 
enabled by the “horizontalist” mode of organizing which activists espoused, allowing for 
common ground to be discovered in action, and making the uprising “leaderful” rather than 
leaderless (Chalcraft, 2012). Indeed, he finds that this ‘participatory democratic style […] 
made possible alliances between diverse and usually mutually divided groups’ as it drew in 
the labor movement and the urban poor, neither of which would have participated in an 
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uprising led in a traditional vanguardist style (Chalcraft, 2015, p. 8).12 It was in this context 
that ‘one of the most important forms of creativity [emerged…:] the on-the-spot and 
unpredetermined constitution of the people as a rights-bearing, activist, diverse, demanding, 
and sovereign subject’ (ibid, original emphasis). This unity originated ‘in the heat of the action 
[…as] new connections between […] subordinated constituencies […gave] rise to new feelings 
of empowerment, the collapse of the "wall of fear" and new forms of collective solidarity’ 
(ibid, p. 9). Leaderfulness, explosion of the poor, and situated creation of a new collective 
subject were thus important historical achievements in which subaltern self-activity was 
prominent.  
But while successfully challenging regimes weakened by crises of hegemony, he points out 
that these features produced only transient unity and purpose, that “the people” could be 
outflanked and, as in Egypt, willing to give the army a chance to rule (2014, 2015). He also 
underscores that ‘the Egyptian uprising, unlike that of Tunisia, was indeed in some measure 
planned because Tunisia had proposed a political model and tactics with it’ (2014, p. 169). 
This example was so extraordinarily inspiring because, just as in Tunisia, “hegemonic 
disincorporation”13 elsewhere had produced an “unruly latency” in the form of ‘dissenting 
constituencies […] alienated from existing forms of contained contention […who] engage in 
a search to make a wide variety of "attributions of similarity” (Chalcraft, 2017, p. 45). 
Tunisians articulated this “people/power bloc contradiction” which provided ‘a new 
diagnosis of the situation and its dominant contradictions, and […] a viable path out of a 
situation of domination […that] implied new ways of constructing what was held in common’ 
(ibid, p. 53). The contributions by Chalcraft thus provide a rich conceptual vocabulary for 
 
12 Page numbers refer to the version of this article available under http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65449/. 
This case of improper referencing was incurred due to finishing the thesis under the movement and 
library access restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
13 Disincorporation refers to a (possible) result of “hegemonic contraction”, which is understood here 
as the retraction, for whatever reason, of sites and processes of incorporation that leaves (members 
of) social groups excluded from previously established rights, benefits, etc. (cp. p. 72 below). 
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analyzing subaltern politics in revolutionary processes. Hegemonic contraction and its 
attendant unruly latency as well as leaderfulness and the construction of new solidarities and 
commonalities in the context of struggle provide important pointers for thinking about 
subaltern self-activity in the Tunisian revolution.   
Abdelrahman echoes the theme of horizontalism in her work. She had found previously that 
opposition groups in Egypt developed cross-ideological links and more decentralized modes 
of activism (Abdelrahman, 2004, 2009). This “decade of protest” led to an accumulation of 
experience and a politicization of society (Abdelrahman, 2015, pp. 69–71). She defines her 
task as investigating the ‘nexus between loose organizational structures […thus created and 
the] revolutionary process’ (Abdelrahman, 2013, p. 570). While the “absence of leadership” 
contributed to successful mass mobilization, it was also accompanied by a “hierarchy of 
struggles” as the ‘pro-democracy movement […] failed to address the concerns of the classes 
and social groups most affected by neoliberal policies’ (Abdelrahman, 2012, p. 618, also 
2015, pp. 80–85). As such, it was unable to link up with what she defines as "citizenship-
based protests”, grassroots struggles which were ‘the outcome of privatization and the 
withdrawal of the state from its traditional role of provider for low-income groups’ 
(Abdelrahman, 2013, p. 579). She stresses that unity was nonetheless achieved as ‘a 
revolutionary subject and project could well be born out of these events rather than give 
birth to them in the first place’ (Abdelrahman, 2015, p. 91). However, lacking an 
organizational mass base, this unified mobilization fragmented rapidly and allowed for ‘a 
pared down notion of revolution […as] the struggle for “freedom” […thus enabling the] elite's 
tactic of reducing Egypt's revolutionary process to an “orderly transition to democracy”’ 
(Abdelrahman, 2012, p. 626). 
In summary, then, the critical perspectives on the Arab uprisings discussed in this section 
have established a much greater role for subaltern self-activity in the revolutionary processes 
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than the scholarship reviewed before. Diverse members of subaltern social groups were 
argued to have experienced regime policies, particularly neoliberal reforms and 
securitization, in ways that differed from those of more protected – or hegemonically 
incorporated – groups. Weakening hegemony and increases in coercion apparently marked 
the lives of many subalterns, producing an “unruly latency” and leading them either to 
engage in silent forms of resistance, more audible strike actions, or actual confrontations 
with the police. These accounts stress that subalterns were not masses to be led but had 
distinct motivations to mobilize and contributed their own informal networks and 
experiences of resistance. Some scholars argue for an anterior formation of oppositional 
(collective) subjects ready to join a national revolt. Others emphasize that the coalescing 
during the revolution of subalterns with members of other social groups had a radicalizing 
effect, allowing for a performative constitution of “the people” as a new collective subject. 
Providing rich ethnographic detail from Egypt, scholars have shown that subaltern self-
activity produced vital transformations, most notably in confronting the police and breaking 
the barrier of fear. Rather than (mostly middle-class) Egyptian activists politicizing the 
crowds, it was only in interaction with subalterns that they came to espouse radical demands 
and thought beyond one-off protests. As such, these critical perspectives provide key insights 
into the question of how subaltern self-activity contributed to the creation of revolutionary 
mass mobilization (RMM) in Egypt. This poses exciting and under-researched questions 
regarding the Tunisian revolutionary process. Hegemonic contraction as well as prior 
subaltern resistance and politics clearly mattered, as we learn from Bayat. But how did this 
contribute to the dynamics of “learning in struggle” during the revolutionary process, such 
as expanding solidarities and the discovery of common ground between previously divided 
groups which scholars have pointed out in the Egyptian case? Was there a self-constitution 
of a revolutionary collective subject as Tripp suggests? If so, how and where was it achieved? 
Might subaltern self-activity in violent confrontations with the police have had 
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transformative effects, as they did in Cairo? And did subaltern agency contribute to the 
coalescing and politicization of struggles by different social groups? Given that it allows for 
these rich questions to be posed, a subaltern politics perspective clearly suggests itself as a 
theoretical optic for this thesis. With these considerations, the research question of the 
thesis can be re-formulated as: To what extent can we understand the Tunisian revolution 
from the perspective of subaltern self-activity?  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has found that existing scholarship established important insights into the 
conditions of possibility for the Tunisian revolution. Elements which this thesis will continue 
to discuss include rampant corruption, clientelism, failed developmental policies, and 
exclusion of growing numbers from state benefits, all contributing to mounting inequalities 
between coastal and interior regions and concentration of youth unemployment in the latter. 
Particularly for the subaltern youth there, the promise of social mobility through educational 
attainment was broken which, together with increased policing of their discontent, violated 
the moral economy established previously by the authoritarian social compact. Dissent 
formed concomitantly in the political and cultural fields as various groups engaged in acts of 
resistance – ranging from cyber-activists and lawyers to grassroots trade unionists and to the 
self-activity of not formally organized subalterns. However, research on the revolutionary 
process was found to be lacking in accounts of how members of diverse subaltern groups 
mobilized, moved from self-activity to politics, and contributed to the creativity and 
innovation necessary to effect crucial transformations which would turn turned localized, 
sectorized, and socio-economic protests into RMM. Explanations for those achievements 
were given by the scholarship through a leadership role played by groups of activists or made 
to disappear into transformative events and left unaccounted for in terms of human agency. 
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These explanations were argued to be unconvincing and weakly grounded in ethnographic 
research, while leaving little role for subaltern social groups other than as masses fueling a 
revolutionary machinery, the purpose of which they did not contribute to. Finally, critical and 
subaltern studies were found to address these issues, providing insights regarding the role of 
subaltern social groups in revolutionary processes. While they do not investigate 
developments in Tunisia in detail, these contributions thus suggest a viable theoretical 
framework for this thesis to address the question: To what extent can we understand the 
Tunisian revolution from the perspective of subaltern self-activity? The chapter has thus 
identified significant gaps in the scholarship and a theoretical perspective from which to 
address them. It will be the task of the following chapter to clarify this framework and 
describe the methods which undergird the research for this thesis. 
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III. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Research Process 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical perspective that informs the 
discussion of the empirical material in the rest of the thesis as well as to describe the research 
process through which this material was generated. The chapter is divided into two main 
parts. Part one provides the conceptual optics through which the thesis approaches the 
central research question on the role of subaltern self-activity in the Tunisian revolutionary 
process. To this end, it sets out a Gramscian perspective on subaltern politics that wrestles 
with questions of hegemony, possibilities for learning in struggle, and the challenges of 
subaltern self-activity in the context of revolutionary processes. Part two of the chapter 
follows on from the conceptual discussion and describes the development of the empirical 
research project as well as the methods used.  
 
III.i. Hegemony, Subalternity and Incorporation  
The theoretical framework of the thesis is rooted in a broadly Gramscian perspective 
exploring the potentials and limitations of subaltern politics through an analysis of hegemony 
“from below”, viz. as it is concretely experienced and contested, rather than through 
abstracted effects of discursive power or capitalist exploitation (e.g. Chalcraft, forthcoming, 
2016; Cox and Nilsen, 2014; Motta and Nilsen, 2011; Nilsen and Roy, 2015a; Salem, 2018). 
Hegemony constitutes the central analytical scheme in Gramsci’s thinking (Femia, 1981). It 
draws on an analytical ‘distinction between civil society and political society, between 
hegemony and dictatorship’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 271). Thus, hegemony is distinct from 
domination through force realized principally through the coercive powers of the state. 
Rather, it entails ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (ibid., p. 59) that needs to be won in the 
field of civil society. The latter is understood by Gramsci as ‘the ensemble of educational, 
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religious and associational institutions […] that create and diffuse modes of thought’, 
meaning that hegemony has a key “cultural emphasis" (Femia, 1981, pp. 24–6). As such, 
Gramsci defined the 
functions of social hegemony and political government […as, respectively,] consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental 
group […and] the apparatus of state coercive power which "legally" enforces discipline on those 
groups who do not "consent". (1971, p. 12) 
This distinction, however, is largely analytical (Femia, 1981). Ultimately, hegemony should be 
understood in terms of social “totality”, an ensemble of political, cultural, social and 
economic forces that allows us ‘to narrate the aggregate dynamics of society as a whole’ 
(Chalcraft, 2016, p. 31). Towards this end, the historical analysis in this thesis uses the 
distinction between “hegemonic formation” and coercive apparatus, foregrounding different 
aspects at different times, while emphasizing their unity in a concrete historical state.14  
In this Gramscian perspective, social groups rather than individuals constitute the “unit of 
analysis”. At the center of the hegemonic formation is the dominant group which rules in 
alliance with other social forces, forming a “historical bloc”. Hegemony, as we have seen, 
means precisely that social groups not immediately part of this dominant coalition are not 
ruled by force. Rather, the “great masses” consist precisely of those groups which are 
hegemonized – always selectively and in gradations – to win their consent. Thus, and unlike 
in the notion of social classes, social groups and the relations between them are not just 
understood in economic terms but are defined by their positions within the hegemonic 
formation. Indeed, it is precisely the degrees and nuances of hegemonic incorporation that 
define multiple social relations in terms of power and subordination, including, for instance, 
race, gender, or social status – all of which intersect in composing the “stratified categories” 
 
14 This follows Gramsci’s definition of ‘state = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony 
protected by the armour of coercion’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263).  
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of various subaltern social groups (Galastri, 2018). As such, the latter are understood here as 
a ‘wide range of groups who possess a subordinate social, political, economic, and ideological 
status […including] large, even preponderant, groups, such as the urban poor, the working 
class, the peasantry, […] slum dwellers and the unemployed’ but also women, slaves and 
minorities (Cronin, 2008a, p. 2). Importantly, the emphasis is on subaltern social positions as 
marked by a “similarity of fate” (Chalcraft, forthcoming) and thus not on an “identity effect” 
produced by systems of exclusion. ‘On the contrary, subaltern social groups are […] actively 
"included" or integrated into the hegemonic relations […and this is why it is] useful to speak 
of the "constitution" of subaltern social groups (Thomas, 2018, pp. 3–4). Subalternity, then, 
is ‘above all a positionality of adverse incorporation in a certain set of sociohistorical power 
relations’ (Nilsen and Roy, 2015b, p. 15). 
While adverse compared to others, incorporation is not without benefits to subaltern social 
groups. 15 As Gramsci notes, ‘hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests 
and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that […] the 
leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind’ (1971, p. 161). Indeed, 
others have argued that ‘hegemonic incorporation […] always involves economic [benefits 
such as…] welfare, jobs, pensions […] to win the consent of a wide variety of social groups’, 
including subaltern ones (Chalcraft, 2016, p. 34). Through economic incorporation, then, 
subalterns have a (potentially sizable) degree of their material interests met, giving them 
concrete reasons for consenting to the existing system of rule. However, hegemony also 
emphasizes cultural and political forms of integration, ranging from associational life in civil 
society to forms of political inclusion such as voting rights, that produce more than “passive 
 
15 It is on this notion of adverse incorporation that a certain distinction between different subaltern 
social groups will become apparent in the following chapters for the Tunisian context. As the section 
on “sites of enquiry and access” in this chapter discusses, most inhabitants of the economically and 
politically marginalized regions in the Tunisian interior can be regarded as “subaltern”. However, some 
are still middle-class in terms of their profession and local social status. This pertains notably to trade 
unionists, lawyers, and activists who, moreover, are distinguished from the subaltern youth by their 
access to and experience with politics – and a certain overall level of beneficial incorporation. 
69 
 
acceptance”. Rather, they are ‘bound up with the concept of “legitimacy”, with a belief that 
the demands for conformity are more or less justified’ (Femia, 1981, p. 38).  
These forms of integration importantly invoke what Gramsci referred to as "common sense", 
and which he defines as ’the traditional popular conception of the world’, or ‘the  generic 
form of thought common to a particular period and a particular popular environment’ (1971, 
pp. 199, 330). Common sense as a mode of thought is imprinted into “language itself” (ibid, 
p. 323), structuring the ways in which people are capable of conceiving, interpreting, and 
expressing their lifeworlds and experience. Through this notion of dominant conceptions of 
the world, hegemony entails an account of “mass consciousness” which is diffused by 
the institutional mechanisms through which perception is shaped - the schools, the Church, the 
conventional political parties, the mass media, even the trade unions […, so that] the very framework 
for […] analysis of the existing system is fixed by the dominant ideology […and the masses] lack the 
conceptual tools, the “clear theoretical consciousness”, which would enable them effectively to 
comprehend and act on their discontent. (Femia, 1981, p. 44) 
This does not render hegemony a veil of “false consciousness”. Rather, it draws attention to 
how material and ideal reasons which members of subordinate social groups might have for 
offering their consent to an often recognizably unequal society, are produced and maintained 
through processes of inclusion. This entails creating sites of political incorporation and 
“contained contention”, such as the parties and trade unions mentioned above, that 
constitute “hegemonic ways” in which diverse social groups, including subaltern ones, can 
voice and potentially find redress for their grievances. As Cox and Nilsen summarize, 
hegemony thus understood is about meeting 
diverse needs selectively, in ways which reinforce existing power relations […] In this complex process, 
the existing social order is variously represented and experienced as natural (unchangeable), as 
purposive (and beneficial to subaltern interests), and as legitimate (and offering a language through 
which subaltern grievances can be expressed). (2014, pp. 66–7) 
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Finally, the notion of incorporation mechanisms underlines that hegemony needs to be 
understood not as a “thing” but in terms of historically constructed processes that are subject 
to change. While it creates the structural positions of social groups, these positions require 
constant reproduction through sites and processes of incorporation. Indeed, we can 
understand the effect of these incorporation processes as defining the extent or scope of the 
hegemonic formation at any given point in time. Through them, ‘the dominant group is 
coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups […in] a 
continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
182). As will be discussed next, it is hegemony’s never seamless, perpetually unfinished, and 
always unstable nature that provides space for contention and subaltern self-activity. 
What are the bases for subaltern self-activity under conditions of hegemony? Understanding 
this begins from recognizing that, while shaping and constraining subaltern self-activity, 
hegemony is never total. Rather, it contains “fissures” (Reguillo, 2012) and gives rise to 
contradictions. This can be explored through what Gramsci described as the ‘healthy nucleus 
that exists in “common sense” […] which can be called “good sense”’ (1971, p. 328). Good 
sense is, on the one hand, a form of “practical consciousness” produced through active 
experience of the social world and its contradictions and, on the other hand, informed by 
elements of popular culture not assimilated into and frequently in contradiction with 
common sense. This latter aspect means that common sense contains not only present ruling 
ideas but “sedimentations” of older ones, such as elements of philosophies or religious ideas, 
leaving in it what Gramsci suggestively called an “infinity of traces” (1971, pp. 324–6). 
Chalcraft points out that popular culture is “necessarily fragmentary” because of these 
deposits ‘left over from previous but now defunct forms of hegemony, […meaning it] has 
different vernaculars, regional particulars, […] ambiguities, contradictions, and forms of 
relative autonomy’ (forthcoming). We can interpret such deposits as having a “dominant 
reading” which, by virtue of their only partial integration into and latent contradictions with 
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common sense, is only imperfectly fixed. This leaves them particularly open to conscious 
reinterpretation which can develop “oppositional readings” (Hall, 2006, pp. 171–3).  
Good sense idioms and stories, as it were, thus furnish a popular language which can be 
mobilized for subaltern resistance, as was shown regarding “memories of revolt” in Palestine 
(Swedenburg, 2012). This good sense present in fissures of hegemony is one important way 
in which common sense contains contradictions present in the consciousness of subaltern 
social groups. Moreover, contradictions result from and are exacerbated by the “practical 
consciousness” side of good sense. It develops through “experience” understood as 
the practical and tacit knowledge that human beings produce […] as they engage and interact with 
[…their lifeworld. It furnishes an] unruly body of half-submerged knowledge mediating between 
objectively existing conditions and social consciousness of these conditions […, that is,] “good sense” 
rooted in our actual experience, as against the hegemonic “common sense” which tells us how things 
are supposed to be (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, pp. 33–4 my emphasis). 
Good sense, then, is both based on and builds experience as conflictual with common sense, 
producing an “unruliness” that can render “dominant readings” unstable. It thus ‘exerts 
pressure upon existent social consciousness [or common sense]’ (Thompson, 1978; quoted 
in Cox and Nilsen, 2014, p. 34). This conflict between good and common sense constitutes a 
key condition of subalternity, which Gramsci conceptualized as “contradictory 
consciousness”. The subaltern, he writes, 
has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of [it…] His theoretical consciousness 
can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical 
consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity […] and one, 
superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 333). 
In the condition of contradictory consciousness, then, common sense ideas ‘which cast the 
status quo as purposive and legitimate, and, more generally, hegemonic ways of being in the 
world, are fused with the practical and often tacit subaltern experiences of an existing social 
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order as problematic’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, p. 67). This condition can be understood as an 
important source for an additional instability of common sense, thus opening possibilities for 
developing “oppositional readings”. Consciously contradictory experience of the world by 
subaltern social groups can be heightened by what Chalcraft conceptualizes as “hegemonic 
contraction”. These changes occur 
when elites […] shut down forms of participation […,] ignore existing sites of contained contention, 
reducing the possibility for the redress of grievances through authorized channels […, or withdraw] 
social and economic rights […, and thus] undermine existing forms of […] political, economic and 
discursive [incorporation…] without replacing them with satisfactory alternatives. (2016, pp. 36–7) 
Hegemonic contractions are not necessarily produced by acute crises but may result from 
dynamics aimed at maintaining or rearticulating the dominant bloc. Invariably, breakdown 
or erosion of existing sites and processes of incorporation infringes upon the rights, status, 
or benefits to which affected social groups have become accustomed. As such, they can be 
likened to violations of their “moral economy” (Thompson, 1993). Unless they are 
successfully legitimized, such violations will intensify conditions of contradictory 
consciousness as they produce further instances in which experience no longer matches, viz. 
can no longer be made sense of with, common sense. Thus, hegemonic contractions can 
produce an “unruly latency” as they give subaltern groups ‘reasons ideal and/or material to 
mobilize contentiously […and form an] enabling condition for transgressive contention’ 
(Chalcraft, 2016, p. 39, also 2017).  
However, the fissures, contractions, and good sense which could summarily be termed forms 
of hegemonic incompleteness constitute precisely that: enabling conditions for subaltern 
self-activity and politics. Even as good sense arises from consciously experienced 
contradictions and creates a potential source of hegemonic instability, its tacit, implicit, and 
unclear nature means it cannot inform a subaltern politics, especially not of a more 
contentious or transgressive kind. Indeed, such latent forms of knowledge and consciousness 
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rooted in contradictory consciousness and good sense are best understood as forming a 
‘reservoir of practical consciousness that may serve as a basis for subaltern resistance’ (Cox 
and Nilsen, 2014, p. 74). The following section elaborates a “developmental perspective” on 
subaltern politics which emphasizes how dynamics of learning might draw on and advance 
these bases for struggle.   
 
Subaltern Politics and Learning in Struggle 
A process of learning and development that widens the bases for struggle sets out from the 
many instances of subaltern resistance, ranging from its most “hidden” and everyday forms 
(Scott, 1985), to the collective actions of nonmovements (Bayat, 2010), and finally to open 
revolt and rebellion (Brown, 1990; Chalcraft, 2016; Cronin, 2008a; Thompson, 1993). With 
Gramsci, these forms of subaltern self-activity are understood as the “most spontaneous” 
that are ‘characteristic of the “history of the subaltern classes”, and indeed of their most 
marginal and peripheral elements’ (1971, p. 196).16 Considering the foregoing discussion, we 
can unpack a profoundly Gramscian understanding – central for this thesis – of much 
subaltern self-activity as “spontaneity” by conceiving of it precisely as grounded in good 
sense and contradictory consciousness. This means that self-activity has its own reasons 
rather than being irrational. It develops in response, for instance, to infringements through 
hegemonic contractions upon the rights and benefits which members of subaltern social 
groups have become accustomed to. It is also thoughtful rather than spasmodic or 
unthinking, drawing precisely on the kinds of practical and popular consciousness latently 
present in good sense. Finally, this self-activity is “knowing”, making use of the experiential 
knowledge and techniques which subalterns have developed in dealing with a contradictory 
world. Such a historically, culturally, and cognitively rich understanding of self-activity is what 
 
16 For Gramsci, this includes “spontaneous revolts” which can be the ‘result of an oppression which 
had become intolerable’ (1971, p. 199). 
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Gramsci meant when he wrote that spontaneous mobilization has its own ‘rudimentary 
elements of conscious leadership’, which, however, ‘cannot be checked’ (ibid, pp. 196-7) – 
or are, at the very least, easily overlooked.  
To sharpen the focus on these “rudimentary elements”, we can conceive of them as 
constituting a subaltern agency informed by what Cox and Nilsen suggestively term the “local 
rationalities” contained in good sense. These describe the ‘ways of being, doing and thinking 
[…] rooted in the experience of [contradictions…] that people develop in attempting to 
oppose the routines and received wisdoms that define the hegemonic elements of common 
sense […and which often have] a defensive character in opposition to attempts from above 
to reorder structures [of inclusion]’ (2014, p. 74). They give rise to struggles they term 
“militant particularism”, which develop ‘when local rationalities are transformed from tacit 
potentialities to explicitly oppositional practices deployed in […] open confrontation with a 
dominant group in a particular place and […] time in a particular conflict over a particular 
issue’ (ibid, pp. 76-7). The particularity of a struggle’s time, space, and content means that it 
can emerge in a similarly situated manner through “catalytic events” developing in the 
context of confrontations. In these situations, the ‘legitimacy of dominant power relations 
are demonstrably reversed, […so that they] raise broader questions about “official reality” 
and encourage people to think anew, to discover and articulate their own local rationalities’ 
(ibid, p. 78). This understanding of how the knowledge and experience of good sense informs 
subaltern self-activity, then, stresses the developmental dynamics and potential of those 
struggles. This is because, on the one hand, any episode of struggle furnishes new experience 
and techniques that further the local rationalities already contained in good sense. 
Importantly, this allows us to comprehend how struggles might have cumulative effects in 
popular consciousness. On the other hand, the potential of subaltern self-activity for more 
open and coherent resistance by larger collectivities is exemplified by the development of 
militant particularisms and revolt:  
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The social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; 
a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes – when the group is acting 
as an organic totality. […But it has] adopted a [hegemonic] conception […] which it follows in "normal 
times" – that is when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and 
subordinate. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 327)  
Gramsci here suggests that an embryonic conception of the world becomes visible precisely 
in subaltern resistance. However, he states quite clearly that such an embryonic conception 
does not constitute the break with dominant conception of common sense required for 
attaining autonomous agency. As such, ‘subaltern groups are always subject to the activity 
of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up’ (ibid, p. 55). This lack of a “new language” 
also illustrates the limitation of such spontaneous self-activity to what can summarily be 
understood as “defensive mobilization”. Not having produced a break with it, it necessarily 
expresses its goals in the language of common sense. Thus, such struggles have been found 
to ‘make appeals in the language of legitimacy and justice and protest against their violation 
[…They are not] a comprehensive defiance of, or aimed to transcend, the existing order’ 
(Cronin, 2008b, pp. 2–3). Instead, defensive mobilization is often rooted in violations to the 
moral economy of subaltern groups and can be understood as aiming to protect or extend 
some existing form of hegemonic incorporation.  
How, then, can more “offensive” forms of mobilization develop that stand a chance of 
challenging, rather than adjusting to, an existing hegemonic formation and its conditions of 
subalternity? In the above quote, Gramsci suggests that sustained action as an “organic 
totality” requires the development of a more mature conception of the world. Indeed, he 
states that a ‘historical act can only be performed by "collective man" [sic], and this 
presupposes the attainment of a "cultural-social" unity through which a multiplicity of 
dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis 
of an equal and common conception of the world’ (1971, p. 349). Thus, a shared conception 
of the world – a new language which, unlike common sense, allows for the articulation of 
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challenges to the existing order – is required to create the unity of a “collective will” around 
a purpose to affect such change.17 Indeed, Chalcraft states that  
the emergence of the collective will, then, is the key moment in the shift from a subaltern status […] 
In collective will a subject, a will immediate to itself and acting for itself, is forged. […It marks] the 
transition to transformative politics […as] subaltern social groups, in a process of transformation, 
discover not just who they are […] but what they want. (forthcoming) 
Developing shared conceptions of the world and a collective will thus appear as interrelated 
processes central to challenging conditions of subalternity. Building on one another, they 
enable a transformation of largely spontaneous and reactive self-activity into an offensive 
against (elements of) a hegemonic formation. The essential dynamic here, according to 
Chalcraft, is “articulation” which ‘involves both an expression in language and conception on 
the one hand, and a joining of two elements previously sundered on the other […through] a 
new form of signification’ (ibid). Articulation results from intellectual labor that is intimately 
connected with and reflects upon subaltern lifeworlds, producing abstractions from the 
dispersed and fragmentary elements of knowledge which inform and are developed by 
subaltern struggles as well as combining them with existing philosophical insights. It is in this 
proximity and interaction between intellectual labor and subaltern struggles that a more 
coherent conception of the world can be developed, one that is “organically” connected to 
the contradictions of subalterns lifeworlds and that allows for their expression in language 
(ibid). Here, then, the process of learning in and through subaltern struggles continues, albeit 
on a more abstracted level involving what Gramsci called “organic intellectuals” (1971, pp. 
5–14).  
 
17 This is also brought out by Gramsci’s statement that, conversely, a ‘group which is still subaltern, 
[…] has not yet gained consciousness of its strength, its possibilities, of how it is to develop, and […] 
therefore does not know how to escape from the primitivist phase’ (1971, p. 159). For a clarification 
of the primitivist phase in terms of the fragmentation of agency lacking a collective will, compare 
Gramsci’s discussion of the general strike and spontaneism (ibid, pp. 126-30). 
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Making a kindred argument, Cox and Nilsen suggest that it is possible to generalize the 
subaltern knowledges and practices that make up local rationalities. They stress that this 
requires those involved in similar defensive struggles to engage in ‘activities of mutual 
learning and development of self-understanding’ through which they can find ‘conceptions 
that resonate across difference’ (2014, p. 79). Developing a coherent conception of the world 
that organically expresses and points to a way out of subaltern conditions can here be 
understood as the ‘articulation, sharing and formalisation […] of practice-based and situated 
“good sense” against ideological and hegemonic “common sense”, or of the articulation of 
previously tacit knowledge in struggle’ (Cox, 2014, pp. 964–5). This ‘translation between and 
abstraction from local struggles’ resonates with the work of “organic articulation” and, 
indeed, can lead to a “social movement project”  as a ‘collective agency from below […with 
the] capacity to identify its own actors socially […and which] posits the social totality as the 
object of challenge and transformation’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, pp. 82–3). It thus constitutes 
the formation of something not unlike a collective will, whereby the abstraction and 
coherence involved results from “learning in struggle”. Indeed, ‘mobilisation entails profound 
changes in consciousness; […] a process through which reflexive self-activity engenders a 
distancing from the hegemonic elements of common sense and simultaneously a process 
through which “good sense” is rendered “more unitary and coherent”’ (ibid, p. 88). Two 
elements are decisive in this process of reflexive self-activity. First, it requires activists and 
“movement intellectuals” forming alliances and new connections with one another to 
exchange knowledge gained in struggle and engage in “popular education” (Cox, 2019; Cox 
and Nilsen, 2014). Secondly, more advanced learning and will-formation requires the 
organizational development of struggles as creators of knowledge and of “pedagogical 
settings” for exchange where knowledge is articulated more abstractly and coherently (Cox, 
2014; Motta, 2017; Motta and Nilsen, 2011, chaps. 6, 8).  
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We can now see that transformations of defensive into offensive struggles, understood as 
developing and disseminating organic conceptions of the world, and thus the formation of a 
collective will around them, are mediated by intellectual labor and organizational activity 
within and between those struggles. Organization is key in the formation of a collective will 
and agency as it allows for ideas to be exchanged and disseminated, new connections to be 
forged, and alliances to be made. In other words, it is through organizational activity that 
collectives coalesce and expand around the unifying purpose articulated in a conception of 
the world. As Chalcraft remarks, a Gramscian perspective 
points away from any panacea in everyday modes of resistance by insisting on organization [...which 
is required] to express, make concrete in practice, and diffuse the collective will. […] Organization is a 
unifier of theory and practice, and a site of learning: a place where the educator [as organic 
intellectual] can be educated [by subaltern struggle]. (forthcoming, my glosses) 
Indeed, Gramsci wrote that it is organization which enables the development of organic ideas 
in a ‘dialectic between the intellectuals and the masses […in which] every leap forward 
towards a new breadth and complexity of the intellectual stratum is tied to an analogous 
movement on the part of the mass’ (1971, p. 334). He concretizes this for the case of political 
parties which play a key role in ‘the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of the world 
[…thus] providing an organic leadership [… through which the masses can become] to a 
certain degree coherent […and act with] a precise and decisive will’ (ibid, p. 335). 
Organization, then, is the “historical laboratory” in which conceptions of the world and a 
collective will can be created.  
From a Gramscian perspective, the transition from self-activity that is defensive to a 
collective agency that challenges (aspects of) the hegemonic formation can thus be 
understood as involving two dialectically related tasks or dynamics. First, that of abstracting 
and rendering coherent the good sense produced in subaltern struggles, thus producing a 
break with common sense and enabling the articulation of challenges to the hegemonic 
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formation as the purpose around which a collective will can coalesce. Second, the concrete 
formation and expansion of that collective will through connection, exchange, and alliance-
formation between different struggles. The dialectic thus flows between practical and critical 
self-activity, masses and organic intellectuals (or leaders), spontaneity and organization, 
praxis and philosophy – and the unity of these seeming contractions is precisely what Gramsci 
conceptualized as “organicity”. As the following section discusses, this understanding of a 
gradual process of learning and development through struggle is also how Gramsci thought 
about the challenges of revolutionary politics under conditions of hegemony.  
 
Revolutionary Processes and Vectors of Mobilization 
The conceptual framework of a Gramscian perspective on hegemony and subaltern politics 
allows us to understand how conditions of hegemonic incorporation entail both constraints 
and possibilities for subaltern self-activity. By emphasizing processes of learning in struggle, 
it also helps us conceptualize how such self-activity might develop beyond its initial 
limitations to more spontaneous, episodic, and defensive forms. Through this learning, 
members of subaltern social groups can acquire the capacity and will to mount challenges to 
the existing hegemonic formation. Required are the development of coherent sets of ideas 
that break with common sense – a new conception of the world – as well as the formation of 
a collective will and agency around those ideas. This crucially entails a dialectic of intellectual 
and organizational work which serves to organically root the articulation of ideas in subaltern 
struggles as well as to, in turn, disseminate those ideas, making them inform the will and 
activity of growing collectives. However, this does not necessarily relate to revolutionary 
processes and politics. Indeed, this conceptual framework is useful for understanding the 
development of a range of different struggles which, although articulating systemic 
challenges of some kind, do not need to be of an outright revolutionary nature or involve 
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movements large enough to achieve such goals. How, then, does this conceptual framework 
help address the central question of this thesis: the creation of revolutionary mass 
mobilization and the role of subaltern self-activity therein?  
The answer to this question is that Gramsci developed his conceptualizations of hegemony 
precisely to devise a revolutionary strategy under such conditions, notably for the Italian 
Communist Party of the period between the two World Wars (Femia, 1981; McNally, 2015). 
The following proposes that this can be unpacked by considering how two distinguishable 
“hegemonic effects”, although dialectically unified in the concept of hegemony, were 
understood by Gramsci as disabling the main revolutionary strategies discussed at his time, 
and how he sought to develop a strategy to address these challenges. With the above 
discussion, we can see that the two hegemonic effects are mass consent produced by 
hegemonic incorporation and common sense produced by dominant conceptions of the 
world (cp. Cox and Nilsen, 2014, pp. 66–7). Gramsci refers to two polar positions on 
revolutionary strategy as voluntarism/vanguardism and economism/spontaneism, which he 
realized would be disabled by these two effects of a developed hegemonic formation (1971, 
pp. 126–9, 158–68, 196–205). The former entails political agitation based on a revolutionary 
theory developed by radical intellectuals and party activists who, once they believe the time 
to be ripe, engage in a “vanguard move” to capture key institutions of government, thus 
initiating a revolutionary process to which the masses would rally. The latter, by contrast, 
assumes that mass mobilization will emerge spontaneously because of economic 
contradictions and that the key task is to provide the masses with organization and resources 
which direct and sustain their revolutionary energy.18  
 
18 Both positions are obviously much more complex and specific than this. However, rather than those 
schematic positions, what is of interest here is how they relate to the Gramscian conceptualization of 
hegemony.  
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Considering the conceptual framework above, we can see how neither strategy successfully 
addresses the conditions created by hegemony. Voluntarism/vanguardism is of less interest 
here as it involves no strategic element of subaltern self-activity. Under conditions of 
hegemony, members of subaltern groups have reasons, material and ideal, to offer their 
consent to the existing order. Thus, they cannot be expected to simply accept leadership by 
conspiratorial circles whose theories for revolution have developed in the abstract and are 
not based on the contradictions which, consent notwithstanding, mark the condition of 
subalternity. Revolution, Gramsci tells us, requires ‘mass politics and not merely an 
adventure by groups claiming to represent the masses’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 198). Lacking 
connection to the lifeworlds of and consent by subaltern groups, then, means that 
voluntarism would result in revolutionary politics without mass mobilization. Conversely, 
conditions of hegemonic common sense result in spontaneism not doing anything to create 
a shift from mass mobilization to revolutionary politics. Here, lacking learning from and 
development of  the many struggles of subaltern groups that fall short of spontaneous revolt 
and mass risings means that no organic articulation of revolutionary ideas has taken place. 
Hence, neither was common sense broken, nor a collective will formed around the purpose 
of revolutionary action. Even if violations to their moral economy might push subaltern 
groups into mass action, they would still reject the “revolutionary leadership” they are being 
offered as an outside imposition. Rather, they are more likely to seek redress for their 
grievances through the hegemonic formation’s ideas and institutions. 
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Figure 1: Revolutionary Processes in orientation to Gramsci (1971), source: own rendering 
 
The Gramscian revolutionary strategy addresses both common sense and consent and 
consequently unfolds as a dialectical unity similar to that of hegemony. In short, it is a 
strategy of “counter-hegemony” (Femia, 1981), and is represented with the other two 
schematic strategies in the graph above. It entails precisely the dynamics of developing a new 
conception of the world and forming a collective that were discussed in the previous section. 
It is also centrally premised on intellectual and organizational work of the organic kind. 
Gramsci discusses this under the two notions of the “philosophy of praxis” and the “modern 
prince”, respectively. The philosophy of praxis constitutes the development of a new 
conception of the world in the form of an organic articulation:  
A philosophy of praxis […]  must be a criticism of "common sense" […] renovating and making "critical" 
an already existing activity […] It affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and [masses…to] 
lead them to a higher conception of life […and] to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make 
politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 330–3) 
In this, he adds, ‘philosophy […] coincides with "good" as opposed to "common" sense […] 
which deserves to be made more unitary and coherent’ (ibid, pp. 326, 328). Here, vividly 
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expressed, is the task of mutual learning producing coherent articulation of the knowledge 
contained in good sense and of the need for the conceptions generated this way to educate 
the masses politically. Articulating a new conception of the world, then, requires an 
organizational context that forms and trains organic intellectuals. However, organizational 
work becomes even more important if a mass educational activity of such proportions is to 
be carried out, as the philosophy of praxis ‘must reach for […] the creation of a new integral 
culture, having the mass character of the Protestant Reformation and the French 
Enlightenment’ (Gramsci quoted in Femia, 1981, p. 122).  
This organizational activity, which finally results in the creation of a collective will for 
revolutionary change, is discussed by Gramsci as the task of a political party which, 
referencing Machiavelli, he calls the modern prince. What is required, he states, is ‘the 
formation of a national-popular collective will, of which the modern Prince is at one and the 
same time the organiser and the active, operative expression’ (1971, p. 133). Forging a 
collective of such national-popular proportion is why a counter-hegemonic strategy can only 
be carried out on the terrain where hegemony itself is created, namely in civil society. Here, 
an attritional tactic which Gramsci likens to a “war of position” is to be carried out in which 
the philosophy of praxis is spread through educational, cultural, and political institutions, 
gradually replacing common sense. The social groups thus educated are to be allied to the 
revolutionary movement, forming a new “historical bloc” to rival that of the dominant group. 
It is precisely because both consent and common sense need to be comprehensively eroded 
that Gramsci finds ‘a social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before 
winning governmental power’ (ibid, p. 57). Hence, forming such a revolutionary collective 
will constitutes a ‘long labour’ (ibid, p. 194) with an important organizational grounding.  
Relating the conceptual framework and the Gramscian revolutionary process discussed here 
to the critical perspectives reviewed in the previous chapter generates additional questions 
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for this thesis to explore and motivates a final conceptual development. The critical works 
reviewed in one way or another all addressed the Gramscian challenges of an organic 
conception of the world, collective will-formation, organization, and the creation of new 
alliances. They did so primarily for the case of Egypt, where an inclusive mode of horizontalist 
organizing, developed across a decade of struggle in civil society, allowed for collective will 
and alliance formation based on an image of the world and a model of mass action 
successfully appropriated from Tunisia. The Tunisian revolutionary process, however, could 
not draw on similar ideational and organizational mediations. This makes the research 
question on the role of subaltern self-activity in the Tunisian revolution all the more 
pertinent. Re-expressed through the conceptual framework: How might subaltern self-
activity and learning in struggle have featured in the creation of revolutionary mobilization? 
Did subaltern struggles overcome the key challenges posed by common sense without 
significant mediation through the agency of intellectuals or formal organization? Particularly, 
how were organic conceptions that could break aspects of common sense articulated? This 
can be summarized in a second main research question for the thesis: To what extent can we 
understand the Tunisian revolution through the possibilities and limitations of subaltern self-
emancipation in the context of a contemporary hegemonic formation? To approach these 
questions, the thesis will use an additional concept termed “vectors of mobilization” that 
complements the above framework. 
The thesis proposes “vectors of mobilization” as a key descriptive workhorse to broach 
questions on subaltern self-activity and transformative learning in struggle in the context of 
a revolutionary process. The main purpose of this lens is to explore the conceptual space of 
struggles developing between the possibilities of more formally organized activity and the 
limitations of more spontaneously defensive ones. To this end, a vector groups together 
phenomena and episodes of (subaltern) mobilization which do not recognizably involve a 
shared project or collective subjects but might nonetheless produce cumulative effects of 
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learning in, as well as transformation of, struggle. Here, they take inspiration from what 
Gramsci called “molecular processes”.19 Vectors capture such processes, first, through the 
notion of vector trajectory and, second, through different types of trajectories and situations. 
Quantitative or cumulative processes of learning and development in the course of 
mobilization are captured in terms of the “distance travelled” along the trajectory of a vector, 
relative to the dimensions of consent and common-sense of the hegemonic formation – in 
other words, as struggles that move against and progressively erode consent and common 
sense. Qualitative or transformative developments, by contrast, are captured by shifts in 
trajectories and the creation of situations that entail new experiences. We can distinguish 
four ideal-typical vectors: hegemonic, insurgent, transgressive, and revolutionary. 
Mobilization unfolding along a hegemonic vector does not challenge consent or common 
sense and is marked by a relative absence of learning-effects. Vectors of this type are meant 
to capture mobilization entailing accepted practices of claims-making and their expression in 
terms of common sense. They directly involve organizations which function as sites of 
political incorporation and draw on their resources. Mobilization under hegemonic vectors is 
directed towards a resolution of its underlying grievances through (the expansion of) existing 
incorporation processes. This type of vector serves to produce and maintain the boundary of 
an existing hegemonic formation defined by these processes of incorporation – this is why it 
does not feature many dynamics of learning in the sense which is of interest here.20 In other 
words, the trajectory of this vector “bends” (subaltern) struggles into the hegemonic 
formation. The second type of vector can be understood as insurgent in that it captures 
subaltern self-activity that does not unfold under a hegemonic vector. However, it mainly 
 
19 Gramsci used “molecular“ to speak of ‘social transformation which takes place as it were beneath 
the surface of society’ (1971, p. 46). He suggestively drew on it to describe processes leading to 
‘changes which in fact progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces’ or to ‘accumulation 
of elements destined to produce an "explosion", that is, an upheaval’, as well as ‘the moment in which 
the real hegemony disintegrates at the base’ (1971, pp. 109, 280, 370).  
20 However, mobilization under this vector might still be generative of solidarities and networks as well 
as provide participants with activist experience.  
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involves tolerated practices of mobilization, makes claims in the language of common sense, 
and seeks resolutions of grievances through existing processes of incorporation. As such, 
insurgent vectors capture mobilization which does not intentionally breach the boundary of 
the hegemonic formation. Such struggles generate learning-effects by developing knowledge 
and capacities for future mobilization, including activist experience, solidarities, and 
organizational resources. Since they constitute movement within the scope of the hegemonic 
formation, both insurgent and hegemonic vectors constitute contained contention.  
If mobilization under insurgent vectors is left protractedly unresolved, its cumulative effects 
may prepare the ground for a qualitative shift to a transgressive trajectory that entails 
learning against common sense, for example through the development of the “militant 
particularism” discussed above. The principal feature of struggles under transgressive vectors 
is that they entail practices which are not sanctioned under the hegemonic formation and 
thus transgress its boundaries. This means that they are frequently met with repression by 
the state, as a movement beyond the scope of the hegemonic formation encounters what 
Gramsci called the state’s “armour of coercion” (1971, p. 263). Movement along a 
transgressive vector produces cumulative or quantitative learning-effects similar to those 
under insurgent vectors. Under a transgressive vector, parts of the subaltern population also 
travel a “significant distance” out of the hegemonic formation and into a situation of revolt 
that entails qualitatively different experiences. However, the dynamics of militant 
particularism captured by this vector do not constitute a break with common sense. The 
trajectory thus remains within the realm of revolt rather than being directed towards 
revolution. Mobilization under this vector will feature only the articulation of demands that 
can, in principle, still be addressed within the existing hegemonic formation. In other words, 
mobilization under this vector remains defensive.  
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Shifting from a transgressive to a revolutionary vector thus requires the organic articulation 
of a revolutionary conception in and through struggle. Moreover, and in order to successfully 
travel the distance from revolt to a revolutionary situation along such a trajectory, it requires 
mass mobilization for such a purpose, viz. a collective will. The following chapters will draw 
on the conceptual framework of subaltern politics and the notion of vectors introduced 
above to understand whether subaltern struggles produced dynamics of learning and 
transformation and, if so, how they may have contributed to creating and shaping the 
Tunisian revolutionary process. Doing so will hopefully offer new insights into the potentials 
and limits for subaltern self-emancipation in a contemporary hegemonic formation, thus 
informing our theoretical perspectives through the knowledge created in subaltern struggles. 
Before moving to discuss the empirical material in the rest of this thesis, the second part of 
this chapter describes how that material was collected. 
 
III.ii. Empirical Research and Methods 
This second part of the chapter describes the development of the empirical research project 
as well as the methods used. Research on subaltern agency in the Tunisian revolution faces 
two methodological challenges. First, identifying sites of enquiry and, second, gaining access 
and gathering material in those sites. The first challenge was mainly addressed through 
researching primary sources in the form of news articles, social media content, as well as 
consulting secondary sources. Here, an event catalogue developed from news articles proved 
particularly helpful. The second challenge was addressed through working with local 
colleagues and using ethnographic methods, combining prolonged fieldwork stays and 
ethnographic observations at sites of enquiry with in-depth, narrative interviews, whereby 
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the latter was the principal method used.21 The following discussion proceeds in four 
sections. The first section describes how focus sites of enquiry were selected using an event 
catalogue. Section two introduces the main localities of ethnographic fieldwork and discusses 
questions of access. Section three describes my interlocutors, including the main subaltern 
groups that I worked with, the interviews conducted, and the methods used therein. It also 
discusses questions of ethics and data security. The chapter closes with self-reflective notes. 
 
Event Catalogue 
The research question on the role of subaltern self-activity in the Tunisian revolution 
developed inductively and relatively late in the research process. Initially, my focus was to 
identify the transformative dynamics in the revolutionary process to which subaltern agency 
likely contributed. The notion of transformation was conceptually open rather than based on 
the development and learning perspective on subaltern struggle laid out above. In many 
ways, the project confronted challenges like those faced by what the previous chapter 
discussed as “processual and transformation perspectives”. For just like with an emphasis on 
“transformative events” and “microfoundations”, subaltern agency was likely plural and 
dispersed throughout the revolutionary process. Thus, a first puzzle was: How to identify sites 
of enquiry that would allow broaching these questions? Since I was after more informal 
 
21 A note on the genealogy of this research project is in order. I was originally studying the Egyptian 
revolution which I had the privilege of witnessing in Cairo. The first two years of my PhD were 
dedicated to this project. Because of the atrocious murder of our colleague Giulio Regeni by the 
Egyptian authorities, whose memory I herewith honor, my fieldwork application was rejected in 
September 2016. Having to redirect my research project, I arrived in Tunisia in December 2016 without 
prior desk research, familiarity with the country, its history, or local contacts. As a result of this, I spent 
the first nine months catching up on some of this, gaining a basic level of the local Arabic, and carried 
out almost all desk-based empirical research for this thesis while already in the country. Over this 
period, I lived in Beb Jdid, a popular quarter of Tunis, which helped my understanding of these 
communities. It was only towards the end of 2017 that I had developed a focus for my research and 
felt relatively prepared to do fieldwork in the communities of the interior provinces which I had 
identified as my main sites of enquiry. Hence, almost all interviews were conducted between 
December 2017 and July 2018. 
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agencies, this challenge could not be resolved by focusing on formally organized groups or 
activist circles. The 12 January general strike in Sfax is generally recognized as a turning point 
in the revolutionary process and marked the first instance of revolutionary mass mobilization 
(RMM) entailing an undeniable organizing role of UGTT. If there was a significant role for 
transformative subaltern agency in creating RMM, it would likely have played out before the 
events in Sfax and the subsequent emergence of RMM in the capital. Still, protests with 
significant engagement by subaltern social groups prior to those events had been plentiful. 
To negotiate this challenge and identify sites of enquiry I analyzed primary media sources, 
most notably news articles and social media content. The goal was to identify transformative 
dynamics by tracking down innovations and novelties, such as qualitatively new forms of 
protest or the emergence of slogans articulating radical political demands, that emerged in 
the revolutionary process.  
While social media analysis provided signposts for the period after 8 January, it was the event 
catalogue which proved most useful in delimiting localities and time periods to an extent that 
made ethnographic research appear feasible. For it, I analyzed more than 350 articles and 
transcripts of news broadcasts reporting on protest events and regime actions, dating 
between the eve of Mohammad Bouazizi’ self-immolation on 17 December 2010 and 28 
January 2011 (the end of the first Kasbah occupation). State-run and independent news 
media were drawn on. Local news sources included Al-Chourouk and As-Sabah, as Arabic 
newspapers, transcripts of Tunisian Channel7 broadcasts, and La Presse de Tunisie as well as 
Le Temps as French publications. International news sources were taken from transcripts of 
Al-Jazeera TV in Arabic, as well as articles on France 24 in French, and Al-Jazeera English, The 
New York Times, and The Guardian in English. Sources were coded for key information such 
as date, time and location of events, number of reported protesters, names of individuals, 
groups and organizations, protest practices, the practices of security forces, deaths and 
injuries, as well as slogans and demands raised.  
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Most of the coding did not reveal noticeable clusters or shifts. Reporting on numbers of 
protesters, protest practices, as well as the nature of demands, for instance, showed 
fluctuation, with growth and radical nature only becoming apparent from around 11 January. 
However, the event catalogue brought two key insights. First, the number of protest events 
between 17 December 2010 and 14 January 2011 did not grow steadily. Rather, protests in 
the interior of the country seem to have peaked on 25 December, remaining concentrated in 
the Sidi Bouzid governorate, and were followed by almost a week of lull from 28 December 
onwards.22 Protests re-commenced in the town of Thala in the Kasserine governorate on 3 
January and centered on that governorate for seven days. The second insight gained from 
the event catalogue was that this phase, from 8 January onwards, was also marked by a 
qualitatively new development: a significant increase in the killing of protesters. Figures 
varied from 21 to 50 casualties over two days, compared to two casualties and three suicides 
before that date. This far exceeded the four casualties of the Gafsa revolt two years earlier 
(Chouikha and Gobe, 2009), and marked a level of violence not witnessed in the country since 
the bread riots of 1983/4. The number of protest events and of deaths are plotted in the 
graph below. 
 
22 Event catalogue data shows that the five reported demonstrations between 28 December 2010 and 
2 January 2011 all took place in Tunis. These were organized either by political activists or lawyers 
(Volpi, 2016). Moreover, protests in coastal regions prior to Januar were only reported in Sfax (one) 
and Tunis (five). Those remained small, and were organized by and drew in mainly lawyers, trade 
unionists, and political activists (see discussion in chapter 7). 
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Figure 2 : Number of protest events (blue) and of protesters killed by security forces (orange) in 
Tunisia 17 Dec 2010 – 14 Jan 2011, Source: own research 
 
These initial findings put into question the linear narratives on the revolutionary process 
reviewed in the previous chapter which posit that dynamics emerging over the first week of 
protests in Sidi Bouzid gradually intensified and spread protest across the country. Instead, 
they suggested a focus on the under-researched events in Thala which appear to have re-
ignited protests, alongside Kasserine and Regueb as the other two centers of protest in the 
period immediately predating the Sfax general strike. Thus, I followed a hunch that events in 
these communities might have entailed transformative dynamics of subaltern agency that 
altered the balance of social forces going forward and settled on them as focal sites of 
enquiry for my ethnographic research. In addition, I conducted interviews in Sidi Bouzid, Sfax, 
and Greater Tunis. The geographical centers of protest in the revolutionary process, including 
these localities, are shown in the map below. In terms of methodology, the first phase of the 
research suggested that, while useful in identifying focus sites for ethnographic research, 
event catalogues of the kind used in the study of contentious politics (Tilly, 2002), did not 
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produce much insight for understanding the role of subaltern agency – or, as I would come 
to conceive of it, self-activity – in revolutionary contexts.  
Figure 3 : Map of The Propagation of the Revolution, Source: Timothée Giraud, International College 
of Territorial Sciences (CIST), available online at: http://cist.cnrs.fr/en/geomedia1/ 
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Sites of Enquiry and Access    
This section describes the localities in which ethnographic work was conducted and discusses 
questions of access. The main sites of enquiry were the cities of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, 
and the towns of Thala and Regueb, with the three latter localities having been the center of 
protests between 3 and 11 January. Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine are the administrative seats of 
the two governorates by the same names, while Regueb and Thala, are smaller, largely 
agricultural towns in the Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine governorates, respectively.23 The two 
governorates form part of the Tunisian “interior” away from the littoral regions. Like much 
of the country’s South and Centre-West, both are economically linked with the Sfax 
metropolitan region, largely as zones of resource extraction and agricultural production – Sidi 
Bouzid, for example, produces a fifth of the nation’s vegetables as well as fruit for export 
(Gana, 2013a). The governorate of Kasserine is more remote, situated on the south-eastern 
slopes of the Atlas Mountains. It features cross-border trade with Algeria, including petrol 
smuggling, and produces cellulose, textiles, and construction material, including marble 
(Feltrin, 2018a). According to the 2014 census, both governorates have roughly 430,000 
inhabitants each out of a national population of 11 million.  
For Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine illiteracy stands at 29 % and 32 %, respectively, against a 
national average of 18.8%, and unemployment at 17.7 % and 22.7 % against a national 
average of 14.8% (INST, 2015). The two governorates ranked least (Kasserine) and third least 
(Sidi Bouzid) developed in a comprehensive survey by the Ministry of Planning in relation to 
education, employment conditions, public health, and social equality (Ben Rabah, 2012). 
However, Tunisia’s overall economic and infrastructural development is high and poverty 
rates are low by regional standards (Ncube et al., 2014). For instance, both governorates 
 
23 Tunisia has 24 governorates which are the main administrative divisions. They are shown as 
“regions” in the map above.  
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apparently feature only 1% of homes that are not connected to the utility network (INST, 
2015).  
As the seats of their respective governorates, the cities of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine are 
important regional economic and administrative centers. Sidi Bouzid has a population of 
about 50,000 (INST, 2015). It is located 265 kilometers away from Tunis and travel takes 
about four hours. Kasserine’s population is double the size, around 100,000 (ibid). It is 
roughly equidistance from the capital but due to road conditions the journey time is at least 
five hours. The population of both cities is noticeably class stratified. On the one hand, they 
feature members of the middle-classes, mostly employed in public administration, 
education, and the judicial system. While middle-class citizens are typically not rich by 
national standards and neither city has residential areas that are visibly affluent, they are still 
wealthy by local standards, including in social and cultural capital. They also often play the 
role of intermediaries between the urban poor and the authorities (fieldnotes, 2018). On the 
other hand, both cities contain sizeable popular quarter. Inhabited by members of subaltern 
social groups, and marked by poverty and informal economies, they have grown considerably 
over the past decades due to rural in-migration. Social relations, particularly in the popular 
quarters, are relatively conservative, for instance regarding gender, but both cities also have 
bars which serve alcohol and are hubs of transregional movement, featuring direct bus 
services to the capital and local hotels. Kasserine feels notably poorer and less developed 
compared to Sidi Bouzid, having none of the latter’s public green spaces or modern shops, 
and fewer well paved roads.24 The adjacent mountains, including the highest summit in the 
country, Jebel ech Chambi, have long provided hideouts for armed groups, including 
resistance to French colonialism, as well as, since 2011, groups linked to Al-Qaeda. This latter 
development also meant that, while both places have a national reputation for unruliness, 
 
24 Some of this is an effect of post-revolutionary development programs which centered on Sidi Bouzid. 
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the region around Kasserine saw episodic fighting during the period of my fieldwork and was 
considered by Tunisians as particularly “dangerous” (fieldnotes, 2018).  
The towns of Thala and Regueb were my other two main field sites. Thala, located 50 
kilometers from Kasserine, has a population of roughly 18,000 (INST, 2015). At an altitude of 
1,000 meters, it is Tunisia’s most elevated community. Like its regional capital, the town is 
known as a center of resistance. It was the hotbed of two important revolts – of Ali Ben 
Ghedhahem against the Bey of Tunis in 1864/5, and of Amor Ben Othman against the French 
occupation in 1906. Thala’s local economy is largely based on subsistence agriculture but is 
also known for its prickly pears, merguez sausages, and for a rare yellow marble quarried 
outside the town. Regueb, by contrast, is a comparatively rich agricultural town which 
produces a sizable proportion of the country’s olives and fruit exports. It has a population 
just above 11,000 and is located 40 kilometers south of Sidi Bouzid (INST, 2015). Together 
with the popular quarters of Kasserine, these two provincial towns constituted the centers 
of open confrontation between protesters and security forces between 3 and 11 January 
2011 (e.g. Aleya-Sghaier, 2012). As I spent more time in these localities, I noticed that their 
social and urban structures bore important similarities. Hence, the thesis frequently refers to 
them under the category “popular quarters and provincial towns”.  
These popular quarters and provincial towns are internally relatively homogenous and close-
knit communities. While some of their residents have middle-class professions, the majority 
are relatively poor, do not have high levels of formal education, work low-paid and informal 
jobs, including subsistence businesses and agriculture, or find themselves unemployed, 
especially if they are young. The built environment typically features narrow residential 
streets and alleys surrounding one or two main streets on which most shops, cafes, and 
businesses, as well as mosques and some public institutions (schools, local administrations, 
and sometimes cultural facilities) are located. This setup is referred to by the youth of these 
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communities as “two houses and a dog” (zouz diar w kalb), an idiom expressing lack of 
entertainment and opportunity. The public life of the male population that I almost 
exclusively interacted with has a rhythm structured around work and visits to the cafes as 
the main sites of sociality. Cafes are frequented in the morning, afternoon, and at night, after 
the main meals. Those not in regular employment – or where office jobs permit it – often 
spend much of the intervening periods at the cafes as well.25 It is here that friendship circles 
meet, cards and other games are played, networks are forged, and occasional jobs and favors 
obtained and exchanged.  
Public life in these popular quarters and provincial towns is male dominated, socially 
conservative (though not visibly religious), and provides residents with strong local identities 
and networks. In all of the above, these communities share important similarities with 
popular quarters in Tunis, whose population is mostly made up of provincial migrants (Allal, 
2012b; Ben Amor, 2015). Indeed, popular quarters and provincial towns – the former in 
Kasserine and, to a lesser extent, in Sidi Bouzid and Tunis, the latter in the form of Thala, 
Regueb, but also Menzel Bouzaiane – became my principal sites of enquiry. This resulted 
from the fact that these localities were the centers of open confrontations with the police 
during the revolution in which I grew particularly interested. The social conservatism and 
close-knit social fabric of these communities posed additional challenges in terms of access 
that exacerbated the problems I already confronted through researching localities remote 
from the capital. Here, my lacking fluency in Tunisian Arabic became a serious obstacle. Not 
being a Middle East scholar by training, my Arabic proficiency was limited and acquiring a 
new dialect while re-activating my French proved challenging. As the research focus took 
shape, it became clear to me that my language skills would not suffice to lead interviews 
independently in context where local dialects and lacking fluency in French of my subaltern 
 
25 Among the young men, additional sites of sociality include places like video gaming shops and gyms, 
but cafes remain most important.  
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interlocutors provided additional challenges. These difficulties convinced me to work with 
local “fixers” who arranged and led most of the interviews, allowing me to concentrate on 
listening and posing follow-up questions.  
Via contacts in Tunis, I established links with three people who had experience in journalism: 
Mohamed Alahmadi, Rabii Gharsalli and Shady Rabhi. Mohamed, with whom I conducted 
almost all my interviews outside of the Kasserine governorate, is 32 years old and hails from 
a small village close to Regueb. From a family of farmers and the only of four brothers to 
leave Regueb, he managed to move from a local community radio station to working with 
international media in the capital despite not having a university degree. His knowledge of 
places and people throughout the country, and acumen in communicating with members of 
different social groups, were invaluable. Rabiaa and Shedi are both from Kasserine and had 
worked on journalistic and photography projects together, though they could hardly be more 
different. Shady is 28 years old and his parents are high school teachers who are well-known 
and respected in Kasserine for their leftist politics and activism. He left the middle-class 
quarter where his family lives to study biochemistry in Monastir but, unable to find a job after 
graduating, returned to his native city. Rabii is 39 years old and has spent all his life in 
Kasserine. He comes from a poor family living in one of the two biggest popular quarters, Hay 
Ennour, and is highly respected – almost revered – by the other young men of the popular 
quarters. He has an air of severity and integrity and people listen to him, although he mostly 
prefers to stay silent. Both are popular figures in Kasserine and had contacts in Thala as well. 
Shady is well-spoken and empathetic and led most of the interviews, while Rabii’s habitus 
and standing amongst youth of the popular quarters were instrumental in gaining access.  
None of them were married or in fixed employment at the time of my research, meaning 
they were mostly free to work with me.26 They became valued colleagues and friends without 
 
26 Rabii also worked at a local public swimming pool and had a post in the local administration. 
Showcasing the flexibility of many work arrangements in places like Kasserine – and the degree to 
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whom the research would have been impossible for me to carry out. Indeed, the project 
turned into a collaborative effort as all three had a personal interest in researching the local 
histories of the revolution and invested themselves in the work beyond what was justified by 
the low rates that I was able to pay compared to an international journalist. The nature of 
our relationship also developed since gender and age, amidst many differences, allowed us 
to connect amicably and we spent much time together outside the interview work. Their 
social standing made questions of access much easier to negotiate than anticipated, including 
dealing with local authorities. Nominally for reasons of protecting me as a foreign national, 
the project would have required permissions by national and regional administrations that 
were time intensive and unlikely to be obtained for the “dangerous places” we worked in. 
Alternatively, it could have resulted in obstructive police accompaniment during my time 
there. As a result, and noting that my presence could not be kept secret, we decided to 
circumvent these issues on the local level. In Kasserine, for example, we declared my 
presence to a contact who, as head of the National Anti-Terror Brigades which oversees all 
security issues there, gave us verbal permission to work freely, telling us to refer to him any 
policeman who might obstruct our work.  
Ease of access also materialized regarding interlocutors. Unlike what I had experienced with 
activists in Tunis, people in the popular quarters and provincial towns – facilitated by the 
rapport of my colleagues – tended to openly share the story of themselves and their 
communities in the revolution. Many of them had never spoken to an outsider about this and 
they often expressed the opinion that this was an important part of history yet to be written. 
However, my access largely remained limited to the male population and naturally incurred 
certain biases resulting from the local networks of my colleagues. As such, the story which 
this thesis tells focuses on the experience of men in the popular quarters and provincial 
 
which public sector jobs often constituted benefit-allocation rather than soliciting of labor – none of 
these interfered significantly with our work.  
99 
 
towns in the revolution, leaving much to be discovered by future research on how other 
subaltern groups engaged in it. The following section describes the ethnographic research, 
the social groups on which it focused and discusses questions of method.   
 
Social Groups, Interviews and Ethical Considerations 
The purpose of this section is to describe the social groups on which the ethnographic work 
focused, and to discuss the interviews and questions of method as well as ethical 
considerations. Overall, more than one-hundred interviews were conducted. The aim of 
understanding the role of subaltern agency in the local development of mobilization 
informed the group-composition of the interviewees. The research focus was on the young, 
mostly un- or underemployed men of the popular quarters and provincial towns as the main 
subaltern social group with which the thesis is concerned. This group is defined by its “social” 
rather than biological age. They are considered “youth” as they still live with their parents 
and cannot afford to build a house – the main prerequisite in Tunisian society to getting 
married, starting a family, and thus being recognized as an adult man. The main condition 
preventing this is lack of economic capital. Absent most other forms of social recognition, 
reputations of masculinity, of being a “real man” – including the ability to defend oneself and 
the community, were vital for members of this group (Ben Amor, 2015; for Egypt, cp. Ismail, 
2006). Often lacking formal employment, they spend a significant part of their days 
socializing in local cafes, and thus frequently have strong local networks. Overall, one third 
of my interlocuters corresponded to this broad category. 
Interviews with other subaltern residents of popular quarters and provincial towns included 
workers, small business owners, civil society activists, and family members of martyrs of the 
revolution, bringing the total number of interlocutors from subaltern social groups to roughly 
sixty. The other more than forty interviews were conducted with members of diverse but 
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mostly middle-class groups. The biggest category here were political activists ranging from 
trade unionists (mostly teachers) and opposition party members to bloggers and lawyers, 
together making up 33 of my interlocutors. Overall, almost eighty interviews were conducted 
in the interior of the country and the rest in Tunis or Sfax. In those latter localities, interviews 
were conducted with activists, trade unionists, lawyers, politicians, and journalists, but also 
with eight residents of popular quarters. 
Interlocutors were mostly approached through the networks of my local colleagues. Some, 
such as trade unionists or lawyers, could be identified by their membership in a group or 
organization which had been reported in the media and secondary sources as particularly 
active in the development of local mobilization. However, identifying the young men who 
fought the security forces proved more challenging. Some were known for their role in the 
revolution, but these individuals frequently turned out to have been observers who uploaded 
videos rather than having been involved in the mobilizational dynamics of the frontlines. 
Relatives of those clearly involved in the latter, namely the martyrs, also knew relatively little 
about those dynamics. Here, the most important technique proved to be identifying friends 
who had been fighting next to them as they were killed.  
Once contacts had been made with members of a given group, snowballing was used to 
approach further interlocutors as is common practice for research in densely knit 
communities (Clark, 2006). To allow for a relaxed and informal conversation, interviews were 
always conducted at places chosen by my interlocuters, mostly the cafes they frequented 
and where they felt comfortable. Conducting one interview frequently led to another with a 
friend or other contact of the previous interlocutor who was quickly called to come to the 
same café. Female interlocuters who did not want to meet in cafes, those who had offices of 
their own or other professional facilities (mostly lawyers, trade unionists, and activists, but 
also shopkeepers and craftsmen) were interviewed in offices or other workplaces. Only seven 
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interviews were conducted in private homes, mostly in Tunis. Due to the number of 
interviews and settings, ethnographic descriptions can only be provided relatively briefly in 
the following chapters.    
For the most part, the aim of the interviews was to understand the development of 
mobilization on the local level. As such, the open, in-depth, narrative format common in oral 
history and movement research was chosen (Perks and Thomson, 1998; della Porta, 2014b). 
Interviews lasted for an average of 86 minutes, producing a total of 146 hours of recording. 
Interviews were overwhelmingly conducted in Tunisian Arabic and led by my colleagues, 
while the language of conversation was French and English in eleven and four cases, 
respectively. Interviews always opened with a set of standardized questions on biographical 
information, personal history of political activism, experience with protest prior to the 
revolution, and on how information on events connected to the revolution was first 
obtained. A question on the first personal participation in local events led to an open 
conversation which mainly proceeded through pauses, encouragement to elaborate on 
points already made, or follow-up questions. The focus throughout was on the lived 
experience of my interlocutors and the conversation was frequently re-centered by prompts 
to narrate those events that were personally witnessed and to describe in detail the actions 
taken personally or by peers (e.g. other trade unionists or youth).  
Interviews generated themes and insights into key local events that were followed up on and 
sometimes included as directed questions in further interviews. Themes followed throughout 
included interactions with the police as well as with other protesters (notably those from 
different groups) prior to and in the course of the revolutionary process. In general, 
interviews with members of different groups and in each locality continued until information 
on key themes and events became repetitive and I felt I had understood local developments 
during the revolutionary process. I also kept a field journal to record observations and 
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thoughts that could complement the interview material. While there was thus an attempt to 
triangulate key pieces of information (della Porta and Keating, 2008), the methods of oral 
history used meant that the research depended both on the memory of my interlocutors and 
on my own judgement, making it rich in interpretation and subjectivity (Abrams, 2010; 
Portelli, 1981). This was the approach best suited to a project aimed at writing a subaltern 
history of the Tunisian revolution, and thus of groups whom ‘objectivity is always directed 
against’ (Fanon, 1963, p. 37).  
As the project involved gathering personal and potentially sensitive information, it raised 
important questions regarding ethics and data protection. These were addressed through 
careful obtainment of consent and data storage. First, it should be noted that risks to my 
interlocutors from participating in the research are low, given present political conditions in 
the country. None of my interlocuters were deceived as to the nature of the project and 
verbal consent was obtained before each interview.27 Consent questions entailed making 
participants aware that everything they said would become part of an academic publication, 
possibly including direct quotes, that they could opt not to disclose any personal details 
regarding themselves or others, choosing aliases if they desired, and asking whether I could 
record the interview. Only five participants preferred partial anonymization (last name or 
details like profession) and two complete anonymization (choosing an alias). This, as well as 
the overall openness and eagerness with which my interlocutors – especially from subaltern 
social groups – shared their stories, signaled that the project, while sensitive in many ways, 
was regarded as desirable by participants. Recorded interviews were not kept on local 
devices but uploaded to a secure LSE cloud storage at the end of each day. Handwritten notes 
were always either directly in my possession or kept in a locked drawer in my private 
apartment. The only instance in which data was transferred from the LSE cloud storage was 
 
27 Asking for written consent would have introduced an element of formality not conducive to the 
atmosphere of the interview and could have embarrassed participants with lower or no literacy. 
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for interview transcriptions. These were done by a Tunisian researcher who signed a data 
protection clause permitting him to temporarily keep interview files in his personal OneDrive 
which is considered a safe storage according to LSE standards. 
Finally, theoretical analysis drew both on inductive and deductive approaches. key themes 
were developed by coding of interviews in NVivo (della Porta, 2014b). This means that the 
thesis followed a grounded theory approach to some extent (Peters, 2014; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1994). While a broadly Gramscian perspective guided the thesis from the beginning, 
key themes such as subaltern self-activity and a developmental perspective on struggle 
emerged inductively. In this sense, the project followed the logic of the extended case 
method aimed at increasing the empirical reach of theories (Burawoy, 1998). This approach 
draws on existing theories and seeks not just ‘confirmations but refutations that inspire us 
to deepen that theory’ (ibid, p. 16). A commitment to learning from the experience of my 
interlocuters meant that the conceptual perspective was used to create ‘the boundaries and 
structural plot of the [thesis] narrative’ (Tavory and Timmermans, 2009, p. 255), while 
considering the empirical material as a source for advancing and refining those same 
concepts. This approach constitutes a recognition of subaltern social groups and their 
struggles as producers of knowledge rather than “testing grounds” for deductive hypotheses, 
as well as a personal commitment to struggles for self-emancipation. A discussion of this 
latter aspect, alongside a general reflection on my positionality, follow in the below closing 
section of the chapter.      
 
Self-reflective Notes 
My commitment to subaltern struggles, as well as to questions of learning and self-
emancipation in and through those struggles, is indeed itself a posture which developed over 
the course of this research, particularly through learning from my interlocutors. As such, I am 
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not an “organic intellectual”. Rather, I was born to the intersectional privileges of a white, 
middle-class, Western European man, who went to elite educational institutions. I had no 
interaction with subaltern struggles until my professional career led me to work in the Middle 
East. Experiencing occupation in Palestine and revolution in Egypt changed me 
fundamentally and ultimately led to the development of my PhD project. Embarking on this 
research has been for me a journey of “unlearning” (some of my) epistemic privilege through 
which I came to see my own role as that of a “translator”, whose main contribution is to 
relate the knowledge generated by subaltern social groups to larger bodies of theory, thus 
potentially furthering our collective learning from and for struggles of emancipation. This 
commitment informs the thesis, giving it a strongly subjective and normative basis.  
When I managed to learn from my interlocutors, being educated this way allowed me to 
perceive my own positionality not just as privilege but as limitation. My lack of understanding 
and a sense of moral superiority, for instance, caused me to resist a lifeworld of masculinity 
that appalled me, where superstition, racism, misogyny, conspiracy theories, hypocrisy, and 
more appeared to be commonplace. As such, my own values and formal education meant 
that comments on the physique of women from my native Germany or on the Second World 
War registered with me as misogyny, lack of education, and antisemitism. Frequently, 
however, they were attempts by my interlocutors to connect, find a common language, and 
express admiration. There were also my own limitations in terms of cultural adaptability as 
sheer endless periods of waiting for people in cafes ground down on my spirits and I proved 
incapable of putting up with the dullness in places like Kasserine, causing me frequently to 
withdraw to my bourgeois life in Tunis.  
And yet, the fieldwork allowed me to see subaltern social groups as producers of knowledge 
in their own right. As I worked with people in the “periphery of the periphery” (Gilsenan, 
1996) who were extremely distant from my own positionality in terms of social, cultural, 
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economic, and, importantly, epistemic privilege, I realized that they knew more about 
emancipatory struggles than I did. They had battled down the coercive apparatus of the state. 
They had learned to maintain discourses and sources of pride amid domination. And they 
had used all of it to mount a revolutionary struggle. Holding a normative belief in the 
necessity of such struggle, I was compelled to learn from them. Thus, a dialectic between 
unlearning my epistemic privilege, and consequently acquiring an ability to learn from my 
interlocutors, on the one hand, and persistent cultural resistance and blindness, on the other, 
enabled and limited a thesis marked by these very contradictions.  
Such contradictions and my own privilege are manifest in it in other ways as well. The 
research gave me the honor of interacting with and learning from people who gave me their 
trust and generously shared their knowledge. For a time, we became fellow travelers in a 
quest for articulating some of their most transformative experiences and struggles. But while 
their daily lives remain enmeshed in these struggles, I was able to withdraw – not just to 
Tunis during the fieldwork, but most notably when I left the country. Moreover, what I 
learned from them now gets written down into a work that furthers my career, serving only 
to widen the gulf of privilege between us. I can only hope to work towards some reciprocity 
by trying to live up to the promise that many of my interlocutors asked of me: to write, as 
accurately as I can, the history of their struggles. This strengthened my commitment to seize 
on ‘every trace of [their] independent initiative’ to understand their role as ‘protagonist[s] of 
a real and effective historical drama’ (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 55, 130).  
Many – if not most – of those traces were doubtlessly lost on me. For example, a whole world 
of female experience was mostly inaccessible to me as a man and a foreigner. Here, my 
positionality did not give me privileged access. Moreover, not having studied Tunisia before, 
and thus with limited knowledge of the country’s history and culture, and insufficient 
command of local Arabic, meant that I grasped shamefully little in terms of detail and nuance 
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in those conversations that I did have. Alas, I often wish that someone more suitable and 
knowledgeable would have carried out this project. But, somehow, my interlocutors were 
given none better than me to write the history of their protagonism in the Tunisian 
revolution. Maybe the thesis will inspire other scholars to follow up on this historical task. 
For the moment, I can only hope that the pages which follow do at least some degree of 
justice to it. 
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IV. Subaltern Politics on the Eve of the Revolution 
 
This chapter develops a perspective “from below” on the hegemonic formation of the Ben 
Ali regime on the eve of the revolution and describes subaltern politics that unfolded within 
this context. It does so primarily for the specific group of the subaltern population whose 
agency I came to understand as key in the context of the revolution: the young, mostly un- 
or underemployed, male residents of popular quarters and towns in the country’s interior. 
Thus, the main purpose of the chapter is to understand the reasons for dissent and 
experiences of resistance with which these young men entered the popular politics of the 
revolutionary process. Sometimes, for reasons of brevity, they will be referred to simply as 
“(subaltern) youth”, “young men”, or “the unemployed”. Other subaltern and middle-class 
residents of my focus localities – the cities of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, as well as the towns 
of Menzel Bouzaiane, Regueb, and Thala – will feature to the extent that they shared and 
explained youth grievances to me. The experience of hegemony under Ben Ali described 
here, then, is primarily that of the young unemployed men of the interior, as are the forms 
of subaltern politics which this chapter discusses. Hegemony is used as an optic on the 
historic-cultural context with which subaltern politics is at any point inseparably intertwined 
(Nilsen and Roy, 2015a). Through this lens, the agency of my interlocutors becomes 
intelligible as historically and culturally conditioned – at once constrained by hegemony and 
motivated by the contradictions that mark subaltern lifeworlds in its fissures.  
The chapter proceeds in four sections. It first discusses how divides and inequalities between 
marginalized interior and more affluent coastal regions of the country deepened due to 
neoliberal economic policies under Ben Ali. These hegemonic contractions produced 
rampant unemployment which affected young men in the interior particularly severely and 
led to feelings of disincorporation from society. Section two argues that, in lieu of hegemonic 
incorporation, subalterns experienced an intensified policing as the key mode of governance 
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through which the regime sought to control their discontent. The chapter argues that the 
conjuncture of oppressive policing and economic disincorporation hit young men most 
intensely and made their lives almost impossible. The following sections argue that these 
conditions were experienced by the young men in the country’s interior as violations of their 
moral economy and sense of dignity, to which they responded by engaging in various forms 
of resistance. Section three shows that those seeking improvements to their economic 
situation turned towards UGTT, as the hegemonic vector of subaltern politics in the country 
but also engaged in various forms of independent mobilizations ranging from sit-ins to 
hunger strikes. In parallel, young men also found other ways to express their discontent, as 
they clashed with the police in football stadiums or targeted symbols of state authority in 
their quarters. Jointly, these developments formed an “insurgent vector” of subaltern self-
activity that signaled withdrawal of consent and produced effects of learning in struggle, 
forming “local rationalities” (Cox and Nilsen, 2014) of activism and embryonic resistance 
cultures. The chapter concludes that, on the eve of the revolution, conditions for subalterns 
in the interior resembled a slow-burning “crisis of hegemony” in which their consent was 
fading and coercion mounting (Gramsci, 1971), thus laying the bases of a resistance that 
pointed towards larger struggles to come.  
 
Economic Disincorporation  
As Ben Ali came to power, postcolonial authoritarian legitimacy built around the charismatic 
leadership of Bourguiba as the deliverer of independence was waning and the regime sought 
to replace it with a narrative built around a reformist government that brought social and 
economic development (Camau and Geisser, 2003; Hibou, 2011a). This was combined with 
preserving certain promises of the Bourguiba era – such as social mobility through education 
guaranteed by public sector employment, and state social provisions – which, in the face of 
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neoliberal reforms, proved increasingly difficult to maintain (Achy, 2015). On the surface, 
neoliberal economic development in Tunisia appeared successful. The country outperformed 
regional peers, posting annual growth rates averaging 5% over the decade ending in 2010, 
and increased per capita income from $2,713 in 2005 to $3,720 in 2010 (Achy, 2011, p. 4). 
However, this growth coexisted with highly unequal regional distribution of gains. It appears 
that hegemonic processes which had served to economically incorporate populations in the 
interior of the country contracted under Ben Ali as inequalities between regions grew. 
Contradictions thus emerged between common sense notions of progress and development 
propagated in regime discourses and the experience of my interlocutors in the interior 
regions. 
While inequalities between coastal and interior regions can be traced throughout the 
country’s history (Clancy-Smith, 2014), they were exacerbated under the neoliberal approach 
to economic development implemented over the Ben Ali years (Beissinger et al., 2015). The 
principal driving factor behind this was a growth model focused on exports, tourism, and 
private sector development. Export-oriented infrastructure and private businesses clustered 
along the coast, creating few employment opportunities in interior regions. At the same time, 
privatization, downsizing of the public-sector, and reduced investment in public companies 
diminished existing employment opportunities in places which had previously benefitted 
from state-led investments in agriculture and industry (Blavier, 2016; Murphy, 2013a; 
Tsourapas, 2013). Growing regional inequality affected the Centre-West region 
(governorates of Sidi Bouzid, Kairouan and Kasserine) particularly harshly, as shown in a study 
by the national statistical institute (INST), published in 2012. In 2000, extreme poverty in the 
Centre-West was about five times higher than in the Greater Tunis area, but by 2010 this 
ration had increased to almost fourteen times higher (INST, 2012, p. 16). And although 
poverty in the Centre West fell from roughly half to a third of the regional population over 
the same period, and extreme poverty from a 25% to 15%, the region was by far the poorest 
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in the country and had been most left behind in relative terms. Indeed, by 2010, more than 
40% of all Tunisians living under conditions of extreme poverty were concentrated in these 
three governorates (ibid, p. 18). That economic policies under Ben Ali marginalized the 
governorates of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine was conveyed to me by many of my interlocutors 
there. Lazher Gammoudi, regional secretary general of UGTT in Sidi Bouzid, gave this 
testimony when we spoke over tea in his spacious office: 
There was no development, no employment. Under the dictatorship, it was the littorals that benefited. 
There are airports, ports, industrial zones. All the investment went there […] We, on the other hand, 
have no factories and nothing else. Everyone is trying to find bread as best they can. 
Development projects and state investment, then, were almost completely absent in the Sidi 
Bouzid governorate. Private sector activities were equally scarce and, in 2010, this region 
with a population of roughly half a million had only 2,750 employees working in industrial 
enterprises, mostly in textiles and the processing of foodstuffs (Feltrin, 2018a, p. 235). 
Agriculture was the most important sector of the regional economy and had benefitted from 
investment programs under Bourguiba which increased productivity, established state-
owned farms, and supported smallholders through cheap loans (Attia, 1984). Conditions for 
agricultural development were affected drastically by neoliberal restructuring under Ben Ali, 
as public lands were sold to private investors and indebted smallholders forced to do likewise 
when the government cut subsidies, and many were no longer able to pay their instalments. 
The impact of land sales was felt throughout interior regions, where families often dependent 
on subsistence agriculture and those previously working on state-owned farms were forced 
into unemployment or to accept inferior labor conditions (Gana, 2013a). They also affected 
many of the young men in the popular quarters and towns of the Sidi Bouzid governorate, 
who relied on income from agricultural activity, including Mohamed Bouazizi who used to 
work a plot of land which his uncle owned in Regueb, a town adjected to Sidi Bouzid (Hmed, 
2015). This was relayed to me by Badreddine Masoudi, head of the primary education union 
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in Regueb, whom we met in the small premises of the local UGTT. Surrounded by walls 
covered with mementos of struggles ranging from those of the local farmers to banners 
declaring solidarity with the Palestinian people, he told us this: 
Regueb's lands were sold to investors from other regions and the Reguebians became simple workers 
without any rights. […] Mohamed Bouazizi had an uncle who owned land here. He was among the 
small farmers who did not have the money to pay the bank [loan]. The bank therefore took over the 
land. […] This is what the banks did in Regueb. The farmers were forced to sell their land and then 
became mere workers on their own land. 
Economic conditions in communities like Regueb clearly declined under Ben Ali due to the 
commodification of agricultural land. Badreddine notes how smallholders were affected 
particularly negatively and suggests that the fate of Mohamed Bouazizi was shared by many 
of the young men in those areas. Conditions in the neighboring Kasserine governorate were 
no better. The arid soils of this region limit agricultural activity largely to low income 
generating pastoralism and cultivation of fruit such as prickly pear, although the sector still 
accounts for roughly 30% of employment (GIZ, 2015, p. 16).  
Under Bourguiba, the region received targeted investments in industry, the flagship project 
of which was the significant expansion of a cellulose factory in the city of Kasserine. 
Transformed into the state-owned Société Nationale de Cellulose et de Papier Alfa (SNCPA), 
it was inaugurated by the president himself (Bourguiba, 1964). By the mid-seventies, paper 
production alone had created more than 3,500 jobs in Kasserine according to government 
sources (IBRD, 1974, p. 26). However, the condition of state-owned companies declined 
significantly under Ben Ali. SNCPA, for example, employed less than 1,200 people in 2005, 
and neither new public nor private investments produced significant amounts of jobs, with 
overall employment in industry across the governorate standing below 7,000 in 2011 for a 
population just under half a million (GIZ, 2015, pp. 22, 24). Several trade unionists that I spoke 
with remarked that the region had been hit hard by a lack of economic development. As such, 
a high school teacher from Kasserine said that ‘there is no agriculture, no tourism, no projects 
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[…] Everyone is poor and miserable’ (Choukri Hayouni). The head of the local UGTT in Thala, 
meanwhile, gave the example that ‘in our region, we only have one factory, because we are 
a forgotten, marginalized region’ (Ezzedine Negrichi). This lack of economic development was 
denounced by many of the young men I spoke to, such as Imed Mourali from Kasserine. In 
his mid-thirties, he had to drop out of school to support his family and was making ends meet 
with a small locksmith workshop in the city center where we met. His hands blackened from 
the work, he offered us tea as we sat around a dusty table: 
Kasserine lacks development. It is on the last place in all areas. […] We have an old factory that gave 
jobs producing cellulose. Now it doesn't even employ 200 people. […] For 23 years [of Ben Ali], 
Kasserine got nothing. They didn't add anything to Kasserine. Nothing after the cellulose [factory]. Did 
you set up a prickly pear factory for me so I can work? No, nothing at all! 
He expresses how the Ben Ali years had not brought any economic opportunities for those 
seeking employment in manufacturing or agriculture and gives the impression that people 
like him felt they had grown up under a regime which ignored their plight. Others were even 
more clear in expressing that unequal development between regions made them feel they 
were being left behind and excluded from the national progress propagated by the regime, 
materializing for others but not for them. This was the case with Ghassen (alias) who lived 
with his family in the neighborhood of Hay Ennour, one of Kasserine’s popular quarters. In 
his late thirties, he had never found regular employment and, under Ben Ali, spent most of 
his days in cafes trying to secure day labor or delivery jobs which he carried out on a scooter, 
his most valuable possession. Now holding a position in public administration, he visited me 
one evening at my hotel in Kasserine where we sat over beers as he recounted his old life 
and conditions in Kasserine:   
We lived under enormous pressure! Penniless, not a cigarette, with unemployment. And we saw other 
regions, the Sahel and Tunis, how they live, and we compared with our situation. Automatically you 
got this feeling of hatred against the regime. […For example] in Thala, they put the stones in trucks 
and transport them to factories in Sousse to process them into marble. And here the people of Thala 
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are unemployed. Our factory, the national cellulose company, was the leading [paper] producer in 
Africa. Go see now: it is stagnating. 
The words of Imed and Ghassen manifest the intense burden experienced by many of the 
young men I spoke to, expressed through the decline of employment opportunities in their 
communities and the economic hardship it induced. Ghassen, who would become active in 
civil society projects after the revolution and was interested in local history, also conveys an 
image of the interior as being exploited for its natural resources, while wealth accumulated 
along the coast where economic conditions were arguably improving under Ben Ali. While 
the situation of young men without higher education degrees was dire, unemployment also 
struck those who had managed to go to university. In Kasserine, there were no employment 
opportunities for people like 34-year-old Houssem Allali, for example, who had studied fine 
arts and filled his time before the revolution by volunteering at the local cultural center. He 
met us at small café where him and his friends were watching a football match over cups of 
cheap tea: 
People were staying unemployed for 10, 15 years! […] In 2008, I had barely lived through two years of 
unemployment. I didn't want to talk about my graduation date. We all felt gloomy about the future. 
We wanted a job in the public service, everyone wanted to be a public servant.  
According to Houssem, decade-long unemployment seemed a likely future and the only hope 
that young graduates like him could imagine was to somehow secure public sector a job. This 
expectation was based on the fact that the public sector in Tunisia had historically played an 
important role in absorbing university graduates, whose numbers expanded under Ben Ali 
from about 20% to 40% of an age cohort (Campante and Chor, 2012). But in the 2000s, 
neoliberal cuts meant that ‘civil service and state-owned enterprises, which were the 
traditional avenues for high-skilled graduates, could no longer guarantee employment’ as 
annual public sector job creation fell from roughly 20,000 prior to 2006 to less than 10,000 
by 2010 (Achy, 2011, p. 9). Indeed, those with postsecondary qualifications were hit hardest 
by increases in unemployment as their share of all jobseekers rose from 20% to 70% over the 
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final decade under Ben Ali (ibid). These conditions violated a key element of the moral 
economy established by an authoritarian social compact which had promised social mobility 
through educational attainment (Hibou, 2011b). This was expressed clearly in my 
conversation with a high school teacher and trade union activist in Thala who remarked that 
‘a public sector job is a right!’ (Jamel Boulaabi). Here, too, there was a clear regional pattern 
as graduate unemployment reached 40% in parts of the interior whereas it stood at some 
10-15% for Greater Tunis (Blavier, 2016, p. 68). With the decline of alternative sources of 
income such as agriculture that had historically served as a remedy to temporary 
unemployment, including for university graduates (Gana, 2012), the young men in the 
interior faced worsening economic prospects regardless of their level of education.  
Hegemonic contractions affected people in the interior not just through the decline of local 
state investments and job creation. In addition, my interlocutors said that they were actively 
discriminated against by the administration when applying for public sector jobs, permits, or 
the allocation of social benefits. This is significant because these mechanisms of inclusion 
operating through the political economy were argued to have effectively ensured support for 
the regime (Hibou, 2011a). That this was not the case for young men in the interior was 
expressed by Naoufel Abbassi, a 38-year-old from Menzel Bouzaiane, who is now an 
elementary school teacher but had been previously excluded because of his regional origin. 
This made him realize that ‘there was marginalization and a feeling of contempt: You pass a 
competition [entry exam], and they send you home because you are Bouzidi [from Sidi 
Bouzid]’ (Naoufel Abbassi). A similar sentiment was relayed by Arbi Kadri, a 35-year-old from 
Regueb who had tried in vain to find a job as a secondary school teacher under Ben Ali. We 
met in a café just outside the local school where he now works. Arbi was well dressed, 
exhibiting the more elevated social status he had gained, and described eloquently how 
graduates in the interior had experienced marginalization and exclusion: 
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I succeeded in the written phase of the competition [for recruiting teachers]. But in the oral 
examination, I was excluded without any valid reason. I imagine you know very well that this 
competition could be bought. [… It was a] system that only benefitted the “lucky” classes and excluded 
those already marginalized and forgotten. 
He points to the issue of corruption in public sector recruitment. To him, it was clear that 
these comparatively well-paid jobs were being allocated to those who could bribe officials, 
while people from already marginalized communities such as Regueb were kept out. 
Similarly, scholars have argued that the system of nominally competitive exams for entering 
public service had under Ben Ali increasingly been replaced by nepotistic hiring practices, 
through which the ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), 
assured political loyalties (Hibou, 2011a). Indeed, in my interviews, the issue of party control 
over public sector recruitment discriminating against applicants from the interior came up 
frequently, as was the case in the conversation with Ezzedine Negrichi, head of the UGTT 
branch in Thala. Ezzedine received us in the union premises of the town where we sat down 
in a small meeting room. A retired teacher and respected local trade union activist, he spoke 
in a clear and determined manner:  
Recruitment in the public service was subject to the agreement of the head of the regional RCD office. 
[… Similarly,] whatever authorization you need, even to sell tobacco, was given to you only if the RCD 
agreed. And so, the inhabitants of Thala were aware that the RCD was the obstacle which prevented 
especially the young people in the region from finding work and livelihood. 
He states that not only public sector jobs but also authorizations required for setting up 
businesses became impossible to obtain without party approval. He also made clear to me 
that the effects were devastating for the already marginalized young men, who consequently 
came to see the RCD as the main impediment to their ability to make a living.28 Indeed, party 
corruption and nepotism was viewed by many of my interlocutors as frustrating their efforts 
 
28 My use of the term “youth” parallels that of my interlocutors in the interior in that it is understood 
to refer to the young men. Women in these communities, while often contributing to family income, 
were not considered in need of regular employment, as the main responsibility of providing for the 
family was that of the men. 
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to find work. This was expressed, by Maher Khadraoui, now in his mid-twenties, from the 
popular quarter of Hay Ezzouhour in Kasserine who spoke of his efforts to find a job as he 
approached the end of high school. He was wearing torn jeans and a colorful t-shirt when he 
met us in a café on the city’s central square and told us that: ‘I had a neighbor who was an 
[RCD] cadre. And he knew that I had nothing. I begged him to help me, to find me a job. He 
said “okay, okay” but he gave his favors to his brothers or cousins’ (Maher Khadraoui).  
Just as Ezzedine suggests, the RCD and its local cadres were anything but an avenue for 
economic inclusion for the young men, who instead experienced the party as a system of 
exclusion. People like them, without high-level connections or abilities to curry favors, were 
being left behind. This was summarized by another young unemployed man from the same 
neighborhood, who preferred not to be identified, as a system in which ‘if you know 
someone, you can work, but if you don’t know anyone, you can’t work’ (Nizar, pseudonym). 
This structure of disincorporation of the young men from regular economic life led them to 
search for opportunities elsewhere. According to a trade unionist from Regueb it contributed 
to the ‘the appearance of the phenomenon of the shadow economy, that of smuggling’ 
(Nasser Zribi). In Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, the smuggling economy involved chiefly petrol 
and cannabis brought in from Algeria and Libya. Engaging in these activities was risky and 
conversations about it brought out another role played by the RCD: surveillance.  
While the police were clearly visible and typically patrolled main streets, youth who had been 
engaged in the shadow economy told me that party informants were much more difficult to 
spot and could appear discretely in the residential quarters. Fathi from Thala, for example, 
who preferred to give his first name only, said: ‘I’ll explain to you how the RCD worked. They 
had ears in all the quarters. If there was an “RCDist” and he saw me or my brothers, he went 
straight to the police to cause us trouble’ (Fathi). At the same time, local party leaders tried 
to control or take a share of the profits from shadow trade (Hibou, 2011a). One example was 
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given to me by Tarik Aidoudi from Hay Ennour in Kasserine. In his mid-twenties, he had still 
been in high school during the time of Ben Ali. Tarik arrived at the small restaurant in the city 
center where we met wearing a grey tracksuit likely coming from his work in the semi-legal 
trade in container loads of faulty cloths and stock-clearances of European stores for which 
Tunisia is a sorting and redistribution hub. He explained to me how a local RCD cadre from 
his neighborhood enriched himself by simply taking from those stocks what he wanted: 
When the cars with clothes were coming […] Nejib arrived and took what he wanted. […] He was part 
of the RCD, I hate him. We were poor and he, on the other hand, takes clothes and everything. Ahmed, 
his son, was our classmate. He wore very nice clothes, whereas we had the same shoes all year round. 
Squeezed out of the regular labor market by unequal regional development, corruption, and 
nepotism, the young men confronted predatory party cadres even in the informal economy 
giving them, as Tarik suggests, a clear sense of injustice. From what my interlocutors told me, 
they stood at best a chance of getting charity – although that came at the hefty price of 
stigmatizing those already-marginalized even further. The most prominent case for this was 
perhaps the Fonds National de Solidarité (FNS). Set up by Ben Ali himself and administered 
directly through his office, the FNS was tasked with supporting communities designated as 
the “zones of shadow” in the country, which the fund aimed to “eradicate” (Tsourapas, 
2013). An intense media attention created around the fund was aimed to evidence the 
benevolence of the president, and so it provides a highly salient exemplification for the 
discursive othering of subaltern populations in the country by the highest echelons of the 
regime. This official stigmatization did not escape the attention of my interlocutors. Choukri 
Slougui, an unemployed university graduate in his mid-thirties from Hay Ezzouhour in 
Kasserine whose family had been receiving support from the FNS said that he felt ‘there was 
a policy of impoverishment and handouts. The regime treated me like an animal, not like a 
human being’ (Choukri Slougui).  
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For the young men from subaltern social groups living in the towns and popular quarters of 
the interior, the Ben Ali regime’s image of economic development and progress clearly did 
not match with experience. To them, as Choukri expresses it, the regime denied the most 
basic sense of humanity and dignity. As processes of economic inclusion contracted and no 
longer operated for their benefit, the experience of these young men became one of 
disincorporation from society, leading to feelings of unworthiness and a kind of social death. 
Nizar and Maher, the young men whose lack of connections left them jobless, express this in 
the following way: ‘Unemployment, poverty, injustice – our lives were worth nothing. An 
obscured life […] we did not see anything, no light, no happiness’ (Nizar, Kasserine). Maher 
added that they ‘lived in a prison; the entrance of this city is a prison and its end is a cemetery’ 
(Maher Khadraoui). This sentiment is echoed vividly by Karim Delhoumi from Hay Ennour. 
Now in his mid-twenties, he had dropped out of high school, feeling that education had 
become worthless and was mostly hanging out with his friends. Meeting us in his regular 
café, he said: ‘Frankly, we weren't living. […] It was a country in which, even when you study, 
you become nothing. We had no perspective. Tunisia was a cemetery’ (Karim Delhoumi).  
As Karim alludes to in mentioning the broken promise of social advancement through 
education, the young men experienced their disincorporation as violations to a moral 
economy which had established expectations of progress and an, if not affluent, then at least 
decent life. I read the feelings which my interlocutors express as imprisonment and being 
dead alive as articulating conditions of contradictory consciousness. Their disincorporation 
meant that they were precisely not “alive” in the way laid out by common sense. Their 
existence had little resemblance to the regime’s images of economic progress and neoliberal 
consumerist modernity. Experiences of poverty, unemployment, marginalization, and 
discrimination stood in stark contrast with these hegemonic conceptions of what life in 
Tunisia was supposedly like. While conditions of contradictory consciousness caused by 
hegemonic contractions appear in the conceptual lenses of the thesis as bases for subaltern 
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politics, the sense of being stuck and seeing no way out which my interlocutors expressed 
already indicated that there was not a straightforward path to resistance. As the following 
section discusses, heavy policing of everyday life in the interior under Ben Ali served both to 
heighten and suppress discontent.  
 
The Policing of Everyday Life 
This section shows that everyday life for subaltern men, especially for the youth, in the 
interior was shaped by the intense presence of the security apparatus. Policing served to 
both augment and suppress discontent brought about through economic marginalization. 
Indeed, the condition of the young men was precisely one of far-reaching hegemonic 
disincorporation, as they encountered the state as a primarily coercive force rather than 
through mechanisms of social, economic, and job provision. Coercion, and the pervasive fear 
it created, was described to me by my interlocutors as a key factor keeping them from 
expressing their discontent. This is what Kais Bouazizi told me, a 31-year-old cousin of 
Mohamed Bouazizi living in one of the popular quarters in Sidi Bouzid. Like his deceased 
relative, Kais does not hold a university degree and was unemployed before the revolution. 
He has since found modest sources of income in civil society work and underlined his 
improved social status by wearing a large watch and smoking a comparably expensive brand 
of cigarettes during our conversation: 
Most of the young people rejected the situation and the policy of the regime but could not speak out 
because they felt isolated. We were afraid to speak. It must not be forgotten that the Ben Ali regime 
was a dictatorial and police regime under which few dared to speak up. 
Kais states that draconian policing instilled fear and a sense of isolation among his peers 
which barred them from expressing their dissent. Intimidation was created by what has been 
described as the omnipresence of the police (Hibou, 2011a). Although the number of police 
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officers per citizen was not particularly high by regional standards (roughly 1/200), the Ben 
Ali regime deployed police forces extensively into public space and gave them unusually high 
patrol duties and long twelve-hour shifts (Lutterbeck, 2015). This was combined with a 
condition of “opacity” whereby ‘lack of formal regulation […and] the absence of clear rules 
[…gave] the regime a “freer hand”’ which constituted ‘a notable difference between the Ben 
Ali and Bourguiba periods’ (ibid, p. 819). As such, a 2006 decree on police duties allowed 
them to investigate ‘everything which is relevant for political, economic, social and cultural 
life’, whereby ‘this intelligence function […was] defined independently of any specific threat 
which might be posed to individuals or the state’ (ibid, p. 821). This account of the policing 
regime’s arbitrariness and intense presence in public space corresponds strongly to my 
interlocutors’ everyday experience. This was brought out vividly by the comments of Hamza 
Aloui, a 29-year-old without a university degree who had been unemployed before the fall 
of Ben Ali. A resident of Kasserine’s destitute Hay Ennour neighborhood, he describes how 
the local police chief denied the young unemployed men like him even the small pleasure of 
socializing in the popular cafes, thus targeting their basic participation in public life: 
[Local police chief] Wissem Ouertatani ruled like a king here. If he found young people in the street, 
he got out of his car and slapped them. He entered the cafes and started beating young people who 
had nothing else to do but sit in the café and have a good time. He chased us out of the café! He would 
not let us hang out in the streets or at night outside the house either. […] The youth of Kasserine lived 
in poverty and marginalization. But on top of that, they lived it all in silence, with repression, 
humiliation, insults etc. […] our mothers were insulted, we were humiliated in a thousand ways. 
Here is the omnipresence and arbitrariness of policing. It did not matter where the young 
men were or what they were doing, their mere presence in public space was enough reason 
for the local police chief to subject them to violence. This led to young men feeling squeezed 
out of the social fabric itself, compounding the humiliation produced through economic 
marginalization discussed in the previous section. This was echoed by Amine Abidi from 
Regueb, a 30-year-old trained pastry chef who works on a large farm. Visibly enjoying his 
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coffee and smiling across his sunburned face, he recounted how people like him had been 
forced out of the streets by the police even in their own neighborhood: ‘At 8 p.m., the police 
would arrive in our quarter and tell us “Go home”. We did not do anything. And yet, we were 
chased away. Oh, I hated the police’ (Amine Abidi). Having no limits to their authority, the 
police ruled over every aspect of public life. And Naoufel, the teacher from Menzel 
Bouzaiane, underscored insults and humiliation by the police as he recalled that ‘the youths 
were angry with the police. They provoked everyone, insulted and humiliated people, treated 
them with contempt’ (Naoufel Abbassi). This quotidian experience of contemptuous and 
humiliating treatment was also forcefully described by Ghassen, the former day laborer.  
Unemployment and marginalization had become commonplace. What was worse was the fact that 
you were subjected to the injustice of the state, the police machinery. The police despised people. 
They humiliated you, beat you in the street, insulted your mother. This will produce hate in you. […] 
There was very blatant injustice. The police who randomly slap young people, things like that became 
our daily life in Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, etc. 
Ghassen suggests that the treatment which subaltern youth received by the police was even 
more strongly constitutive of feelings of injustice than their economic marginalization. Being 
beaten and verbally abused in public, including, as Hamza similarly mentioned, by police 
hurling insults of their mothers at them, was experienced by the young men as particularly 
humiliating. Scholars have argued that a sense of dignity and masculine honor is constructed 
by young Arab men from subaltern social groups around the ability to move freely in their 
neighborhoods and be perceived as strong men capable of protecting their families (Ismail, 
2006). This is not an essentializing, orientalist point about “Arab men and their pride”. 
Research in marginalized  communities the world over has found that young men, having 
little else around which to construct a sense of self-worth, develop a type of “strong-man 
subjectivity” (see e.g. Whyte, 1943, for an account from the US). It was precisely these basic 
notions of dignity and masculinity which the police were denying subaltern youth in the 
interior by publicly demeaning them and the honor of their family. As it appeared to me, this 
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was a main reason why the young men I spoke with felt such intense hatred of the police. 
But violence did not stop at the level of beatings and humiliation of dignity. 
Aside from attacks in public space, several of my interlocutors also experienced intense forms 
of physical violence, including torture, that were administered more discretely. Indeed, the 
Tunisian police were notorious for using arbitrary arrest and torture (Ismail, 2003; 
Lutterbeck, 2015). As such, Human Rights Watch found that, despite a nominal ban under 
Ben Ali, ‘security forces continued to torture persons with impunity during interrogations’ 
(HRW, 2011). An earlier report by Amnesty International concluded that, under the pretext 
of anti-terrorism measures, Tunisian security forces held people ‘in prolonged 
incommunicado detention […] during [which] detainees are systematically tortured and 
otherwise ill-treated’ (AI, 2008, p. 33). They found that ‘illegal detention and enforced 
disappearance […] since the entry into force of the Anti-terrorism Law [in 2006,… affected] 
hundreds, possibly thousands, of people’, and that practices of torture included ‘suspension 
by the ankles or in contorted positions […] electric shocks; burning with cigarettes […and] 
sexual abuse’ (ibid, pp. 11, 16). The above-quoted young man from Kasserine who preferred 
to go by the alias Nizar said that he had been detained and tortured on multiple occasions: 
The police tortured me! They put me in prison many times! A lot of injustices. They created charges 
without foundation and arrested you even when they found you on the street. […] Without reason. 
They didn’t let you live quietly, freely. They didn’t let you breathe. 
This testimony underlines that forced disappearance and torture occurred without victims 
having committed an offense. This suggests that arbitrary police violence, including extreme 
forms, marked the lives of subaltern men in the interior to a significant extent. Coercion, 
then, was an important part of the atmosphere of fear through which the regime sought to 
control subaltern groups and which Nizar described as literally suffocating. This was also 
brought out in other conversations I had, such as with Fadhel Bouzidi, a carpenter in his late 
fifties who received us in his workshop in Kasserine’s Hay Ennour neighborhood. He had been 
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detained frequently due to his Salafi affiliation. As we sat around a small fire which he built 
to keep out the winter cold, he told us that, in Kasserine alone, there had been ‘five or six 
centers where they tortured us: the center of terrorism, the center of state security, and 
several sections of the national guard. This is what made Ben Ali and the police so hated in 
Kasserine’ (Fadhel Bouzidi). Physical violence at the hands of the police seems to have been 
the lot of subaltern men irrespective of their age or activities. As I learned in my conversation 
with Saif Seyhi, a young man from Thala in his mid-twenties, even young boys were at risk of 
being detained if they crossed the path of the police at the wrong moment. He met us in a 
small eatery in Kasserine where he now lives and told us this: 
The police wanted to arrest people who worked in drugs, and we fled […] I was arrested […] I was in 
front of the commissioner, he said to us: “Imagine what this generation is capable of: At 8 years old, 
he runs away from the police!” Then he slapped us and let us go home. […] I hate the police. When I 
see a policeman, I run away. 
This story suggests that the young men in the interior of the country grew up learning to hate 
and avoid the police whenever possible. Here, again, arbitrariness and fear reinforced each 
other, as my interlocutors were never sure what might draw the attention of the police. 
Karim, the young school dropout from Kasserine, told me that this could happen simply 
because they did not correspond to the image of squalidness deemed proper to a subaltern 
status: ‘We didn’t smoke cannabis; we didn’t even drink. [… But] if you dressed well, you 
were accused of selling cannabis [... and] you could spend the whole day at the police station’ 
(Karim Delhoumi). From these accounts we see that the police controlled every aspect of the 
lives of subaltern youth in the interior – from the physical spaces they could occupy right 
down to what clothes they could wear without arousing suspicion – all the while maintaining 
a state of perpetual opacity as to the rules to be followed. In other words, the law was what 
the police said it was. Through this opacity and arbitrariness, the police put further strain 
onto the precarious economic lives of young men like Hamza: 
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My brother had a small business of “Mlāwi” [a cheap sandwich]. And since it's a popular quarter, 
everyone gathered there. [… Local police chief] Wissem Ouertani came to close the shop for no reason! 
Like that, just so that his orders are carried out. […] They didn’t let you live, work. 
He says that people like him were being denied the possibility simply to live and work. Here, 
the effects of arbitrary policing appeared to have merged with the processes of hegemonic 
contraction discussed in the previous section to jointly render life impossible for subaltern 
youth in the interior. In these experiences, the police came to be identified with the state 
more broadly and the hardship which its policies caused for members of subaltern groups. 
Helmi Cheniti, who had dropped out of university to work in a chemical factory in the coastal 
city of Monastir, expressed this sentiment in the conversation we had in his family home in 
Thala. The older brother of a young man who was killed during the revolution, he spoke 
passionately about the police in those years: 
In our mentality, the police were the state. When you saw a policeman, for you it is he who prevented 
your livelihood. He is responsible for your empty pocket, your frustration, your poverty, the injustice 
you feel etc. We knew nothing, only the police. 
The police appear here as the principle manifestation of state authority and are thus held 
responsible for economic marginalization and injustice. In this, what Helmi terms “our 
mentality” can be understood as a local rationality. Derived from concrete experience of 
hegemonic contractions and contradictions with common sense notions of what life was 
supposed to be like, Helmi expresses a “good sense conception” of the state as equivalent 
with structures of coercion. That such notions might have foreshadowed developments to 
come was also suggested by a comment which Karim made after recounting his experiences 
with the police under Ben Ali: ‘Our dreams were very simple. I wanted nothing at all, no job, 
nothing – just that the police would not humiliate us and lets us live in peace’ (Karim 
Delhoumi). Essentially, Karim is voicing political demands for a dignified life, although they 
were not abstracted beyond the immediate source of repression in the form of the police. 
Here, we can see the kernel of demands expressed through good sense, and which held the 
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potential for political articulation. These responded a local conditions of a slow-burning 
“crisis of hegemony” (Gramsci, 1971) in which consent faded and was increasingly replaced 
by coercion. As the following two section discuss, forms of subaltern politics building on these 
conditions could be observed well before the onset of the revolutionary process.  
 
Self-Activity of the Unemployed 
How, then, did the young subaltern men in the interior respond to their conditions of 
hegemonic disincorporation and to the oppressive policing of their everyday lives? What 
avenues did they pursue for voicing discontent and putting pressure on authorities? In other 
words, to what extent did the bases for dissent discussed thus far lead to subaltern politics 
under Ben Ali? This section argues that UGTT structures allowed for a certain level of 
subaltern mobilization and economic claims-making. Yet, my interlocutors also engaged in 
various forms of self-activity, including mobilizing efforts by the unemployed, localized 
resistance, and their own independent claims-making. These developments signaled the 
emergence of an insurgent vector of mobilization which, although evolving in a complex 
relationship with the union, was largely independent from formal politics.  
The weakness of pre-revolutionary formal political structures in the Tunisian interior – for 
example, opposition parties and civil society – was something that I noticed early on in my 
fieldwork.29 More than two thirds of my subaltern interlocutors stated that they had no 
interaction with any political organization prior to the revolution, and only little more than 
10% said they had personal experience of political activism.30 This corresponds to scholarly 
findings that suppression of their activities made opposition parties and politically active 
 
29 The noted exception is, of course, UGTT which will be discussed separately below. 
30 As footnoted above, I define political activism as engagement with formal political structures 
(including UGTT). By contrast, the activism of the unemployed prior to the revolution will be 
understood as a case of subaltern self-activity. 
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NGOs under Ben Ali essentially a Tunis and middle-class affair (Hudáková, 2019; Warkotsch, 
2015). It suggests that the opening up of the political and civil society spheres under Ben Ali, 
relative to the Bourguiba era, created precious few sites for the political inclusion of 
subaltern groups.31 This was the impression given by Bassem Hajji, a 28-year-old university 
graduate in literature from Thala, who had been unemployed under Ben Ali. An articulate 
young man who now runs a small NGO, he received us in his office, well-equipped with 
modern IT. Though he had always been interested in politics, he said that the structures of 
political opposition parties were hard to access for young men like him: 
Maybe the [opposition] parties were meeting discreetly. What was their program? I have no idea […] 
Maybe they were politicized, and they knew what the regime was. But we, the young people, didn't 
know any of that. 
He suggests that the inaccessibility of opposition groups meant that becoming politically 
engaged was difficult for the youth and limited their ability to develop an understanding of 
politics. This had been the case even for someone like him whose uncle was a member of the 
banned Parti Communiste des Ouvriers de Tunisie (PCOT, but mostly called POCT). As Choukri 
Hayouni, a trade unionist from Kasserine and former POCT activist, pointed out, this was also 
due to the lack of activity by these groups. An Arabic teacher in his mid-fifties, well-known 
and respected by many of my young interlocutors from his quarter of Hay Ennour for his 
overt criticism of the Ben Ali regime, Choukri left the POCT after the revolution. He met us at 
a café in the city center frequented by trade unionists and conveyed a strong feeling of 
disillusionment with the opposition parties that existed under Ben Ali: 
 
31 After coming to power, Ben Ali introduced regular multi-party elections. Yet, the few parties which 
managed to obtain registration were carefully selected and created little more than a veneer of 
pluralist politics (Murphy, 1999; Willis, 2012). Many opposition movements remained illegal, and even 
legal parties were subject to surveillance, restrictive party financing, and other forms of repression 
that confined their public activities to election campaigning, publications, and events in their 
headquarters (Hibou, 2006; Warkotsch, 2015). 
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We had secret organizations which were practically not active. We called each other "comrade" or 
"brother", but there was neither practice nor anything. There were also legal organizations, but they 
were a façade. 
While Choukri suggests that political parties had been a mere façade or crippled by secrecy 
and inactivity, he also mentions the solidarity which these organizations cultivated among 
members. This corresponds with what scholars have described as “abeyance networks” for 
Tunisian politics which, although not offering much in terms of opposition activity, cultivated 
connections among activists and provided the potential for mobilization (Hmed, 2012). The 
principal context in which these networks were maintained was UGTT. Indeed, opposition 
political parties and civil society organization rarely acted outside UGTT which was effectively 
the sole tolerated space for activism and social mobilization in the country.32 This function of 
the union has been described by scholars as a “refuge” for opposition political tendencies 
(Yousfi, 2015a). That UGTT was de facto the only locus of politics under Ben Ali – and thus 
the only site of political inclusion that subalterns could turn to – was brought out in my 
conversation with Fathi. A man from a provincial town in his late forties who had been active 
with the POCT during his sociology studies, he preferred to give his first name only: 
There were no mobilizations. Political life was almost dead. [...] The people were under UGTT, and 
UGTT was to be criticized: there were those who were for and those who were against Ben Ali. Its 
mobilizations were social; there was no politics. It was very controlled. 
Fathi’s comments correspond with the notion that there was no significant opposition politics 
under Ben Ali, and that mobilizations which did occur happened under the umbrella of UGTT 
where it was nevertheless tightly controlled. He also remarked critically that trade union 
mobilizations were limited to socio-economic issues and that many trade unionists were 
regime loyalists. This latter point has been described by scholars as the presence of “two 
 
32 This role of UGTT developed in lieu of electoral politics during the Bourguiba period when the union 
became the sole space in which political currents not represented in the single party, such as 
communists and Arab Nationalists, could express themselves. This state of affairs continued under Ben 
Ali (Yousfi, 2015a). 
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UGTTs” (Camau and Geisser, 2003), in which a largely co-opted leadership and a more 
militant base coexisted within the organization. Discussing UGTT’s complex history of 
entanglement with the postcolonial state is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is 
important to repeat that the union was integrated with the state as a sort of “transmission 
belt”, aiding in the implementation of economic policy and relaying popular grievances to 
the central government through its grassroots structures (Yousfi, 2015a). For this double 
function to be effective required the union to have some freedom as a space for political 
expression. This, therefore, made it the main hegemonic vector of social and, in a tightly 
limited form, political mobilization, including for subaltern social groups. The way this played 
out was illustrated most clearly in the 2008 Gafsa revolt, the most salient and dramatic 
incident of subaltern mobilization during the Ben Ali years.  
At the core of the revolt in the Gafsa mining region, bordering Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine to 
the south, were grievances of subalterns around regional economic marginalization and 
corrupt hiring practices. Here, they centered on the main regional employer, a state-owned 
mining company. In January 2008, unemployed men from the town of Redeyef began to 
protest their exclusion from company hiring, with the support of their local union branch 
(Chouikha and Geisser, 2010; Geisser and Gobe, 2007). These protesters first raised the 
slogan “At-tajghīl istihqāq ya is-sābet as-sorrāq” (A job is a right, you pack of thieves), which 
would become a signature of mobilizations by Tunisian unemployed activists (Beinin, 2015, 
2016). In so doing they clearly articulated their grievances in terms of violations to their moral 
economy (Thompson, 1993). The local grassroots mobilization led to the involvement of “the 
other UGTT”. The role of the union leadership in this context was critically described to me 
by Fahem Arbaoui, a grassroots trade unionist and secondary school teacher from Thala. 
Looking friendly over his spectacles, he spoke to us in the local union office: 
When the government is unable to cope with the masses, the UGTT would negotiate with the 
protesters and sometimes managed to find solutions. For example, in Gafsa, the government did not 
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go to meet the protesters. Instead, a member of the executive committee of UGTT went to find a 
solution. When there is a popular rejection of [state] power, there is not necessarily popular rejection 
of the UGTT. It’s a questionable role. 
He opines that the role which the UGTT leadership played in Gafsa perfectly exemplified its 
function under Ben Ali whereby the union would act as a mediator between the regime and 
protesters. This function was crucially enabled by its popular legitimacy. But it also meant 
that the union leadership contributed to stabilizing the regime. In other words, UGTT was 
precisely a hegemonic vector of mobilization in that it functioned to direct popular discontent 
towards resolution within the existing hegemonic formation.33 In the case of Gafsa, however, 
union mediation did not result in a peaceful solution. Rather, the regime first imposed a 
media blackout and cut all road access to the center of the revolt in Redeyef. It then moved 
to forcefully put down the mobilization, leading to the death of three protesters and the 
arrest of its charismatic leader, local UGTT leader Adnan Hajji (Allal, 2010).  
Despite their ending, the events of Gafsa were mentioned by several of my young 
interlocutors as an encouragement to try and press their own economic demands. For the 
revolt had created an important precedent in which local trade unionists and the 
unemployed had mobilized together against the systematic economic marginalization of 
subalterns in the interior. As such, Hamza Sayhi, a 29-year-old from Thala without a university 
degree, said that, after Gafsa, he and other unemployed men began addressing the local 
UGTT with their grievances. Visibly proud of the café he now owns and where he received 
us, he spoke smilingly about the emerging activism at the time: 
Demonstrations which raised demands concerning the economic and social situation of people only 
emerged after Gafsa in 2008. The fear decreased among the people and they mobilized. […] We used 
 
33 The example of Gafsa thus illustrates how integration of UGTT into the hegemonic formation meant 
that (at least during the Ben Ali regime) it cannot be considered as a vector of subaltern self-activity. 
Together with the rest of this section, however, it also shows that grassroots trade unionists, often 
coming from subaltern social groups, were part of such self-activity. 
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the UGTT to put pressure on local or regional authorities to attain our rights. […] The young 
[unemployed] turn to the UGTT to claim their right to work and to life. 
Hamza describes how subaltern youth like him felt encouraged by the events in Gafsa to 
defend what they regarded as their right to a livelihood that the regime had been denying 
them. Here, just as in the case of the Gafsa revolt, we can see how deteriorating economic 
conditions due to hegemonic contractions were understood as violations of the subaltern 
moral economy to which they responded by engaging in self-activity (Cronin, 2008a; 
Thompson, 1993). That these young men sought out the support of UGTT also underscored 
the union’s continuing role as the principal organizational site for subaltern mobilization and 
claims-making under Ben Ali. The events in Gafsa similarly invigorated the self-activity of 
unemployed university graduates in the interior who, from the mid-2000s onwards, had 
begun mobilizing locally to articulate their grievances, especially demands for public sector 
jobs. This is what Arbi, the formerly unemployed teacher from Regueb, told me. He had been 
involved in activism that led to the founding of a union for unemployed graduates (Union des 
Diplômés Chômeurs, UDC) in 201134: 
In Sidi Bouzid we boycotted the CAPES in 2005. […] It was the first spark. [... We tried to] create the 
UDC, but the system refused to authorize this organization and we had to hold our meetings discreetly 
in cafes. Our mobilizations were not recurrent because of police repression. But in 2008, we mobilized 
after the events in the [Gafsa] mining basin. […] The local UGTT helped us, they opened their office for 
our meetings. 
Unemployed graduates, then, experimented with various tactics for making their grievances 
heard, such as the boycott of the CAPES, the notoriously corrupt recruitment exam for public 
school teachers. As Arbi states, the mobilization of the unemployed in the Sidi Bouzid 
governorate – just as elsewhere – was obstructed by the police and remained sporadic. In 
the aftermath of the Gafsa revolt, him and his fellow activists began to turn more systemically 
 
34 While activists involved in mobilizations by the unemployed had been organizing locally since 2005, 
the UDC was founded officially only after the revolution, in 2011 (Badimon, 2011; Gordner, 2017).  
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towards the local UGTT for support. As sympathetic trade unionists gave them access to their 
spaces, the unemployed graduates, just like other activists, found in UGTT a “refuge” from 
state repression. While local union branches were willing and capable to offer protection 
within their premises, there were, nonetheless, limits to the degree of mobilization which 
they would actively support. This is what Cherif Khraifi suggested, a 38-year-old history 
graduate who had been involved with the communist party since his university days and 
became one of the co-founders of the UDC. An experienced and well-spoken activist, he 
received us at the POCT headquarters in Tunis where he now works as the chief-editor of the 
party magazine:  
For the UGTT, its purpose is to defend people who have a job. But the unemployed are not part of its 
strategic interests […] So basically the relationship was this: some trade unionists supported us by 
sharing our press releases and signing our petitions. But that was all. 
This difference in strategic interests between UGTT and the unemployed graduates, then, 
meant that individual trade unionists were willing to support the unemployed, but that union 
structures generally would not get involved in the kind of contentious mobilization that had 
been seen in Gafsa. This was similarly brought out in the comments of Houssem, the 
unemployed arts graduate from Kasserine. He and other graduate job-seekers had ‘in 2008, 
felt that this was our opportunity to defend our rights. We demanded public sector jobs 
[…and] did a hunger strike in front of the RCD office, then at the UGTT, but nothing came of 
it’ (Houssem Allali). As Houssem describes it, unemployed youth in the interior experimented 
with various forms of self-activity, including hunger strikes, and chose strategic locations to 
articulate their grievances, suggesting an awareness of existing sites of hegemonic 
incorporation. Yet, as he tells us, the marginalized young men were ignored both by the ruling 
party and by UGTT, suggesting that support by local union branches was far from universally 
forthcoming. The image that emerges is one in which groups of marginalized young men 
defended their perceived right to employment, especially in the public sector, by engaging in 
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forms of localized self-activity that found varying degrees of support through local UGTT 
structures and trade unionists. These efforts were sometimes crowned by small successes, 
an example of which was relayed to me by Bassem, the young NGO-founder from Thala: 
The only movement I joined before the revolution was in 2008 […] with a group of other unemployed. 
[…] We organized a sit-in claiming our right to work […] Two or three of us found a job and there were 
many who thought that they had secured those jobs in a revolutionary way […] neither through the 
RCD, nor through the UGTT. 
As Bassem suggests, engaging in self-activity to pressure authorities for employment rather 
than going through established sites of inclusion – UGTT or the RCD – was perceived by many 
as a substantial innovation, even if successes were few. Through their emerging self-activity, 
unemployed young men in my field sites, both with and without higher education degrees, 
gained experience and forged new connections amongst themselves and with local trade 
unionists. These, then, were precisely instances of subaltern politics, in which experiences of 
hegemonic contractions and attendant contradictions with common sense stimulated self-
activity and entailed processes of learning and development. The young men who defended 
their perceived right to work developed new solidarities and ways of claims-making, learned 
about their possibilities and limits, including the degree of union support in their localities, 
and thus produced good sense knowledge for how to deal with their situation.  
This reading suggests that the localized efforts of the unemployed in Gafsa and beyond 
signaled the formation of an insurgent vector of mobilization among the (mostly young) 
subaltern men in the interior. That insurgent vector developed in a complex relationship 
with, but remained clearly independent of, UGTT as the hegemonic vector of subaltern 
politics. In other words, subalterns cultivated local rationalities of activism which contributed 
to and shaped the constellation of social forces in the country. These were doubtlessly 
important achievements. However, they did not entail sites of, and a language for, 
articulating grievances that went beyond socio-economic ones, notably the suffocating 
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policing of everyday life to which young men were subjected. Here, discontent showed in 
more fleeting, half-articulate, and hidden forms. As the final section of the chapter will argue, 
such less visible gestures hinted at embryonic resistance cultures in the popular quarters and 
towns in the Tunisian interior. 
 
Cultures and Spirits of Resistance 
The activism of the unemployed left historical traces as it developed through the Gafsa revolt 
and produced an organizational legacy in the form of the UDC. Other forms of self-activity by 
subalter youth who refused to quietly submit to disincorporation and coercion under Ben Ali 
remained more hidden. In my interviews, I learned of several small-scale acts of resistance 
and other traces of defiance. They appear to have centered precisely on experiences of 
subordination and domination in everyday life for which, unlike with notions of socio-
economic rights, the language of common sense did not offer expression. The most notable 
examples I came across revolved around acts of resistance directed against the police. As I 
learned from Helmi, a 25-year-old from Hay Ennour in Kasserine who preferred to go by his 
first name only, such resistance could take the form of attacks against institutional 
manifestations of regime repression in their popular quarters. Having still been a high school 
student under Ben Ali, Helmi explained to us that he was part of a circle of friends who braved 
the regime by engaging in such acts under the cover of the night: 
We would meet at a PlayStation gaming room. Everyone in the neighborhood went there. And there 
it [planning] started […] We jumped on the RCD premises at night, surrounded it with tires and set it 
on fire. You set fire and you fled, at the time […] We burned, and we left, we did not stay. Burn and 
get lost! – at Hay Ennour. 
The acts of resistance that Helmi describes developed out of everyday socializing spaces for 
the youth of the popular quarters. Tellingly, the friends did not randomly vandalize in their 
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quarter but chose as their targets the two main organs of the state through which they 
experienced exclusion and humiliation: the RCD and the police. Unable to confront the police 
directly, they went for the RCD office, thus forcing the local police to chase after them at 
night when the young men could easily disappear. Tarik Aidoudi, the school-dropout who 
described party cadre corruption above, was part of the same circle and told me that their 
actions involved careful planning, including a red herring for the guard of the RCD office who 
was invited to a small eatery. Tarik called their motives plainly as “taking revenge on the 
police and the RCD”. They subverted the seeming omnipotence of the police and exposed 
their inability to keep order at night, while simultaneously showing the party cadres that 
they, too, were vulnerable. By undermining the regime authority that humiliated them, 
young men were able to regain a sense of dignity by displaying courage and masculinity – 
precisely those attributes that they were being denied through daytime police encounters. 
And yet, such contestation was not possible out in the open. Rather, the pattern that Helmi 
describes was night-time “hit and run” actions.  
The one context in which direct confrontations with the police did take place was during 
football matches. Attendance of these events was highly popular among young men in the 
interior who would travel long distances, including to the capital, to watch their favorite 
teams play (Allal and Pierret, 2013). Several of my interlocutors told me that those matches 
frequently entailed clashes with the police. Amine, the farm worker from Regueb, said that 
‘there were conflicts in the stadium: we threw stones, they [police] responded with teargas, 
and there were scuffles’ (Amine Abidi). And Maher from Hay Ezzouhour in Kasserine 
commented that ‘in the stadium, we insulted the police and there would eventually be 
clashes. In the stadium, I took revenge on the police’ (Maher Khadraoui). Maher and Amine 
suggest that, in the stadium, the youth found strength in numbers, and inflicted payback for 
the insults that the police usually directed against them and which could not be reciprocated 
in the everyday encounters.  
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The football clashes and nocturnal actions in the quarters were, then, a means through which 
young men in the interior expressed their discontent. By engaging in these forms of 
resistance, they also forged solidarities and gained valuable experience in confronting the 
police, learning their strengths and weakness, thus building local rationalities of resistance. 
Scholars have observed such patterns in other countries as well, noting that they constitute 
ways in which young men from subaltern groups cultivate a “resisting subjectivity” (Ismail, 
2006). Indeed, several studies found that experience with clashes in stadiums provided 
subaltern youth with vital knowledge and skills in confronting the police during revolutionary 
mobilization in both Tunisia and Egypt (Allal, 2012a; Dorsey, 2012; Ismail, 2012). 
From my conversations with young men in the interior, I understood that these self-activities 
of resistance were more than mere outbursts of frustration. On the one hand, they can be 
read as defending popular moral values – here of a dignified life violated by police oppression 
– much in the same way as the unemployed did regarding the moral economy. Beyond this, 
however, these fleeting forms of resistance seem to have been attempts at more directly 
political expression that, unlike socio-economic demands, did not have a language in 
common sense. Based on how they experienced politics and the state, targeting the police 
thus becomes legible as the only form of political expression which young men with limited 
or no access to sites like UGTT could imagine. Such a reading was suggested to me by Seif 
Hamdi, a 28-year-old road construction worker from Thala without tertiary education, who 
had been unemployed before the revolution. We met in a café at the entrance to the town 
and, after quizzing me about the nature of the research, he gave the following comment 
about his understanding of the police under Ben Ali: 
The police were the only face of the authorities we knew. It was the only means to put pressure on 
the authorities who ruled the country. We never saw an official who came to speak to us. So, to send 
a message to the authorities, we only had the police. 
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This conveys not only that the police were the principal way in which the state manifested in 
the lives of subaltern youth, but that taking it on was also the only way in which he felt 
political expression was possible. This implies that acts of resistance through which the young 
men targeted the police need to be understood as purposeful activity conditioned precisely 
by the relative absence of a political language and sites of articulation. In other words, they 
were “half-articulate” ways (Chalcraft, forthcoming) in which subalterns sought to express 
the contradictions they experienced. Lack of political language and conception is also what 
Choukri, the unemployed graduate from Kasserine’s Hay Ezzouhour, alludes to when he said: 
‘Even though we were not political activists, we felt that there was injustice, that we lived in 
a police state and dictatorship. We felt it, but we did not have the means to speak and express 
ourselves’ (Choukri Slougui). Distinguishing their situation from supposedly more 
knowledgeable activists, Choukri suggests that it was the lack of means for articulation which 
kept him and his fellow youth from expressing their discontent in political language. This 
supports the notion that their small-scale acts of resistance constituted half-articulated 
expressions of a refusal considering the broader political and economic conditions that 
subalterns were living under. Moreover, they were forms of self-activity which signaled a 
readiness to confront and battle with the state.  
Noticing that the condition of my interlocutors involved “hegemonic silencing”, I became 
more attuned to popular forms of political conception which they used to describe their 
situation. I realized that my interviewees frequently offered interpretations of their situation 
under Ben Ali that drew on informal political knowledge that was present in popular accounts 
of history. These stories – at least as far as they were told to me in the context of interviews 
about the revolution – were histories of resistance by their communities, most of which 
transmitted orally. Indeed, in all my main field sites, interlocutors told me stories of this kind 
through which conditions under Ben Ali were historically contextualized and framed as 
forming part of a legacy of marginalization and oppression predating his rule. Beyond 
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temporal embedding, these stories drew connections between suffering and resistance as a 
collective response. Here, in other words, was a political language expressed in the terms of 
good sense knowledge. Kais from Sidi Bouzid, for example, gave this historical account: 
Poverty and marginalization, not just in Sidi Bouzid, was a 60-year policy. Before with Bourguiba, then 
Ben Ali continued the marginalization and impoverishment of all the regions of the interior [... because 
they had] pledged allegiance to the Youssefists. Even before, under the Bey, the Hmamma were hated. 
Bourguiba took revenge on Sidi Bouzid, and Ben Ali continued in the same vein. 
Kais offers here an interpretation of the economic marginalization of the Tunisian interior as 
resulting from a punishment by successive regimes for the disobedience of these regions 
extending back to the period prior to French colonization. He also mentions the trans-
regional collective of the Hmamma, the ʿarsh (tribe) of the Sidi Bouzid area (Camps and 
Martel, 1998), as the object of repression by the authorities. While the post-independence 
state claimed to have overcome those tribal divisions, it implemented, according to Kais, a 
pattern of regional discrimination corresponding to those divisions. That this contributed to 
marginalized and stigmatized populations holding on to tribal senses of belonging and 
solidarity was suggested to me by Hajer Assoudi from Kasserine, a 26-year-old woman from 
Kasserine who teaches Islamic education. As one of the few young women from a popular 
quarter whom I was able to speak to, she agreed to meet in the offices of a religious NGO:  
We have a lot of pride in Kasserine, we consider it the source of the revolution, of dignity, of bravery 
and of resistance. […] I belong to the Fraichich tribe. It is a rebellious tribe, which has resisted since 
French colonization. 
Hajer attaches a sense of pride and dignity to both Kasserine and the confederation of the 
Fraichich, whose constituent tribes populate a large part of Tunisia’s Centre-West region 
(Camps and Martel, 1998). She relates this pride and sense of self-worth to the resistance by 
these collectives since French colonial times. Local high school teacher and union activist 
Abdelwahed Homri provided a summary of the many different periods in which the people 
of Kasserine were involved in such acts of resistance against the central authorities: ‘There 
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was the revolt of Ali Ben Ghedhahem against […] the increase in the majba [tax], in 1861, the 
revolt of the peasants in 1906 in Thala, the Youssefist opposition was rooted here, and so 
were the bread riots [of 1984]’ (Abdelwahed Homri). The revolt led by Ali Ben Ghedhahem, 
which Abdelwahed mentions, was one of the most important cases of resistance to the 
modernizing Beylical state in the 19th century; specifically, against the imposition of new 
taxes (Guellouz et al., 2010). This uprising, as well as the first armed resistance to French 
colonial rule, organized in 1906 by residents from the region of Thala, drew on the tribal 
solidarity of the Fraichich (Kassab et al., 2010). And like the Hmamma of Sidi Bouzid, the 
disobedient people of the Kasserine region participated prominently in the two major 
mobilizations against Bourguiba’s rule, the Youssefist opposition and the 1984 bread riots 
(Murphy, 1999). Choukri Hayouni, Abdelwahed’s Thala-born colleague cited above, took his 
hometown’s historical marginalization to have been revenge taken by successive regimes:  
If you look at the history of Thala, you find for example that the Youssefists implicated Thala in a 
confrontation with the Bourguiba regime. […] This implication caused the Tunisian regime to exercise 
a kind of revenge on Thala […] throughout the 60 years of the reign of Ben Ali and Bourguiba. 
Many in the communities of the interior, then, interpreted their conditions of marginalization 
through their local and trans-local histories of resistance. Though almost certainly amplified 
by the recent overthrow of Ben Ali, they nevertheless constitute the very cornerstone of a 
local and regional sense of history. These memories of revolt had two important functions. 
First, they allowed for present conditions to be made sense of, by interpreting them as the 
result of political developments in which their communities had actively participated. 
Second, they provided a popular language rooted in good sense conceptions of history, which 
was able to give political expression to local rationalities of activism and resistance. In this, 
they furnished materials for an embryonic counterhegemonic narrative that could made 
sense of present experience. Against common sense notions presenting their marginalization 
as rooted in lacking modernity and cultural backwardness, subalterns could draw on popular 
139 
 
conceptions of history to see those same conditions as punishment for their past 
disobedience – and thus as consequences not of their weakness, but of collective strength 
and agency. The condition of subalterns in the interior was, then, marked by contradictions 
between hegemonic conceptions of the world and good sense knowledge, furnished both 
latently in their experiences of activism and resistance as well as by memories of revolt.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that, in the final years of the Ben Ali regime, the lives of young 
subaltern men in the Tunisian interior were beset with contradictions and rich with instances 
of mobilization and resistance. Regional economic marginalization, rampant unemployment, 
corruption, and discrimination broke the link between education and social mobility and 
excluded young subaltern men from the regime’s promises of progress and consumerist 
modernity. This disincorporation from society violated their moral economy, created a sense 
of injustice (Thompson, 1993), and led to a feeling of being denied the right to life itself. Here 
were stark contradictions between what common sense held life was supposed to be like, 
and how subaltern youth in the interior experienced it. The discontent which this produced 
was both heightened and suppressed by an intense and draconic policing of their lives. 
Encounters with the police brought daily humiliations which undermined notions of self-
worth and masculinity, constituting further violations of popular notions of a dignified life. 
Submitting (young) subaltern men to violence, humiliation, and further strain on their 
economic lives, the police became objects of hatred and the embodiment of an exclusionary 
and oppressive regime.  
Thus, the situation for many members of subaltern groups in the interior differed markedly 
from one in which the Ben Ali regime, by skillfully producing economic dependencies 
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combined with subtle, panoptical forms of surveillance, was said to have elicited “voluntary 
servitude” and support from ‘the vast majority of the population – not to say almost all if it’ 
(Hibou, 2011a, pp. 9, 211). What this perspective fails to appreciate is that not all social 
groups were equally incorporated, that the hegemonic formation was “uneven”, and that (at 
least certain) subaltern groups lived in its fissures. Indeed, especially the young men in the 
interior were confronted with a slow-burning “crisis of hegemony”, in which coercion had 
largely come to replace consent (Gramsci, 1971), albeit one in which  persistent common 
sense continued to limit their ability for political articulation.  
Focusing on the young men of the interior, this chapter has shown that, in the face of these 
conditions, subalterns, were far from passive. Their experiences were not those of a society 
which had suffered a “political death” (Camau and Geisser, 2003; Hibou, 2011a); rather, they 
engaged in various forms of self-activity to address violations of their moral economy and 
resist oppressive policing. Subaltern youth in the interior neither “acted as if” (Wedeen, 
1999) they consented, nor was their resistance “hidden in everyday acts” (Scott, 1985). 
Instead, they developed their own struggles and mobilizations. While these remained 
localized and largely unconnected, they were, nevertheless, instances of subaltern politics 
unfolding under a new, insurgent vector of mobilization that, while interacting with UGTT, 
developed largely outside existing political structures. Drawing attention to this emerging 
vector contributes to our understanding of subaltern politics and resistance under Ben Ali by 
showing that subaltern self-activity took plural and sustained forms beyond the Gafsa revolt 
and union structures (Allal, 2010; Chouikha and Gobe, 2009).  
The events of Gafsa were recognized as important not just by Tunisia’s political activists but 
by many unemployed young men, who used a language of economic rights to raise similar 
demands for jobs. They engaged with UGTT as the hegemonic vector of mobilization through 
which common-sense demands for economic development could to some extent be 
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articulated. But their mobilizations also took many independent forms ranging from sit-ins to 
hunger strikes through which they sought to put pressure on the state. Rather than engaging 
in “non-movements” to accrue “degrees of autonomy” (Bayat, 2010), their activism 
corresponded to what has been termed “defensive mobilization” around perceived rights as 
part of a moral economy (Cronin, 2008b; Thompson, 1993). Engaging in these forms of self-
activity, members of subaltern groups gained mobilizing experience, forged new connections 
and solidarities, and developed local rationalities of activism. 
While the unemployed could express demands for redress to (some of) the contradictions 
they were experiencing in a common sense language of rights, the situation was more 
complicated for those seeking to send messages of a more political nature. Here, the chapter 
has argued that the limited expressions of more systemic subaltern discontent with the 
regime resulted from a hegemonic formation leaving the young men devoid of language and 
sites for political articulation. Indeed, reading them through this “hegemonic silencing”, 
fleeting and unconnected acts of resistance ranging from youth targeting symbols of the state 
authority in their popular quarters to clashes between football fans and the police become 
legible as a politics that was “half-articulate” (Chalcraft, forthcoming). Engaging these agents 
of the state in various ways, subaltern youth cultivated not just “resisting subjectivities” 
(Ismail, 2006, 2013) but also gathered experience that built local rationalities of resistance. 
Here, then, were kernels of a more unruly subaltern politics suppressed by a lack of language 
and conception as well as by a suffocating policing presence. Overcoming such conditions 
was not beyond the grasp of subalterns in the interior, though, as was indicated by the good 
sense conceptions of history present in their communities. These appeared like signposts to 
the path of open defiance upon which the young men would set themselves in the 
revolutionary process. As it produced dynamics of learning that worked and develop the 
good sense contained in the fissures of hegemony, subaltern self-activity itself contributed 
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to an accumulation of struggles that prepared the ground for these revolutionary 
developments to come. 
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V. From Subaltern Politics to Local Revolts 
 
This chapter discusses developments in the Tunisian interior over the first three weeks of the 
revolutionary process, beginning with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 
December 2010. It makes the case that, over this period, conditions in several localities across 
the governorates of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine reached a state of local revolt and, further, 
traces the contribution of different social forces to these developments. The main argument 
is that, in all localities, complex interactions between two vectors of mobilization unfolded: 
a hegemonic one under which local activists organized largely peaceful daytime 
demonstrations articulating demands around economic development and police repression; 
the other one driven by the transgressive self-activity of marginalized young men who 
engaged in confrontations with the police at night in the residential quarters. Both can largely 
be understood in terms of subaltern self-activity.35 However, the former meant that such 
self-activity remained circumscribed by hegemony, whereas the latter dynamic led to the 
development of local rationalities of activism and resistance, discussed in the previous 
chapter, into forms of militant particularism. As such, the chapter argues that subaltern self-
activity which had unfolded as an insurgent vector over the final years of Ben Ali now 
developed into more transgressive forms, thus constituting the key social force that pushed 
the situation in the interior towards conditions local of revolt. Forms of mobilization along 
the hegemonic vector, most notably by local trade unionists, also played an important role 
in facilitating local struggles and functioned as their principal site of articulation. 
Mobilization, however, remained fundamentally defensive, as the demands which were 
 
35 I say “largely” because subaltern self-activity is, per definition (see introduction), activity not due to 
the leadership efforts by members of other social groups. As was discussed above, political activists 
and trade unionists are often (in the Tunisian interior) to almost exclusively (on the national level) 
members at least of the middle classes. Moreover, clientelism and material benefits for trade unionists 
mean that even some of a nominally subaltern status are stitched into the hegemonic formation. 
Finally, and in addition to the overall level of state-domination over UGTT under Ben Ali, this chapter 
will illustrate how mobilization by grassroots trade unionists was often confined by the very nature of 
UGTT as a hegemonic vector of mobilization, viz. one which could not openly challenge the status quo. 
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raised did not articulate a break with common sense but, rather, constituted bids for the 
improvement of the status quo. Moreover, the two forms of subaltern self-activity, while 
interacting and producing aggregate effects, remained largely separate in terms of 
participants. As such, the chapter concludes that a transformation of the struggle into 
revolutionary (mass) mobilization had not yet occurred at this stage. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one discusses events in the city of Sidi Bouzid 
and shows that the young men here were the first to openly confront the police in response 
to what they perceived as an assault on their local community. The following section 
discusses how activists and youth in other localities of the governorate subsequently 
mounted their own struggles, whose motivations varied from wanting to compete with their 
peers in Sidi Bouzid to seeing an opportunity to press their own demands for local 
development. The section argues that struggles across the governorate appeared to be on 
the verge of being contained through heavy police repression by the end of the year. 
However, as section three shows, a new front of mobilization opened in Thala at the 
beginning of January 2011. Here, a qualitatively new development occurred, as the two 
separate vectors of mobilization coalesced for the first time and an entire community united 
around a project of collective self-defense spearheaded by the youth. Section four argues 
that the limitation of this struggle at the level of defensive demands was brought out clearly 
by the developments in Thala. The penultimate section briefly discusses how mobilization 
began in parallel in the city of Kasserine and the final section draws out the chapter’s 
conclusions.  
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The Young Men of Sidi Bouzid Rise Up 
The situation in Sidi Bouzid in the immediate aftermath of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-
immolation on Friday, 17 December 2010, was evidently tense. Within hours, a crowd had 
gathered in front of the governorate building. Several members of Bouazizi’s family sought 
an audience with state officials. They were joined by trade unionists and other political 
activists who had learned through word of mouth about the attempted suicide and were 
gathering to acquire more information. Bouderbala Nsiri, a medical doctor in his early sixties, 
whose practice overlooks the square in front of the governorate building of Sidi Bouzid, 
provided a description of this first assembly. Having a long history of activism himself, 
including as a member of the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), outlawed under Ben Ali, 
he emphasizes the spontaneous and peaceful nature of the gathering that day: 
On 17 December, there was a gathering of about 200 or 300 people in front of the governorate 
building. […] Information circulated by word of mouth, and others who were curious, who were 
politicized a bit, joined, but it was not organized […] and there were no confrontations on the 17th. 
[…] The next day, at 10 a.m., there was a much larger crowd in front of the governorate. 
Despite the tension surrounding the assembly and the crowd’s size, there was thus no 
escalation on the first day. Bourderbala states that there had been no demands made that 
day other than those of the Bouazizi family. The following day, however, things changed 
rapidly. According to Bouderbala, the crowds on 18 December were significantly larger. As 
my interlocutors told me, there were chiefly two reasons behind this development. First, 
local trade union and unemployed activists had organized a demonstration. And, second, an 
increasing number of bystanders were drawn in, both from the surrounding popular quarters 
and the regional market held on Saturdays (Hmed, 2012). The first aspect was described to 
me by Lazher Gharbi, retired director of a local school and head of the regional primary 
education teachers’ union. A longtime member of the banned communist party, he and other 
trade unionists as well as unemployed activists had met early in the morning to coordinate 
146 
 
for the demonstration that day. Lazher spoke to us in the same function room of the UGTT 
building where they had met before moving to protest in front of the governorate:  
On 18 December, we came to this hall. We set up a commission in support of the events at the level 
of the regional UGTT to support the mobilization of the citizens with a participation of the trade 
unionists and the young unemployed. After that, the events started.  
The action on the second day was thus different in the sense that it featured an intervention 
jointly organized by grassroots trade unionists and unemployed activists – in other words, 
the two main groups which had been mobilizing in the Tunisian interior over the final years 
of the Ben Ali regime. Indeed, as Mohamed Lazher Gammoudi, the trade unionist from Sidi 
Bouzid who is now its regional secretary general, and who was himself a secondary school 
teacher at the time, said the main slogans raised that day were precisely those of the 
unemployed movement and of UGTT: ‘We were a group of unemployed, trade unionists, and 
political activists […] So on Saturday there were the slogans “Work, Freedom, National 
Dignity” [UGTT] and “A job is a right, you pack of thieves”’ (Mohamed Lazher Gammoudi). 
The activists shouting slogans were joined in front of the governorate building by members 
of Mohamed Bouazizi’s immediate family, who were seeking justice for their relative 
(Salmon, 2016). However, it seems that people outside these groups, even members of his 
extended family, originally felt little reason to get involved. For example, Kais Bouazizi, the 
distant cousin of Mohamed, told me that he and some friends who were unemployed like 
himself at the time had not joined the initial demonstration. They only approached the scene 
out of curiosity when they began to hear noise: 
I was in a cafe near the governorate with a group of friends. We started to hear noise outside the 
governorate. […] We approached and saw the family of Bouazizi and some activists from Sidi Bouzid 
[…] The event that blew things up, that was when a policeman slapped a woman and insulted her. So, 
he humiliated Sidi Bouzid. We started throwing stones at the police and they used teargas […] The 
weekly market was not far from the governorate and people started joining. So, at first, there weren’t 
a lot of people but afterwards we grew very numerous and became courageous. […] The clashes 
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became violent, police reinforcements arrived, and clashes shifted to the neighborhoods, so the police 
were forced to fight there. 
Based on Kais’ account, the initial group of demonstrators comprising relatives of Bouazizi 
and activists had not intended an escalation with the authorities. Rather, it was an assault on 
a woman which provided the initial spark. Here was an important difference to the pattern 
discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas humiliation at the hands of the police was 
endured by the young men on a daily basis, it did not usually affect women directly. Kais 
suggests that violence targeting a female member of the community was perceived by him 
and other young men present at the scene as a humiliation to the masculine honor of the 
entire community, obliging them to counterattack. As police reinforcements arrived, the 
young men retreated to the popular quarters, forcing the police to fight on their home 
terrain. That what happened was in reaction to a perceived provocation by the police was 
also brought out in my conversation with Bilel Rebai, a 33-year-old resident of the same 
popular quarter of Hay Ennour as Kais. Bilel used to be a seasonal worker in a hotel resort on 
the coast and would come to spend the winters in Sidi Bouzid. He was present in front of the 
governorate on 18 December as well and recounted the events thusly: 
A cop launched a teargas canister although the people did nothing. I remember it very well, it was in 
front of ordinary citizens, not even protesters. This was the cause of everything […] And we were just 
curious and wanted to watch, but the police targeted the people who watched. […] They had attacked 
us, a provocation, and we responded. Afterwards it became vengeance.  
Rather than to a slapping of a woman, Bilel points to the first firing of tear gas as the police 
action that changed the situation. What both young men who participated in the subsequent 
clashes agree on, however, is their perception of a provocation by the police to which they, 
as bystanders, felt compelled to respond. While this again points to a situated and defensive 
reaction, Bilel also states that the motivation for young men like him was more active and, 
as the previous chapter discussed, historically grounded: revenge against the police. These 
accounts suggest that the first violent clashes in what would become the Tunisian revolution 
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emerged out of a conjuncture between different local rationalities that had developed over 
the preceding period: On the one hand, activists took an opportunity, here through a local 
event, to voice demands around issues of economic marginalization and unemployment. On 
the other hand, repressive police actions were seen by rebellious youth as provocations, 
including to male honor, that encouraged revenge-actions. In this context, the situated and 
contingent coming together of previously largely separate logics meant that police repression 
encouraged rather than suppressed mobilization. From this point on, though, the self-activity 
of the young men developed into a form that differed markedly from previous periods as 
they drew the police into their neighborhoods. Trade union leader Lazher Gammoudi said 
that fighting between the young men and the police persisted through the following nights: 
After Saturday, there were no demonstrations because the police suppressed demonstrations during 
the day. But there were clashes at night and that really paid off. Without these nocturnal mobilizations, 
the revolution would never have succeeded. [...] All night long, the young people braved the police.  
Here, local rationalities of resistance previously confined to the stadiums or limited to 
nocturnal hit-and-run actions broke out into the open and developed into a form that would 
become a signature of the revolutionary process: night-time confrontations between 
subaltern youth and the police. Subaltern self-activity in the form of these confrontations, 
then, constituted the principal dynamic that drove and sustained local mobilization. Without 
it, as Lazher’s comment suggests, trade unionists and local rationalities of socio-economic 
claims-making could not have held fast in the face of police repression. In the words of 
another local trade unionist, ‘the nocturnal actions of the youth were a new form of 
mobilization that took the police of Ben Ali by surprise’ (Lazher Gharbi). Bilel described to me 
how the young men managed to put up this fight: 
During the day, the policeman could even take his coffee next to you [...] Around 7:00pm, everyone 
gets ready. [...] We go out together. These are popular quarters, we know each other. We talk about 
the plan. We do what we want until the morning. If someone is stuck, we free him [...] [The police] did 
not know the quarters. So, when they come in, they face difficulties. 
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Three factors seem to have been decisive for the resilience of the youth, all of which drew 
on the young men’s prior experience of resisting the police. First, they chose to confront the 
police exclusively under the cover of the night, thus concealing their identities and avoiding 
arrest. Second, they drew the police into their neighborhoods where the young men had 
superior knowledge of the urban terrain and could outmaneuver the police. This advantage 
weighed particularly strongly since many of the police reinforcements were brought in from 
other areas and so lacked familiarity with local conditions. Finally, the confrontations drew 
extensively on the intimate social fabric of the popular quarters which allowed for planning 
without the need for the kinds of formal organizational structures that the police could easily 
identify and squash. Coming out of seemingly informal chats in popular cafes and friendship 
circles, quelling this sort of “many headed” (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2002) or “leader-full” 
(Chalcraft, 2012) popular resistance would have required imposing a round-the-clock curfew. 
How much the fighting played out – at least initially – to the youth’s advantage was 
emphasized by Kais who described their tactics and methods of communication: 
We were talking to each other over the phone and on Facebook [...] The cause of the youth’s victory 
was guerrilla warfare. We were trapping them in alleyways they do not know. [...] And we coordinated: 
the youth of [a neighboring quarter] told us that they could not hold up against the pressure anymore 
and that they wanted Hay Ennour's reinforcement, for example. [...] Initially, Sidi Bouzid was alone [...] 
but then Meknassi and Menzel Bouzaiane and Regueb mobilized to put an end to this isolation.  
The young men mounted the defense of their quarters in a highly skilled manner, using their 
knowledge of the terrain for tactics of encirclement and coordinating through different 
channels to deploy their numbers to flashpoint sites. Kais points out that this amounted to a 
“guerrilla warfare” through which the youth were able to resist the vastly more well-
equipped police forces, suggesting that their mobilization drew on significant degrees of prior 
experience. Here, then, a catalytic event requiring a defensive response by the young men in 
order to protect their community prompted them to develop their local rationalities of 
resistance into a militant particularism enabling open confrontation with the dreaded police 
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forces. Yet, Kais also suggests that the youth of Sidi Bouzid would not have held out for long, 
had it not been for the mobilization of adjacent localities. Agreeing with this assessment, a 
local trade unionist said that: ‘What distinguished Sidi Bouzid [from the events in Gafsa] is 
that mobilization in the other municipalities of the governorate allowed the siege of the city 
to be broken’ (Lazher Gharbi). As the next section discusses, the developments there entailed 
dynamics of mobilization that paralleled those in Sidi Bouzid, but also differed from them in 
important ways.  
 
Spread and Containment of Mobilization  
As chapter two discussed, the scholarship on the Tunisian revolution holds that trans-local 
mobilizing dynamics stemmed from the efforts of activist agencies which spread information 
and organized demonstrations in other localities (e.g. Allal and Geisser, 2011b; Yousfi, 2015a; 
Zemni, 2015a). A notable claim is that the first violent confrontations outside of Sidi Bouzid, 
in the 50-kilomter-removed town of Menzel Bouzaiane, were strategically organized by local 
trade unionists at the behest of their comrades in Sidi Bouzid to break the latter’s isolation 
and avoid a repeat of the Gafsa scenario (Hmed, 2012). In my conversations, I was given a 
different account by local youth and trade unionists who suggested a greater role of their 
independent activity in this first spreading of mobilizations. This was the case with Ala Hidri, 
a 26-year-old who had been in his final year of schooling at the time of the revolution. We 
met him at a café popular with the youth of the town and he told us how he and his friends 
acted of their own accord, conveying a concern with the accuracy of the historical record: 
The people arriving in the louages [collective taxis], told us about the teargas [in Sidi Bouzid...] We 
talked, and we said we must express ourselves and react. We are a town that is known to be difficult 
and which does not take these things. […] So, we took to the streets on 19 [December], at night, and 
started burning tires. 
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Ala interestingly states that, rather than through modern communication technology, him 
and his friends first heard about the situation in Sidi Bouzid by simple word of mouth. He 
proposes that the response of the young men in Menzel Bouzaiane was motived by a desire 
to uphold the town’s reputation as being a strong and resisting community. Indeed, I would 
frequently come across such motivational references alluding to a sort of competition 
between communities, often expressed in notions of masculinity, of needing to evidence that 
they were “the real men”, and that, as Ala puts it, they “would not take” being seen as idle. 
Responding to the situation with their own acts of unruliness, the self-activity of young men 
appears once more as having been driven by a perceived need to defend male honor. These 
motivations, rather than a pre-conceived plan by the local UGTT, were behind the 22 
December attack on the local police station which led to the death of two protesters. Or, at 
least, this is what Naoufel Abbassi, a local trade unionist and schoolteacher in his late thirties 
who had been unable to find work under Ben Ali, told me. He spoke to us in the café adjacent 
to the town’s UGTT offices:  
In the beginning, there was a spontaneous popular mobilization of the marginalized youth. [...] On 22 
December, the UGTT organized a peaceful march. There were women in the march because their sons 
had been arrested and they demanded their release [...] But the police did not accept this demand and 
provoked people [... And] when they insulted the women, the young men attacked the police station 
[...] So the youth took control [... and] resisted. It was a guerrilla warfare: they blocked roads and 
climbed on rooftops - well-rehearsed tactics [...] The police fired tear gas, then rubber bullets and 
things escalated to the point when they used life fire.  
Naoufel confirms that the youth had been mobilizing independently of UGTT before 22 
December and his detailed account suggests that what happened that day was not planned 
by trade unionists. Instead, like events in Sidi Bouzid, the coming together of the wider 
community and young men who were ready to fight, produced a situation where assaults on 
women by the police pushed the youth to respond by counterattacking. Indeed, Naoufel 
states that the young men took control at this point, utilizing tactics for confronting the police 
honed during the preceding nights. That they had come prepared was emphasized by Ala: 
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‘We were ready for a confrontation, but we didn't imagine that they were going to attack the 
women and children. It was a bit of a human shield. But they used gas [and…] finally they 
shot’ (Ala Hidri). Ala suggests that he and the other young men originally felt protected by 
the presence of women and children in the crowd, but when the police aggressed the 
demonstrators regardless, the youth were compelled to defend them. As they put intense 
pressure on the policemen trapped inside their station, the latter eventually opened life fire, 
killing two protesters, before they eventually surrendered, and the young men burned down 
the building. This level of escalation remained singular over the coming weeks (Salmon, 
2016), but it signaled that a constellation of forces had emerged in which local conditions 
could rapidly spiral beyond the control of the authorities.  
The pattern in the two vectors – that of UGTT and of transgressive mobilization by subaltern 
youth – flowed together and created explosive conditions on the ground was repeated in 
other localities as well, although the way in which they interacted varied. The next place 
where mobilization occurred after Sidi Bouzid and Menzel Bouzaiane was the town of 
Regueb. Here, the very first mobilization to occur was organized by local trade unionists in 
solidarity with the people of Sidi Bouzid, as Walid Abidi told me. A forty-year-old graduate in 
history who had been involved in activism since university, he became active in the nascent 
movement of graduates who, like himself, could not find employment under Ben Ali. We met 
him at a busy café in the town center, where he told us that: 
On 22 [December], UGTT decided to do the first mobilization in Regueb. It was in solidarity with Sidi 
Bouzid. 60 or 70 congregated at the UGTT, not more […] On the back of this, we decided to set up the 
[union for unemployed graduates] UDC.  
Walid recalls that the UGTT-organized demonstration was relatively small and stayed 
confined to the union premises, suggesting that declarations of trans-local solidarity by 
activists did not mobilize large numbers at this stage. As with the events of Gafsa two years 
prior, though, he and other unemployed graduates saw the build-up of mobilization as an 
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opportunity to press ahead with their own activism. This was similarly described by Arbi 
Kadri, the formerly unemployed teacher who said that the unemployed activists of Regueb 
took a step towards formal organizing: 
On 25 December, we released our very first press release as the UDC. And we went out to do a 
demonstration with UGTT where we demanded our rights […] It was a large demonstration that went 
around the town and there was no violent intervention by the police because it was organized by the 
local UGTT. 
In a development similar to those in Sidi Bouzid, larger mobilization occurred in Regueb 
through a conjuncture between UGTT and the self-activity of the unemployed. They stepped 
up their efforts as they communicated their grievances under the name of UDC as an 
independent organization for the first time. The numbers of people protesting also appeared 
to have increased as UGTT now allowed the demonstrations it organized to be used as a 
platform for articulating the demands of the local unemployed. While trade-union sponsored 
mobilization and the self-activity of unemployed graduates produced a notably high level of 
organized socio-economic claims-making in Regueb, some of the most marginalized young 
men of the town did not consider these joint actions enough. Amine, the local farm worker 
who recounted being chased from the streets of his quarter by the police, suggested as much. 
He participated with his friends on 25 December and opined that ‘the UGTT was 
demonstrating in the town center. […] They just did a little show and went home. They asked 
us to return home, but we continued’ (Amine Abidi). Those without university education, 
then, felt that demonstrations calling for jobs would do little to improve their lot. Instead, 
they opted for more forceful action that targeted the local branch of the agricultural bank 
that had been behind many of the land sales threatening their livelihoods. This was what 
Nasser Zribi, head of UGTT in Regueb, suggested, although, at this stage, the local union 
branch could not back these actions: 
We understood but did not support the demonstrations that occurred on the night of the 25th [of 
December], when a group of youth burned tires and set fire to the agricultural bank [… Afterwards,] 
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we received advice from the central union not to open our doors any more […] We work together, so 
we cannot ignore their suggestions […] We have to protect people […] The police asked for 
reinforcements […and] arrested around 30 young men. 
Just as with the arson attacks discussed in the previous chapter, the young men chose their 
target strategically in an apparent attempt to send a political message. Nasser said that this 
was intelligible to trade unionists and they sympathized to an extent but, as they exceeded 
the UGTT-organized demonstration, the actions of the young men put the local union in a 
tight spot. Grassroots trade unionists like Nasser had to keep a delicate balance between 
supporting mobilization in their local communities and avoiding confrontation with central 
UGTT structures still loyal to Ben Ali. Rather than unconditional support for, let alone leading 
and galvanizing, transgressive youth mobilization (as claimed by Hmed, 2012; Yousfi, 2015a), 
then, local UGTTs limited themselves to facilitating subaltern self-activity in the form of 
peaceful demonstrations. Nasser’s account suggests, further, that it was in the interest of the 
local community that trade unionists kept open channels of communication with the national 
leadership and the regime. The protection of the community this offered was needed 
urgently when the police used reinforced capacities to embark on a series of arrests. These 
developments indicate that a division (including of mobilizational labor) existed between 
those segments of the local population involved in more radical forms of struggle, chiefly the 
most marginalized youth, and others who sought to maintain local dynamics on a more 
conciliatory trajectory and keep open possibilities for compromise with the regime. 
That such possibilities for compromise remained important was made clear when, following 
an intensification of arrests from 25 December throughout the Sidi Bouzid governorate, local 
and regional UGTT structures intervened to press for prisoner release. This was pointed out 
by Safuan Bouazizi, a 35-year-old from Menzel Bouzaiane, who had been expelled from the 
Sousse university due to his political activism. Unemployed and without hopes of finishing 
his studies, he was among the local youth who were confronting the police:  
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On the 25th [of December,] police reinforcements arrived and there was a wave of arrests. […] The 
youth fled to the countryside. [...] My father put me in the car and took me to my grandfather's house 
in the countryside […] A delegation of the regional UGTT from [Sidi] Bouzid went to [Menzel] Bouzaiane 
[…They] demanded an end to the militarization of Menzel Bouzaiane and the lifting of the siege.  
He describes local conditions from 25 December onwards in terms of militarization and siege 
and suggests that this effectively stifled their ability for resistance. Here, the regional UGTT 
intervened on behalf of the community. Indeed, the head of UGTT in Sidi Bouzid said that 
after a ‘night when the best youth of Sidi Bouzid were arrested […] I spoke before everyone 
in front of the police station and we demanded their release’ (Lazher Gammoudi). These 
interventions by local UGTT cadres suggest that the union continued to function as a site for 
the articulation of popular grievances in common sense terms. For example, Bouderbala, the 
doctor from Sidi Bouzid, stated that ‘the demands were simple: We had entered into a cycle 
of arrests, so the local UGTT mobilized to liberate the people that had been arrested and to 
reduce the amount of security forces’ (Bouderbala Nsiri). Effectively seeking a return to the 
status quo ante, the demands articulated by local UGTTs thus maintained the defensive 
character of their prior mobilization around socio-economic rights. From this, we can see that 
local trade union structures, precisely because they did not enter open confrontation with 
the regime, continued to function as sites of political articulation that mediated between 
local communities and the authorities. Just as with the socio-economic claims of the 
unemployed, the demands which trade unionists could thus articulate and press for 
remained circumscribed by common sense, viz. they did not entail fundamental critique or 
rejection of the existing system of rule. 
UGTT interventions had modest success in securing the release of some prisoners (Salmon, 
2016). However, the stifling police siege persisted and the youth who had pushed local 
mobilizations forward were forced to scale back their struggle. As such, Kais commented that 
‘things started to calm down in Sidi Bouzid, because there were a lot of arrests of the most 
active people’ (Kais Bouazizi). Indeed, by 29 December, Al-Jazeera, which had covered the 
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events in Tunisia closer than any other major news source (Rane and Salem, 2012), reported 
that ‘calm has returned to the discontented province’ (“Al-Jazeera TV 29.12.”, 2010). Kept 
under conditions of siege by the police, some of the local youth stated that they felt isolated 
during this period and that the situation began to resemble worryingly that of the Gafsa 
revolt in 2008: ‘No one helped us, we were alone, like Gafsa […] It was Thala and Kasserine 
who freed us from isolation. […] The reinforcements left, and we could breathe’ (Ala Hidri). 
Ala refers to the local mobilizations in Thala and Kasserine which began on 3 January as the 
events that brought notable relief. Kais, meanwhile, stated that ‘the explosion at Thala and 
Kasserine breathed new life into the mobilizations in Sidi Bouzid’ (Kais Bouazizi). Both young 
men agree that the continuation their struggle became possible because the siege did not 
persist – as it had two years prior in the case of Gafsa – and that relief was provided by other 
localities rising in revolt. As was suggested in chapter three, then, the last week of December 
2010 marked the decline rather than steady growth, of mobilization in the country.36 The 
situation at this point can be summarized as one in which the interaction between different 
vectors of mobilization had given rise to local revolts, advanced most notably the 
development by the young men of their local rationalities of resistance into a militant 
particularism enabling open confrontation with the police. However, these were evidently 
difficult to sustain in the face of heavy police repression, a notable absence of revolutionary 
demands, and unified mobilization. 
 
 
36 Event catalogue data shows that the five reported demonstrations between 28 December 2010 and 
2 January 2011 all took place in Tunis. These were organized either by political activists or lawyers 
(Volpi, 2016). 
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A Unification of Struggles in Thala  
What Kais referred to above as an “explosion” first occurred in Thala, high up in the 
mountains of the Kasserine governorate. Here, confrontations between protesters and police 
began on 3 January. These developments did not come from nowhere but built on a 
groundswell of self-activity by young unemployed men who, as the previous chapter 
discussed, mobilized in Thala from 2008 onwards. Like in Regueb, unemployed graduates in 
Thala had gained experience in working with the local UGTT to articulate their demands. And 
indeed, the first demonstration to occur in the town during the revolutionary process was 
organized at the intersection between these two vectors of mobilization – though it was the 
unemployed who made the first move. As Bassem Haiji, formerly unemployed but now 
running an NGO, told us, they took to the streets on 27 December. As we were sitting in his 
office, he began to chain-smoke when he started recounting the events: 
Since 2008, we [unemployed graduates] tried to form a movement and claim our right to work […] We 
only had legitimate demands […] When the movement of Sidi Bouzid began, we were encouraged. We 
decided to do a protest […] So 2011 was an extension of what happened since 2008.  
As Bassem relays it, the events of the revolutionary process were initially perceived by him 
and his fellow unemployed graduates in Thala as an occasion, not unlike that of Gafsa in 2008, 
to press ahead with their own demands for jobs. He also stresses that they perceived such 
claims as legitimate, thus reinforcing the notion that, as the previous chapter discussed, 
employment opportunities were considered to be part of the moral economy (Thompson, 
1993). Local concerns, then, motivated the first mobilization in Thala. Much like in the 
localities of Sidi Bouzid, UGTT in Thala was ready to support mobilizations around demands 
expressed in common sense terms and joined the protest of the unemployed. The head of 
the local union branch, Ezzedine Negrichi, made clear that they did so precisely to back the 
socio-economic claims coming out of their local community: 
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For us [trade unionists], there was daily communication with Sidi Bouzid […] But the mobilization that 
occurred in Thala was a protest of the unemployed graduates on 27 December which we joined. Given 
the marginalization that we have lived through for decades, the claims made were uniquely those of 
Thala […] There was a demonstration on the main street […with] slogans like “A job is a right, you pack 
of thieves”.  
While Ezzedine and his colleagues kept themselves informed about events unfolding in Sidi 
Bouzid, they did not call for local mobilization in solidarity with the struggle there. Rather, 
they sought to denounce local conditions of economic marginalization. Here, trade unionists 
acted not so much as a network that trans-locally instigated mobilizations (Hmed, 2012; 
Yousfi, 2015a), but as a facilitator for the self-activity of the local unemployed young men. It 
was in such a capacity, and because of the protection from police repression which they 
hoped to gain from UGTT involvement, that the young men sought their support. Indeed, the 
flow of activity was frequently the inverse from what is claimed in the scholarship, as self-
activity of the youth drove the action forward while trade unionists and other activists 
responded, facilitated, and at times tried to contain or steer mobilizations in the direction of 
common sense. This happened not just in the localities of Sidi Bouzid, but, initially at least, 
also in Thala. This was the case with the first demonstration to occur in the town. Hamza 
Seyhi, unemployed at the time and without higher education, was part of a group who joined 
this action: 
The [unemployed] graduates mounted the first mobilization and we [other] unemployed joined them 
[…] The unionists proposed to follow the old procedure, that is to say: bureaucracy, dossiers and 
depositions. […] I said: we have a group of unionists present who have a kind of immunity […so] we 
cut all roads and administrations. The authorities will have to listen to us. But there was nothing. 
From the comments of my interlocutors, it is clear that the unemployed young men in the 
interior who held university degrees were willing to work with UGTT, as the extant channels 
of claims-making, in order to find a job, probably because they still perceived a chance of 
succeeding with this approach. By contrast, Hamza’s comments suggest that those finding 
themselves in the even less favorable position of not having higher education felt that this 
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would not work for them. Like the young men who attacked the agricultural bank in Regueb, 
Hamza expressed the desire to adopt more radical tactics. While the nonconforming 
unemployed still wanted to address themselves to the authorities, they had the impression 
that more drastic action was necessary to gain the attention of the state. They were trying to 
sway the trade unionists to extend their “immunity”, as Hamza puts it, to cover such actions. 
However, the trade unionists would not stand for it and the initial mobilization in Thala 
finished without disruptions and remained a one-off event for almost a week. Just as 
elsewhere, then, local trade unionists stayed away from acts of open defiance and 
transgressions of common sense. The developments that ensued in Thala would come to 
stand out precisely because they overcame this division of struggles and led to the unification 
of the local community around the kind of militant particularism that had elsewhere 
developed among the young men only. The dynamic came from an unassuming kernel: a 
demonstration which the school children of the town mounted on 3 January 2011. 
On a Monday marking the first day of schooling after a two-week break, students from the 
Lycée Ibn Charaaf took to the main street in Thala to express their solidarity with Sidi Bouzid 
(Salmon, 2016). It appears that this demonstration was not intended to be a transgressive 
action. Rather, it was thought of as a demonstration like those which students had mounted 
many times over in solidarity with the Palestinian or Iraqi people. This is what one of the 
organizers, Omar Saidi, told me, who had been in his final year of high school at Ibn Charaaf 
at the time. Now unemployed and with lots of time on his hands, this energetic young man 
helped us in finding other interlocutors in Thala, where the particularly close-knit character 
of the community initially posed problems of access. We sat down with Omar in the municipal 
park, and he began to recount the transformative experiences he had: 
Previously, when we did a demonstration, they let it happen. But this time, they directly started with 
teargas […] Other young men joined […] and it evolved into a confrontation that did not finish until 
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2:00 am […] Things passed over into the quarters when it became impossible to build or hide behind 
a barricade [on the main road]. 
Omar points out that they were surprised by the forceful reaction of the police. Apparently, 
they had misjudged how sensitive the situation in the country had become from the 
perspective of the regime – to the extent that it would not permit demonstrations even by 
school children. When they were attacked by the police, other young men from the 
community quickly joined, paralleling the dynamic of defending women in Sidi Bouzid, and 
Omar recalls that the ensuing confrontations lasted into the night. Rather than trying to hold 
their ground on the main street, the youth withdrew into the neighborhoods that were more 
easily defensible. These same developments were also described by Hamza Seyhi, who had 
been trying to push the local UGTT for a more confrontative stance. He said that the 
unemployed young men reacted immediately to the police aggression: 
Near the school there are two cafés, and, during the day, you find the unemployed [young men] there 
[…] We had our own brothers and sisters in the schools […and so we] reacted and intervened. And it 
turned into clashes between the police on one side and the youth and residents of the quarters on the 
other.  
Hamza suggests that it was natural for him and other young men present at the scene to 
intervene in order to protect their younger siblings. In line with Omar’s comments, he also 
recalls that the clashes quickly moved from the main road into the residential neighborhoods. 
At this stage, however, a new kind of development occurred, as the youth were joined in 
their struggle against the police by other categories of residents. As in Sidi Bouzid two and a 
half weeks earlier, the first clashes had developed as a defensive reaction to acts of 
aggression by the police. The ensuing events in Thala, however, diverged significantly as not 
just the young men but the local community as a whole engaged in what amounted to a 
project of collective defense. Here, we can only speculate that the close-knit social structures 
of this comparatively small and isolated community with a strong legacy of radicalism made 
a substantial difference. Whatever the ultimate causes, even the more seasoned members 
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of the community perceived the joint struggle that emerged as a significant novelty. This was 
brought out by the 62-year-old local UGTT leader Ezzedine Negrichi who, a week earlier, had 
been advocating more moderate approaches to protest: 
Everyone mobilized according to their position. There were women giving you water and making 
bread. And this created a kind of union between the inhabitants of Thala that, me at my age, I have 
never experienced [...] You could enter any house and you were taken care of: you eat, you sleep etc. 
Here, the whole community mobilized to sustain confrontations with the police, creating new 
feelings of solidarity forged in struggle which united the people of the town (Fantasia, 1989). 
In this, the accessibility of every home – something utterly unthinkable in ordinary times 
where only men who are members or close friends of the family can enter the house – stands 
out as creating more encompassing feelings of solidarity. However, this did not mean that 
divisions and social hierarchies were done away with. Ezzedine’s comments also bring out an 
important gender dimension, as he effectively said that the women of the community 
“stayed in their place”, viz. they remained indoors and contributed care labor that sustained 
the fighting ability of the men.37 The importance of the accessibility of homes was also 
emphasized by Bassem, who said that the young men found shelter there: ‘When the police 
attacked, all of the houses opened their doors. You could enter any house and you find the 
women waiting […] with tomatoes, so that […if you were affected by teargas] she puts them 
on their eyes’ (Bassem Hajji). From Bassem’s comments, we gather again that women gave 
crucial care to the fighting men. The unity which the people of Thala thus forged in their 
struggle was strikingly expressed by Seif Hamdi, the road construction worker, who got so 
immersed in recounting the events that he kept flicking imaginary ash from an unlit cigarette. 
Describing the transformation that occurred, he said: 
 
37 I interpreted such comments by my male interlocutors primarily as statements emphasizing social 
cohesion in struggle. However, they also signaled the inscription of gendered power relations which 
appear to have persisted throughout the revolutionary process (e.g. Debuysere, 2016, 2018). 
162 
 
What drove us to mobilize was the contempt, the violence, the aggression. When you are being 
humiliated, you will react with the same rate of violence […] The dignity of Thala was at stake and the 
people mobilized to support themselves […] We forgot the struggle of Sidi Bouzid […] In this moment, 
Thala fought for Thala.  
This suggests that the motivations which we had previously come across among the young 
men – reaction against police violence, resistance to feelings of being humiliated, and a 
perceived need to defend the dignity of the community – came to be shared by a broad cross-
section of the local population. Upholding the reputation of Thala as a historical hotbed of 
revolt, as mentioned in the previous chapter, appears as a widespread motivational force. 
Seif further proposes that, as the struggle grew more inclusive, it also became more focused. 
Rather than expressing solidarity with Sidi Bouzid, as the pupils had done in the beginning, 
the cause of their struggle became the defense of the local community itself. The cohesion 
that was thus created contributed to making the rebellion in Thala particularly resilient. 
Indeed, the town resisted hundreds of police reinforcements that began pouring into the 
town from 4 January onwards (Salmon, 2016). With residential quarters built on hills rising 
from the central thoroughfare, and whose labyrinthine alleyways, often too narrow for cars, 
were unfamiliar to the newly arriving police forces, the terrain of Thala was uniquely 
favorable to the defenders. The accounts by Hamza and Omar vividly described the 
effectiveness with which the residents of the quarters fended off the police: 
A barricade was placed at each street corner and was manned by a small group [...] When the police 
attack the first corner, the protesters there flee, but the protesters of the next corner attack. That’s to 
say that, if a police vehicle enters our field of vision, we can easily encircle it. It was not planned, but 
effective. (Hamza Seyhi) 
When they changed techniques, we "the revolutionaries”, if you allow, changed techniques, too. 
When they brought motorcycles, we also did our tricks: A cable between two poles on the right and 
left of an alley; the bike passes, the policeman falls [laughs] (Omar Saidi) 
The two young men give us a good idea of the tactics deployed in this battle. Even lacking a 
coordinated strategy, the defenders devised maneuvers that corresponded to the terrain 
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that they knew so intimately. There was a mix of pitched and running battles in adaptive 
response to police actions. Police forces were “permitted” to advance into the quarter as the 
first line of defenders fled once it felt that its position was no longer tenable. However, the 
routed men would be absorbed into the next defensive structures and groups at a more uphill 
position. As such, each advance of the police only meant that it faced more resistance at the 
next crossing. Moreover, the deeper they penetrated the quarters, the more they found 
themselves surrounded, with protesters raining stones and Molotov cocktails onto them 
from all sides and from surrounding roofs. From the perspective of the police, the quarters 
of Thala were thus a “swamp” that absorbed and deflected their actions, and which offered 
no strategic position to be captured. When it tried to respond to this impasse by using 
motorcycles that were more maneuverable and could penetrate deeper into the quarters to 
try and make arrests while avoid being encircled, the defenders adapted in turn. Mounting 
this intense resistance, the people of Thala managed to defend their quarters, confined the 
police to strategically disadvantageous positions in the town center, and prevented the mass 
arrests through which the regime had quelled the revolts in Sidi Bouzid. In the process, they 
forged new solidarities among themselves and, as Omar’s labeling of themselves as 
revolutionaries suggests, developed a heightened sense of self-worth. As the following 
section discusses, their resilience forced the regime to sue for a ceasefire and officially ask 
the people of Thala for their terms, thus giving them the opportunity to articulate their 
demands.   
 
Articulating Militant Particularism 
As the regime came to realize that it was unable to subdue the people of Thala with the 
techniques of repression that had proven effective elsewhere, events in Thala took an 
unexpected turn. On the evening of 6 January, having faced four days and three nights of stiff 
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resistance, the commanding police general announced through loudspeaker that the 
authorities proposed a 48-hour ceasefire to be used for negotiations (Salmon, 2016). This 
was accepted. My interlocutors, referring to this period as a ḥudna (truce), said that they 
were cautiously optimistic that a solution could be found. Bassem summarized the feeling 
among his fellow youth as: ‘Our idea was to let the UGTT and the activists we knew talk [with 
the regime]. Maybe they would come up with a solution [...] I always say, if Ben Ali found a 
solution at that moment, everything would have stopped’ (Bassem Hajji). Bassem signals 
clearly that many of the young men were ready to relinquish their struggle if the terms of a 
possible agreement turned out to be acceptable to them. Indeed, he suggests that this had 
been a crucial moment in which the regime could still have achieved a peaceful solution that 
did not challenge the national political status quo. The approach of negotiating with the 
authorities was accepted even by the more radical youth. For example, Hamza Seyhi, who 
had been among the unemployed arguing for transgressive tactics, suggested that a kind of 
popular consensus existed around demands for economic development and an end to police 
repression: 
We agreed to the negotiations and waited [to see] what the authorities would propose [...] We thought 
that perhaps they would propose a factory project that would provide employment. We were 
expecting some jobs. That's what we expected. […] During the first night of the ḥudna, on 6 January, 
[…] there was a peaceful protest in front of the police station, and all the inhabitants of Thala 
participated […:] men, women, children, young people, old people […] And among the slogans that 
were raised that night were “Kharrjūlna wledna w okhrjū min bledna” (Free our sons, and get out of 
our town/country) and “Lā khūf lā roʿb, ash-shāraʿ milk ash-shaʿb” (Neither fear nor terror, the street 
is the property of the people). 
Hamza suggests here that the people of Thala, including more radical elements like himself, 
were ready to end their resistance if the regime promised to deliver solutions for regional 
economic underdevelopment and the lack of jobs. Thus, improvement of the economic 
situation remained the principal aim of the struggle. In addition, the slogans he mentions 
suggest that popular demands had also come to include issues of police repression, 
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previously the concern mainly of subaltern youth. Here, the fact that residents of the town 
had engaged in joint struggle over the previous days appears to have made a significant 
difference. The slogan demanding the freeing of prisoners and withdrawal of the police, for 
instance, has two possible meanings regarding the territory that the police were to leave as 
either the town or the entire country. Even more tellingly, the second slogan expresses the 
open defiance of authority that the community had shown in practice over the preceding 
days. The people of Thala were telling the regime in no uncertain terms that the barrier of 
fear and terror that had been containing dissent was broken. They also signaled that they 
would not relent until they had reclaimed their perceived right to a life free from coercion, 
in which they, and not the police, owned the streets.  
Here, then, was the community-wide unification of struggles for local socio-economic and 
political goals, entailing both the willingness and demonstrable capacity to openly defy the 
authorities. In other words, the people of Thala had unified around the militant particularism 
of a local struggle (Cox and Nilsen, 2014). The negotiations that took place over the course 
of the ḥudna clearly articulated the goals of this struggle, providing an important historical 
document for the nature of popular demands at this stage of the revolutionary process. As 
Bassem had mentioned above, the people of Thala entrusted trade unionists with negotiating 
on their behalf. The talks were led by the head of the local UGTT, Ezzedine Negrichi, who 
described the demands that they made in the name of their community: 
The negotiations took place between the police leadership and the local UGTT [...] We demanded the 
release of all prisoners and that the authorities assume full responsibility for all consequences of the 
protests. Secondly, to end the police siege applied to Thala and its inhabitants. Finally, that the regime 
must work on development and find radical solutions for the economic problems of the region. [...They 
said] that a representative of the president of the republic would come on 8 January, and he would 
hold a dialogue with the inhabitants [...] There were those who refused the outcome of the 
negotiations. They said that this is a ruse. But for us, the struggle itself was not the goal but the means 
to achieve our goals. 
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The demands that UGTT conveyed on behalf of the people of Thala were evidently assertive. 
Not only were all prisoners to be released, but the authorities were asked to assume 
responsibility for the degree of escalation that had taken place, and thus declare that it had 
been the regime rather than the resisting people which had been in the wrong. In line with 
the above slogans, in the demand to end the repressive policy of besieging communities we 
see the assertion of people’s sense of a right to live in freedom from police terror. Finally, 
the demands for economic development asked for a comprehensive solution to the 
marginalization of the wider region, suggesting that what was expected was more than some 
jobs for the unemployed youth. Despite their forceful articulation, however, the demands 
which the people of Thala raised were also notably un-revolutionary. At least as far as they 
were – and could be – expressed through UGTT as a site of articulation within the existing 
hegemonic formation, the demands remained “defensive”, lacking ‘a comprehensive 
defiance of, or aimed to transcend, the existing order’ (Cronin, 2008b, p. 3). While 
mobilization driven by subaltern self-activity had thus clearly reached the level of a local 
revolt, it had not (yet) produced the kind of transformative dynamics that would lead to the 
articulation of new, revolutionary conceptions.  
And yet, the slogans quoted above also indicate that a potential for radical articulation was 
forming. Here, we can spot traces of ‘a conception which manifests itself in action, but 
occasionally and in flashes’, as people started to act ‘as an organic totality’ (Gramsci, 1971, 
p. 327). In these situations, the problem is posed by hegemony or, more specifically, by 
common sense and the existing sites of articulation which jointly function to deny subaltern 
social groups a language for expressing more fundamental social contradictions. What was 
being reached here, then, was not a limit in the developmental capacity of subaltern self-
activity as the key motive force of the struggle to a kind of “economic-corporate 
consciousness” (Lenin, 1970). Rather, it was the language of common sense, and the sites 
through which subalterns could articulate their grievances in it, which were being exhausted.  
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This can be read from Ezzedine’s suggestive comment above that, even as a trade unionist 
who had actively engaged in the struggle, the point was not so much to develop it further for 
its own sake, but to use it to secure the goals articulated through the local UGTT. The 
dissension he mentions, though, also signals that some felt a point of no return had been 
reached and stated directly that they did not believe in the regime’s willingness to 
compromise. While a unification of struggle around the militant particularism of revolt had 
thus been reached in Thala, we see, too, that the persistence of a hegemonic language of 
common sense still prevented the potential for revolutionary politics from being articulated. 
In other words, radical dissent among the most marginalized young men still found itself 
bereft of a site of articulation. Their suspicions that the regime was merely engaging in a 
delaying tactic were already supported by news that the popular quarters in Kasserine had 
risen in revolt. 
 
Revolt in Kasserine’s Popular Quarters 
From the evening of 8 January onwards, the day that the regime had promised to hold a high-
level dialogue with the people of Thala, developments in this town and in Kasserine city 
would converge in important ways. The scene for this was set by the self-activity of the young 
men in Kasserine, which emerged in ways that both paralleled and differed from other 
localities. In this regional center of administration, the first protest during the revolutionary 
process took place as early as 22 December 2010. Unlike in other localities, it was organized 
neither by the unemployed youth nor by trade unionists, but by activist lawyers leaving the 
district court in solidarity with Sidi Bouzid. One of the lawyers who joined that day told me 
that ‘twelve of us left the tribunal in our robes and we marched to the office of the UGTT. 
But they closed their doors and left us outside’ (Jaafer Bouzidi). Lawyers protesting in their 
robes became a signature of demonstrations in Kasserine and subsequently the Tunisian 
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revolution as a whole (Gobe, 2016). Locally, they also played an important role as organizers 
and protectors of demonstrations, thus taking over some of the functions which, as Jaafer 
suggests above, UGTT refused to perform in Kasserine.  
This fact was termed a disgrace by Choukri Hayouni, the trade union activist and former POCT 
member from Kasserine whom we heard from in the previous chapter. He participated in 
many demonstrations in Kasserine, where he works as a teacher, as well as in his hometown 
of Thala and expressed his anger at the regional union leadership: ‘The door of the UGTT 
remained closed from that day [22 December 2010] until the 14th of January [2011]. They 
[the regional union leadership] fled in an act of historical cowardice […] If there is a disgrace 
in Kasserine, it is that of the regional UGTT’ (Choukri Hayouni). In Kasserine, seat of the 
regional UGTT, the union thus continued to stonewall all efforts at local mobilization, just as 
it had done with the self-activity of the local unemployed youth in the final years of the Ben 
Ali regime, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Lack of union support and protection was arguably one of the reasons why demonstrations 
in Kasserine did not take off. Moreover, as was discussed for other localities already, 
declarations of solidarity with Sidi Bouzid by lawyers did not to motivate many members of 
subaltern groups to join. In Kasserine, dynamics of subaltern self-activity would instead 
develop along a transgressive vector of mobilization with its own local rationalities. This time, 
it was an attempted self-immolation by a young unemployed man from one of the city’s 
popular quarters that set things in motion. Fadhel Bouzidi, the carpenter from Hay Ennour 
who had recounted his experiences of torture before, told us that: ‘The spark in Kasserine 
was Hosni, not Bouazizi […] On 5 January, Hosni Kala’iyya set himself on fire […] The next day, 
we heard that he was dead. Although, until today, he is still alive’ (Fadhel Bouzidi). Hamza 
Aloui, one of the young unemployed men from the same quarter, similarly suggested that 
rumors about the death of their neighbor led to the first clashes: 
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On the 6th [of January], Hosni died, and the demonstrations started […] We were confronted by the 
police. They fired gas […] So it turned into clashes, into battles. Everyone fought in the quarter. […] 
Our motivation to fight was neither freedom nor democracy, national dignity, or anything like that. It 
was the police repression. 
Having been among the young men humiliated by the local police, Hamza says that residents 
of Hay Ennour had first come out to demonstrate in reaction to an apparent act of 
desperation by one of their neighbors. What escalated the situation, much like it had in Sidi 
Bouzid and Thala, was the repressive response by the police that started firing teargas. 
Unwilling to take further humiliation, the men of the quarter fought back, and clashes raged 
throughout the night of 6 January in Hay Ennour. Thus, it was ominously on the very night 
when trouble started brewing for the regime in Kasserine that a truce was proposed in Thala. 
If the regime had been worried about where developments in Kasserine might be headed, 
the following day would prove them right. For, on 7 January, Tarik Aidoudi and his friends, 
who had previously attacked the local office of the RCD, decided to go one step further: ‘The 
police were distracted. This was our opportunity. We burned down the RCD office and the 
police station located in Hay Ennour’ (Tarik Aidoudi). As the first RCD building and the second 
police station after the one in Menzel Bouzaiane went up in flames, the police increased the 
pressure. In the aftermath of this daring act, what had begun as skirmishes with the police in 
Hay Ennour developed into continuous battles that engulfed the two main popular quarters 
of Kasserine.  
Here, again, local catalytic events – a self-immolation and the daring act of setting fire to 
state institutions – prompted the young men of the community to transform their local 
rationalities of resistance into an open confrontation with the authorities. As such, Houssem 
Allali who was among the unemployed graduates that had been trying in vain to find the 
support of the local UGTT, suggested that he and other youth from neighboring Hay 
Ezzouhour now felt compelled to engage in the unfolding struggle: ‘for us, the beginning was 
what happened that Friday [7 January] at Hay Ennour. […] They set fire to the police station 
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[…] To support Hay Ennour, but also to show that “we too can ignite things”, the first tire was 
burned in Hay Ezzouhour’ (Houssem Allali). In Houssem’s comment, as before in the case of 
Menzel Bouzaiane, we can spot the traces of solidarity and competition between the young 
men of different localities, as they were motivated to come to the aid of their peers and to 
not be found wanting. Hamza relays that the joint struggle of the two largest popular quarters 
of Kasserine had the effect of forging new solidarities similar to those that were discussed 
above for the case of Thala: 
The youth of Hay Ezzouhour and Hay Ennour had a certain specificity, because these two quarters 
have a rebellious nature […] An intense solidarity developed between the two quarters, a love that I 
have never seen before […] The quarters became like a fortress that the police could not take. 
Hamza suggests that the ability and willingness of the young subaltern men in Kasserine to 
fight the police was the result of what he terms their “rebellious nature”. In other words, 
their struggle drew on the experiences of resistance to police repression that they had been 
gathering before. As Hamza’s comments show, it was the development of new solidarities in 
joint struggle through which local rationalities of resistance coalesced and developed. Here, 
as in Thala before, was the emergence of a militant particularism that informed a project for 
the collective defense of the popular quarters. These became, in Hamza’s words, their 
fortresses that they were bound to defend at all cost. As Hasan Nasri, a 45-year old taxi driver 
from Hay Ezzouhour, put it: ‘At the entrance to Hay Ennour and Hay Ezzouhour, there were 
confrontations. But in the city center there was nothing. From the 7th [of January], it was 
deserted’ (Hasan Nasri). A local struggle largely driven by the self-activity of the young men 
fighting the police had thus made significant territorial gains. With these developments, the 
battle lines in the Kasserine governorate had been drawn for the evening of 8 January 2011, 
when the people of Thala awaited a presidential envoy. 
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Conclusion 
Events in the Tunisian interior during the first three weeks of the revolutionary process, 
starting on 17 December 2010, significantly altered the constellation of social forces in the 
country as several communities across the Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine governorates entered a 
stage of revolt. These developments built on local pre-histories of interaction between trade 
union mobilization and the  self-activity of subaltern youth, notably in the struggles of the 
unemployed young men, which continued to shape patterns of mobilizations across 
localities. In lieu of a trans-local organizational force driving the dynamics, a complex and 
contingent interaction between two vectors of subaltern self-activity – one shaped by 
transgressive actions of subaltern youth, and the other by trade unionist- or activist-
organized mobilizations – occurred in all cases. Notably, the escalation of local conditions 
resulted from the former as young men engaged in defensive reactions to police repression 
and assaults on their communities. Common across different localities were confrontations 
between these young men and the police, mostly at night, in residential quarters. These 
confrontations were informed by and further developed local rationalities of resistance that 
had taken shape under Ben Ali. This provides evidence for how the formation of an insurgent 
vector of subaltern politics discussed in the previous chapter had entailed “molecular 
processes” which had ‘modif[ied] the pre-existing composition of forces’, leading to an 
‘accumulation of elements destined to produce an "explosion", that is, an upheaval’  
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 280, 370). Indeed, what occurred across the rebelling communities of the 
interior was a dynamic whereby catalytic events were sufficient to transform existing local 
relationalities of resistance among the youth into militant particularisms (Cox and Nilsen, 
2014). As such, a transgressive vector of subaltern self-activity driving and escalating local 
mobilizations to become conditions of local revolt emerges as the most clearly discernible 
pattern over the first three weeks of the revolutionary process. 
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The discussion in this chapter thus points to a prominent role of subaltern agency in the 
development of mobilizations in the Tunisian interior, a fact largely ignored in the existing 
scholarship. This provides an important corrective to analyses which credit trans-local activist 
networks centered on trade unionists with having organized, connected, and radicalized 
mobilizations, including by members of subaltern social groups, effectively creating 
revolutionary conditions on the local level (see chapter 2; e.g. Allal and Geisser, 2011b; 
Hmed, 2012; Yousfi, 2015a). Rather than contributing a strategic agency that led to the 
unification of struggles within and across localities, the role of trade unionists and other 
activists was much more in keeping with what this thesis defined as a hegemonic vector of 
mobilization that was, however, variously shaped by prior local struggles. As the case of 
Kasserine showed, this could mean even UGTT structures withdrawing completely, and 
activists organizing mobilizations without much popular support and participation. In most 
cases, however, trade unionists and local UGTT structures contributed actively to 
mobilizations in their localities. This included organizing peaceful demonstrations and 
supporting similar protests by the unemployed youth, as well as the important role of 
articulating and negotiating for the demands of the local community, including on behalf of 
the young men who got arrested. What local union structures and activists, with the notable 
exception of Thala, appear not to have actively supported or participated in were open 
confrontations with the authorities. In other words, they were demonstrably not the forces 
that drove the development of militant particularism and local revolt. Rather, these resulted 
principally from the self-activity of the young men. Here, previous research might have 
conflated the fact that trade unionists and other activists often spoke for their communities 
in the media and negotiated with the regime on their behalf, with an active promotion of 
these more transgressive mobilizations. Their role, then, was that of an important facilitator 
and site of articulation for a struggle that was primarily driven forward by those members of 
subaltern groups who largely lacked prior engagement in formal politics.  
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The chapter also argued that developments in the revolutionary process up until the point 
discussed here remained subject to and were shaped by hegemony in important ways. Rather 
than holding that something akin to a revolutionary situation had been developing in the 
interior of the country over the initial weeks of mobilizations (e.g. Hmed, 2012), the chapter 
showed that revolutionary transformations had not yet occurred for at least two reasons. 
First, with the noted exception of Thala, the rebelling communities did not yet witness de-
sectorized mass mobilization (Dobry, 1986). Rather, a vector of activist-organized 
mobilization during the day, in which women and the local middle-classes participated, 
featured relatively low levels of violence and interacted but did not coalesce with a vector of 
mobilization by young men engaging in violent confrontations with the police at night. In 
other words, a separation of local struggles persisted, including among different subaltern 
groups. Here, a division could be spotted between members of the community seeking to 
achieve concrete goals around economic development, prisoner release, and general police 
repression, and others who were unsure whether this would ultimately improve their 
situation, and who might already have harbored more radical, though under-articulated, 
political conceptions. With unemployed graduates as well as (tendentially more middle-class) 
activists and trade unionists broadly among the former, the most marginalized young men 
seemed to also have been the most radical. Here, divisions created and maintained by 
hegemony, including among members of different subaltern groups, whereby structural 
positionalities accounted for differential engagement in vectors of mobilization, persisted to 
varying degrees, and a unified, de-sectorized struggle had, except for Thala, not emerged by 
8 January. 
The second reason for the lack of revolutionary transformations was that the effects of 
hegemony showed even more tenaciously at the level of articulated demands. Here, the role 
of UGTT as a hegemonic vector of mobilization and the principal site of articulation for 
subaltern politics compelled local union structures to avoid overtly supporting radical forms 
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of mobilization and to not articulate revolutionary demands. Indeed, it was partially in the 
interest of the local communities that they refrained from doing so, as this maintained an 
important channel for communication and negotiation with the regime. Yet, it also meant 
that articulation through UGTT remained bound by the language of common sense and could 
not serve as an expression for conceptions breaking with hegemony which had begun to 
show “fleetingly and in action” (Gramsci, 1971) in the attacks on police stations and the joint 
struggle of Thala. Like similar actions discussed in the previous chapter, these remained at 
the level of un- or under-articulated politics. With the unfolding struggles thus coming up 
against but not yet breaching the boundaries of common sense, they also maintained a 
fundamentally defensive character: they did not entail the articulation of new, revolutionary 
conceptions, but expressed their demands in terms of improvements to the status quo. While 
the forces of subaltern politics thus drove much of the dynamics at this stage, they were also 
limited by the perseverance of the hegemonic formation. However, a key difference was now 
being produced through “molecular processes” of subaltern politics, in that a militant 
particularism developed by the young marginalized men was pushing wider segments of the 
population into a situation of revolt. As the next chapter discusses, the situation that was so 
changed would eventually create the conditions for a revolutionary re-articulation of the 
struggle. 
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VI. Revolutionary Transformation of the Struggle 
 
This chapter develops the argument that key transformations in the Tunisian revolutionary 
process were produced in the context of local struggles in the country’s interior over a brief 
period dating roughly between 8 and 10 January 2011. Over the course of these days, people 
in the three centers of revolt, Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb, made the decisive passage from 
defensive struggles that had largely remained sectorized and divided between different 
vectors of mobilization to a unified struggle that articulated radical political demands. The 
chapter makes the case that these developments built on dynamics of subaltern self-activity, 
regime repression, and popular learning, not unlike those that had unfolded previously. As 
the first section of the chapter discusses, a qualitatively new situation was created when 
people interpreted the killing of protesters as demonstrating that hegemonic inclusion had 
become unattainable and that the regime had lost its legitimacy. Following the gradual 
erosion of hegemony through subaltern disincorporation as well as the intensification of local 
struggles over the previous weeks, these developments finally led to a collapse of hegemony. 
The second section argues that under these new conditions the situation was reinterpreted 
through a process of popular critical self-activity that articulated a revolutionary new 
conception: the people wanted to bring down the regime. At this stage, then, people in the 
rebelling communities of the interior broke with common sense and found a new language 
that allowed them to rearticulate the aims of their struggle in revolutionary terms. Drawing 
on by way of prior organic intellectual and organizational activity, the key resources for this 
process of critical self-activity came from good sense created in struggle and popular 
conceptions of history.  
The third section argues that this popular interpretive work and the rearticulations it created 
allowed for the unification of the local populations under a new, revolutionary vector of 
mobilization. Here, a collective will to bring down the regime was formed, and revolutionary 
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situations were for the first time created on the local level. These changes brought about a 
first, symbolic victory for popular forces as the regime began to withdraw the police. The final 
section of the chapter concludes that these transformations in the Tunisian revolutionary 
process are best understood as resulting from popular self-activity in which subaltern agency 
played a leading role, rather than in terms of “events” or activist leadership. However, it also 
stresses that these achievements came with important limitations as conceptions and a 
collective will forged in struggle remained under-developed and prone to fragmentation.  
 
From Revolt to Hegemonic Collapse 
The events described in the previous chapter ended with a situation that was marked by 
significant developments and gains for the local revolts in the Tunisian interior but still 
appeared open to a peaceful resolution. In Kasserine’s biggest popular quarters, Hay Ennour 
and Hay Ezzouhour, the young men had burned down a local police station and RCD office 
and managed to push the police back to the entrances of the quarters at the crossings with 
the city’s main street. A similarly stiff and successful resistance by the people of neighboring 
Thala had already forced the regime to ask for a ceasefire, enter negotiations, and finally 
promise to send a presidential envoy to hear their demands. As my interlocutors in Thala 
said, they were ready to end their struggle if the regime made certain concessions, and there 
is no reason to assume that the youth in Kasserine would, given a similar opportunity, not 
have done the same. However, the suspicions of those in Thala who, like Hamza Sayhi, the 
young man who had tried to push local trade unionists for more radical action over 
unemployment, had never believed in the regime’s willingness to compromise would be 
confirmed. He recounted how, rather than a presidential envoy and jobs, the regime sent a 
notorious police captain with orders to shoot at protesters: 
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On Saturday, [8 January] they changed captains and Moncef Laajimi came. He stopped Gafsa's 
movements in 2008 [...] We went down to the [police station on the] main road […then] we heard 
shots […and] people shouted: "it's real bullets, it's real bullets". Marouene, may God rest his soul, was 
shot dead. […] Why did the [government] official not show up even if there was an invitation and a red 
carpet? We realized: he had nothing to give and to add […After that,] there was no one who was 
against the mobilization. 
Despite the arrival of a police commander known for repressive tactics, the use of live 
ammunition, which occurred only once before in Menzel Bouzaiane more than two weeks 
earlier, was clearly unexpected and led to shouts of horror. This unforeseen level of violence 
and the broken promise of dialogue, Hamza relays, convinced those who engaged in them 
that negotiations were pointless. But he suggests that the developments also caused him to 
rethink his opinion that increased pressure might lead to a more favorable response by the 
regime. In this new context, Hamza concluded that the nonappearance of the government 
official signaled that he, and by extension the regime, would have had nothing to offer to 
them no matter the circumstances. The regime’s decision not to send a personification of 
hegemonic inclusion but someone applying extreme coercion rendered palpable a 
disarticulation of hegemony and the willingness of the regime to forcefully subdue the 
rebellious people. That this was indeed a decision of the central regime is suggested by the 
fact that police forces opened fire at protesters not just in Thala, but in the two defiant 
popular quarters of Kasserine at the same time (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; Salmon, 2016). That 
night, Karim Delhoumi, the school dropout from Hay Ennour, and his mostly underage friends 
were making their way to the frontlines of the ongoing battle with the police. After two nights 
of fighting, they thought they knew what to expect:  
We went together to the Hay Ennour roundabout. We were hooded, we took tomatoes and milk with 
us to protect ourselves from gas […] The police were at the gas station, just over there […] There was 
so much gas that you could not see. Then, a burst: five successive shots. And we found Slah and Raouf 
on the ground. 
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After recounting what happened to his two friends, Karim fell silent, gazing to the crossing 
where they died, meters away from the café where we were sitting. Conversations like this 
made me realize how dramatically the lives of my interlocutors, especially the young men 
who had lost friends, were wounded, or who generally had participated in these traumatic 
events, were altered by them. The situation they experienced, although qualitatively new, 
resonated in important ways with a prior feeling, discussed in chapter four, in which they had 
been “dead alive”. Their hegemonic disincorporation, like Hamza’s comment suggests, was 
now manifest as the regime demonstrated that it had nothing to offer them but death. 
Indeed, the youth who had already existed in a liminal state in which hegemony was fading 
and coercion mounting experienced that the latter only intensified as the situation of revolt 
that they created distanced them ever more from incorporated positionalities. In other 
words, they experienced that, unlike hegemony which is strongest in the core of the 
hegemonic formation, the state’s “outer armour of coercion” (Gramsci, 1971) was getting 
thicker, as it were, the further they pushed down the road of revolt. 
And yet, this new-found knowledge led the youth not to despair but hardened their 
resistance even further. This was suggested by Nizar, at least, the young man from Hay 
Ennour who had been tortured and preferred not to be identified. He said that: ‘When Raouf 
died next to me, it was enough. When they fired gas, I threw [the teargas canister] back. 
Then, they focused on me. They shot me with a bullet in the arm, then again in the side’ 
(Nizar). As he describes it, his reaction to the threat of imminent death was not flight, but 
extreme courage, relenting only when he himself was shot disabled. Seif Abadi, an 
unemployed young man from Hay Ennour in his mid-twenties, described a similar reaction to 
me. Like many of the youth fighting the police at the entrance to the quarter that night, Seif 
had still been in high school at the time. We sat in a small restaurant over breakfast and he 
went through an entire pack of cigarettes as he excitedly and empathically recounted: 
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When we saw the blood, we reacted in a weird way, the opposite way [...] It erased everything – doubts 
and fear – the sight of blood, the encounter with death. I was no longer afraid of dying because my 
life is no better than that of the martyrs. [...] You are part of this group. If you must die with them, you 
die, and that's it.  
On the one hand, these accounts correspond to scholarly notions that increased repression 
may “backfire” and may lead to an increase and escalation of mobilization, rather than 
subduing it (della Porta, 2016; also della Porta and Reiter, 2006). On the other hand, and 
while certainly ‘producing anger rather than fear’, the reactions of my interlocutors to these 
“moral shocks” took more than emotional forms of “outrage and hope” (della Porta, 2016, 
p. 118). Indeed, hope was quite absent at this point. As Seif describes it, his was a conscious 
reassessment of the value his own life and a resulting defiance to stand in solidarity with his 
friends, even if it meant he would die. Here, structures of feeling that had devalued life itself, 
rationalities of resistance, and bonds of solidarity forged in struggle all appear to have come 
together driving conscious decisions to resist and, rather than outrage or hope, produced an 
extreme courage and “bravery” (Kurzman, 2012) that allowed the young men to keep 
fighting.  
While this experience needs to be read through and is limited by the terms of masculinity 
discussed in the previous chapters, the demonstration of resolve by the young men inspired 
other members of the community. As such, Choukri Hayouni, the teacher and trade unionist 
from Hay Ennour, expressed his astonishment when he found that ‘people no longer had a 
grain of fear! [...] With tear gas all over our faces, and live bullets flying, the people did not 
care and resisted. And the youth were shouting “Don't be afraid, don't be afraid!”’ (Choukri 
Hayouni). The bravery of the youth, Choukri suggests, broke the barrier of fear and 
encouraged those who had stayed away from the fighting to join their ranks. Here, the use 
of lethal force by the regime indeed led to a new situation in that members of the rebelling 
communities engaged in direct confrontations with the police irrespective of their class 
background. This was brought out clearly by the statement of Neji Gharsalli, an experienced 
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activist and lawyer who had organized the first peaceful demonstration in Kasserine. In his 
sixties and with a dignified demeanor, he welcomed us in his office that was filled with 
memorabilia for the causes of Arab Nationalism. We were treated to coffee and sweets as he 
spoke pensively: 
There was a real coalescing between the citizens. Since the death of the first martyrs, we became a 
united bloc; us [lawyers], the unionists, and the youth […] We were at the Hay Ezzouhour roundabout 
[…] They fired rubber bullets and tear gas, and two lawyers were wounded […But] it was them [youth] 
who presented the martyrs. Without them, there would not have been a revolution. 
Neji gives us a strong impression of the unifying effect that the regime’s decision to use lethal 
violence had on the people of the rebelling communities. It appears that the situation 
changed in three important ways subsequent to that decision. First, hopes for hegemonic 
incorporation were eradicated and approaches like negotiations and common sense 
demands for the extension of incorporation were demonstrably exhausted. Second, and 
contrary to what the regime might have hoped for, the barrier of fear was broken as the 
youth stood their ground. Together, this caused activists like Neji and Choukri to rally to the 
militant particularism developed by the youth and join open confrontations with the police. 
All three aspects can be interpreted as unification under a transgressive vector of 
mobilization through which members of diverse social groups were now experiencing a 
substitution of hegemony with coercion, leading whole communities to withdraw their 
consent and engage in open revolt. As Neji and Choukri state, the development of this 
qualitatively new situation was driven by the subaltern youth. In other words, building on 
historical processes of hegemonic contraction and persistent expansion of its fissures 
through subaltern self-activity, local conditions had reached a “crisis of hegemony” that 
affected members of all social groups which the regime now ruled by ‘exercising coercive 
force alone’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276).  
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The unifying effect of this development was experienced not just by the middle-classes, but 
also by people like Fadhel, the carpenter who had been subjected to torture for his Islamist 
orientation. He said that: ‘For the first time, I felt that the people of Kasserine loved each 
other. There were no more barriers […] From the 8th [of January], we were like one. There 
were no longer distinctions’ (Fadhel Bouzidi). Social distinctions and divisions, another effect 
of hegemony, appear to have been overcome, at least partially, giving rise to feelings of 
solidarity, or even love, that united the local community.  
Similar developments, having already occurred in Thala at an earlier stage, were expressed 
by my interlocutors in Regueb. As the previous chapter discussed, mobilizations in this town 
were divided between those organized by activists and trade unionists raising demands for 
incorporation and actions of more radical youth and had also slowed down towards the end 
of December. Abderraouf Abidi, an architect and civil society activist in his late thirties 
recalled that the local UGTT on 9 January called ‘a general strike in Regueb in solidarity with 
the deaths in Thala and Kasserine’ (Abderraouf Abidi), making it the first local UGTT branch 
in the country to officially announce a strike in the revolutionary process (Salmon, 2016). The 
regime, however, made very clear that it would have no such mobilization by trade union 
structures, and local police forces opened fire on the demonstrations that day, killing four 
protesters. As in Kasserine, this entirely new situation led to a unification of the community. 
This was relayed to me by Arbi, the unemployed activist who co-founded the local UDC at 
the end of December and had followed the approach of the trade unionists thus far: ‘On 9 
January, there was blood! So, there was nothing left to lose. […] Even the activists who did 
not support the confrontations before knew that we could no longer go back’ (Arbi Kadri). 
And Hachem Maaidi, an IT graduate in his early thirties who had been unemployed at the 
time of the revolution, similarly said that: ‘What changed was that even the people who were 
against the confrontations got involved in this fight, those who refused violence and all that’ 
(Hachem Maaidi). Although people had thus found unity, the developments in Regueb 
182 
 
showed that they still faced a formidable adversary. Indeed, 9 January was the day which 
made this similarly clear in Thala and Kasserine as many more lost their lives there as well.  
With three young men having been killed the day before in Kasserine and one in Thala, the 
morning of 9 January saw large funeral processions departing from the homes of the martyrs, 
with people from all classes, age-groups, and genders present. What was intended as 
peaceful and dignified burial processions turned into the first mass confrontations of the 
Tunisian revolution to occur in broad daylight as the police, to the disbelief of people, stuck 
to its crowd dispersal logic and attacked the funerals. In Hay Ezzouhour, the body of 
Mohamed Amin Mbarki, who had been killed at the age of sixteen, was transported by his 
neighbor Hasan Nasri in his car. Hasan, having himself faced dire economic circumstances 
that had led him to migrate, first to Morocco and then to Europe, in search of work, 
sympathized with the plight of the youth under Ben Ali. He described the events of that 
morning to us as we warmed over tea in a small café on a freezing February morning: 
When I got to the Hay Ezzouhour roundabout, the police were preparing to intervene, so I wanted to 
turn around. But people didn't let me do it […] There were people behind me who started throwing 
stones, and the [police] responded with gas […] There were snipers on the roofs […] who were shooting 
people […] We had to confront each other! The people didn't want to run away, they wanted to 
confront the police in the funeral. It was either the death of the citizens or the burning of the police 
station. The youth weren't afraid, they attacked. 
Fearing for the dignity of the funeral and the lives of the women and children in the crowd, 
Hasan wanted to retreat. But the steadfastness of people had grown so much that they 
withstood not just the tear gas but even sniper fire. Indeed, in the ensuing battle, the youth 
succeeded in burning down the local police station, although the price they paid in blood was 
high. The regime also attacked the other funeral processions and the demonstration in 
Regueb, killing an estimated total of thirty people that Sunday, 9 January 2011, thus turning 
it into the single bloodiest day in Tunisian history since the bread riots more than 25 years 
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earlier (Salmon, 2016), and constituting an unprecedented level of violence under Ben Ali.38 
My interlocutors referred to these events as massacres that, as scholars have argued, 
shocked the country and significantly influenced subsequent developments on the national 
level (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012; della Porta, 2016; Volpi, 2016; Yousfi, 2015a; Zemni, 2015a).  
Locally, the trauma was no less profound. Hamza Aloui, one of the young fighters from Hay 
Ennour who had been experiencing frequent police humiliation before, said that: ‘We never 
thought they would forbid us to bury someone who died […But] they even killed people at 
the funerals!’ (Hamza Aloui). Hamza expresses his shock and a sense of violated honor that 
he felt for not being allowed to bury the dead. Others said that, under the impact of these 
events, people began to reconsider the situation. This was suggested to me by Mohamed 
Taher Khadraoui, a civil society activist from Kasserine in his fifties who had been affiliated 
with opposition parties under Ben Ali. He had made a small fortune working in the Gulf 
countries and received us in the office of the charity which he now runs: 
At the funerals of Slah, Raouf, and Amin, the police intervened and dispersed us. The funerals were 
prevented, and the people were slaughtered! The largest number of people died in Kasserine and 
Thala that day. And there, the regime revealed its true authoritarian nature and that of the repressive 
apparatus. On 9 January, the real revolution began.  
Denial of the dignity of burial and what Mohamed Taher called the slaughter of 9 January 
had a profound effect. As he puts it, they marked the beginning of the revolution as the new 
situation made the regime’s authoritarian and repressive character plainly visible. In a more 
popular language, a similar point was made by Hsan Jamli, a butcher from Thala in his fifties 
and father of the first martyr of the town, who met us at the local UGTT office. He said that, 
‘at the funeral […] they blocked the road and […] shot at us with live ammunition and tear 
 
38 The number of casualties in the two nationwide revolts after independence that took place under 
Bourguiba, the 1978 General Strike of UGTT and the Bread Riots of December 1983 to January 1984, 
was around 200 in each case (Camau and Geisser, 2003; Kassab et al., 2010). By comparison, the 
previous major violent repression of protests under Ben Ali in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008, killed 
three people (Allal, 2010). 
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gas […] They allowed some women to pass, but not the men. You see the dictatorship!’ (Hsan 
Jamli). Here, see how popular self-activity and repressive actions of the police constructed 
“catalytic events” in which the ‘legitimacy of dominant power relations are demonstrably 
reversed’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, p. 78). And indeed, both interlocutors suggest that there 
was a “revelation” that led to something like a final collapse of hegemony, the slow 
deconstruction over the previous years and weeks had accelerated dramatically with the 
disintegration of hopes for incorporation and the killings. 
A similar chord was struck by Choukri Slougui, an unemployed graduate from Hay Ezzouhour 
in his mid-thirties, who pointed out that the situation caused people to reflect anew: ‘We 
had been demanding bread, employment, etc. But with the massacres, he [Ben Ali] lost his 
legitimacy […] After the killings, consciousness was constituted’ (Choukri Slougui). Choukri 
states that belief in the legitimacy of the regime – and thus the most important effect of 
common sense – was deconstructed in the catalytic events of 8 and 9 January. This, then, 
constituted a “crisis of authority” in which people became ‘detached from their traditional 
ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276). But 
Choukri also hints at a transition from a deconstructive phase to constructive one by saying 
that changes in consciousness occurred at this stage. In other words, the struggle started 
coming up to ‘a process through which reflexive self-activity engenders a distancing from the 
hegemonic elements of common sense and simultaneously a process through which “good 
sense” is rendered “more unitary and coherent”’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, p. 88). As the next 
section discusses, this process unfolded through a popular work of reinterpretation. 
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Critical Self-Activity: Articulating Revolution 
Breaking free from the constraints of common sense in the process of an intensifying 
confrontation with the state, subaltern self-activity produced conditions in which people 
began to reinterpret their experience, understanding of self, and their relationship to the 
regime. How did such processes unfold in a context where prior organic intellectual and 
organizational activity were clearly in short supply? In other words, what were the 
imaginaries from which people’s critical self-activity might have constructed “oppositional 
readings” (Hall, 2006) of their situation? In our conversations, several of my interlocutors 
gave suggestive comments on how they began to relate their experiences of the qualitatively 
different situation that now prevailed to good sense conceptions of history as well as to a 
popular political language referring to Palestine. The latter reference was used by Sariha 
Hayouni, an Arabic teacher in her mid-forties. Like her cousin Choukri Hayouni who had 
organized the interview, she was from Thala but now teaches at a high school in Kasserine. 
When we spoke to her in the office of her husband’s insurance company, she said: ‘We now 
witnessed scenes at home that we used to see only in the news from Gaza’ (Sariha Hayouni). 
And Hachem, the IT graduate and unemployed activist from Regueb commented: ‘People 
started to compare our situation with Palestine. This ignited things.’ (Hachem Maaidi). The 
statements by Sariha and Hachem suggest that comparisons with the situation in Palestine, 
one of the strongest allegories for injustice available in popular political language throughout 
much of the Arabic world, were made by people from different social groups. Under 
conditions of hegemonic collapse, then, powerful vocabularies of good sense political 
conceptions became available as foils with which people started to re-interpret their 
situation. This was expressed in a highly suggestive manner by Choukri Slougui, the 
unemployed graduate from Hay Ezzouhour, who made a further connection with the period 
of anti-colonial struggle:  
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It was a scene that can only happen between two enemies […] A real war! With one side an armed 
party, and the other people who defend themselves with stones. This scene is repeated in Palestine 
every day […] Mohamed Amin Mbarki, his grandfather was a great Moudjahid, a fighter against French 
colonization, one of Kasserine’s revolutionaries. And so, the same scenario is repeated, but with 
internal hands. In the same way, Mohamed wanted to confront injustice […] I perceived that there 
was a confrontation between the people and the regime. 
This comment provides an example of how popular critical self-activity drew on multiple 
forms of good sense to re-interpret the present situation and, as Choukri suggested before, 
constructed a different political consciousness. On the one hand, the qualitatively new 
situation gave rise to experience that is made sense of through comparison with Palestine as 
a referent for fundamental injustice, adversarial confrontation, and disproportionate power. 
On the other hand, good sense conceptions of history were drawn on to construct a parallel 
with situations in which the local community was engaged in righteous resistance. Here, the 
first martyr from Hay Ezzouhour was placed, through his ancestral lineage, in the context of 
“memories of revolt” against an unjust and foreign oppressor, allowing for his actions to be 
read in the light of those by his grandfather, and making him, too, a revolutionary. Thus, 
Choukri surmises that they were confronting an injustice like that in Palestine, or that 
experienced by their ancestors during colonial times, that was now being perpetrated by 
“internal hands”, viz. by the domestic regime. Indeed, he states that he perceived that there 
was a confrontation between two enemies – “the people” and “the regime” – and thus a 
fundamental antagonism, effectively constructed through something akin to a “chain of 
equivalence” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) between legitimate struggles for overcoming unjust 
regimes and their own resistance. This suggests that a re-interpretation of the situation along 
revolutionary lines was taking place.  
Here, what we are spotting here is a break with the language of common sense that had 
previously confined the struggle, at least in terms of articulate demands, to defensive forms. 
The good sense vocabularies and conceptions mentioned challenge fundamental elements 
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in the ruling ideology, notably the legitimacy of the post-colonial state as based on delivering 
independence from foreign rule (Camau and Geisser, 2003). As Choukri’s comments suggest, 
this dominant conception was reversed, and the regime re-interpreted as a foreign 
oppressor. The people, by contrast, claimed for themselves the legitimizing conception of 
revolutionary liberators. Indeed, these developments apparently occurred in a process of 
popular critical self-activity, rather than through an intervention of outside intellectuals or 
leaders. In Gramsci’s words, rather than a ‘systematic educational activity on the part of an 
already conscious leading group’, they were an ‘auto-reflection on the part of the people - 
an inner reasoning worked out in the popular consciousness’ (1971, pp. 126–7, 198–9).  
Indeed, this process seems to have worked through those “sediments” of common sense – 
anti-colonial struggle – where good sense conceptions of history, or an “infinity of traces” 
(Gramsci, 1971), opened possibilities for “oppositional readings” (Hall, 2006). That placing 
their actions into a context of popular conceptions of history was a key process of 
reinterpretation that motivated the struggle of the people of Kasserine was suggested by 
Jaafer Bouzidi, one of the local lawyers. In his early forties, he had been politically active as a 
student, which earned him an expulsion from Tunis University and forced him to finish his 
legal studies in Libya. He received us in his office where, seated under a framed picture 
showing him in a row of lawyers marching, arms interlocked, at the helm of a demonstration 
during the revolution, he gave the following testimony: 
I belong to the Fraichich [tribe of Kasserine], we have a past and a history. I am tough in a daunting 
present, and I try to reproduce my past. I try to reproduce the image of yesterday, the image of my 
revolutionary grandfather who fought colonization. We have these idioms here: "We fought 
colonization", "My grandfather is a Falleg [fighter against French colonialism], your grandfather is a 
bootlicker". We use these popular expressions to create a desire to excel despite your means […] All 
these complexes converged in a precise moment, and thus the revolution was born. And the 
foundations were built on the blood of men. I saw with my own eyes how these youth stormed the 
Hay Ezzouhour police station with nothing but a stone in their hands. I saw women forcing their sons 
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to join […] The only concern was to be united against this machine of oppression, to beat the tyrant 
that was oppressing the people.  
Jaafer asserts a sense of pride, dignity, and historical agency drawn from good sense 
conceptions of history. Just as Choukri, he lays claim to the past by rendering equivalent the 
revolutionary fight against French colonial rule by the tribal community and the present 
struggle against Ben Ali. Against the erasure of their tribal identity through hegemonic 
discourses of modernity – and, as one might add, against European intellectual perspectives 
rendering North African cities “places without history” (Camus, 1996) – Jaafer proclaims that 
the people of Kasserine have a past and a history. Indeed, he suggests that it is this very past 
from which courage to face up to a daunting present emerged as people reproduced the 
revolutionary struggle of their ancestors. Here, subaltern agency, especially of the young 
fighting men is, beyond their own experience, rooted in collective “memories of revolt”, 
giving them the reassurance of hailing from a people who fought and won historic battles. 
This evocation of their revolutionary past served to construct a sense of historical agency 
implicating the people in a mobilization through which, as Jaafer puts it, the revolution was 
born, and a will emerged to beat the tyrant. Here, then, people made the crucial transition 
towards building a revolutionary collective will and sense of historical protagonism.  
How can we understand these developments? With Gramsci, we would suspect that the 
creation of a collective will presupposes the development of unifying conceptions of the 
world (1971, p. 349). It appears that a vocabulary for such new conceptions came from “old 
good sense” and revolved around a historical re-reading of present experience. Drawing on 
what Jaafer called “popular expressions”, constituting a kind of good sense oppositional 
language always latently present in the fissures of hegemony, it seems that a counter-
hegemonic reading of the present was being constructed. This reinterpretation involved 
conceiving of the people as a unified subject, of the regime as its enemy, and of the struggle 
as aimed at bringing it down that stand in dialectical relationship with each other and laid 
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the ground for a revolutionary re-articulation of the struggle. Indeed, a decisive 
transformation was produced at this stage whereby new forms of signification that broke 
with common sense were expressed in language, thus articulating a new conception of the 
world around which a collective will for the overthrow of the regime could coalesce. Fadhel 
Bouzidi, the 62-year-old carpenter from Hay Ennour, suggested that, after the massacres, a 
revolutionary transformation of the struggle occurred: 
He [Ben Ali] became an enemy, with all the meaning of the word. It’s like a colonizer. It was not a 
Tunisian against a Tunisian, no. He’s Israel, I’m Tunisia. [...] After the killings, it was politicized. The 
people came into being and this word began to circulate. The people accepted no less than the fall of 
the regime. […] And so, the slogan “Ash-shaʿb yurīd isqāt an-niẓām” (the people want to bring down 
the regime) appeared.  
Fadhel draws together the different registers of popular language and expression through 
which people reinterpreted their situation and their struggle. He states that the regime was 
now seen as a colonizer, a foreign power, and that those struggling against it “became the 
people”, representing the defenders of the true nation, thus expressing a claim to popular 
legitimacy. Re-interpreting themselves and the situation based on the solidarities and 
imaginaries of popular consciousness produced what Fadhel called a process of politicization. 
He places in this context the emergence of what would become the signature slogan of the 
Arab Uprisings: “Ash-shaʿb yurīd isqāt an-niẓām” (the people want to bring down the regime, 
henceforth ASYIAN).  
In this slogan, we can see the articulation of a new conception of the world that makes sense 
of the present situation and its contradictions and points to a way out of them in terms of 
revolutionary change. It renders the people as a national-popular collective subject with the 
right, capacity, and will to overthrow an unjust regime. This articulation is deeply organic to 
the Tunisian popular imaginary. The expression “the people want” draws on the opening line 
of a poem by Aboul-Qacem Echebbi, considered the poet of the national struggle against 
French colonialism, which had been popularized by its inclusion in the first national anthem 
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of independent Tunisia (Colla, 2012). Organic connection to the present situation was 
constructed by rendering this enemy in terms of the domestic regime that the people had 
come to see precisely as parallel to the colonial oppressor of old. And finally, Fadhel suggests 
that ASYIAN emerged after the regime started killing protesters. Indeed, as Colla (ibid) points 
out, the meter and rhythm of ASYIAN is that of a slogan commonly raised at politicized 
funerals: “Bil-rūḥ, bid-dam, nafdīk, ya […]” (With soul, with blood, we sacrifice for you, oh 
[name of a martyr or cause]), meaning that it was likely first raised in such a context. Through 
this, ASYIAN can be understood as articulating a new conception of the world that re-cast the 
ongoing struggle in revolutionary terms that were organically rooted in present experience 
and the vernaculars of good sense.  
It has proven impossible for me to determine when and where precisely ASYIAN was first 
articulated in the Tunisian revolutionary process. The suggestive evidence above points to on 
or after 9 January in Kasserine, a notion affirmed by some scholars (Aleya-Sghaier, 2012). 
Others claim that the slogan was first raised in the Sfax general strike on 12 January, though 
they do not provide evidence for it (Zemni et al., 2013; Zemni, 2015a). The first video 
documentation of a slogan approximating ASYIAN that I was able to track down dates from 
11 January in Sidi Bouzid.39 And while the full slogan appeared on Twitter only with the 
beginning of mobilization in Egypt on 25 January 2011, other clearly revolutionary 
articulations like “Ben Ali – Dégage!” (Ben Ali – Get out!) began to circulate from 10 January 
onwards. Summarily, this suggests that revolutionary transformation of the struggle in 
Tunisia is best conceived as a process, rather than a discrete event (Sewell, 2005), in which 
the first important articulations were likely created between 9 and 11 January.  
 
39 This is based on an analysis of videos posted on YouTube during this period by the Tunisian blogger 
collective turned thinktank Nawaat and my own research in the Tunisian National Archives which are 
collecting videos and photographic evidence from the period of the revolution. The video in question 
from 11 January 2011 in Sidi Bouzid can be accessed online at: 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=9AMkiApAKA0&index=68&list=PLu9NNXunTgMOxAI52pb8PXINCfRFRU
c4n (last accessed 16.03.2020). 
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The process of popular critical self-activity described here, and ASYIAN as the most 
comprehensive revolutionary articulation it produced, are also notably different from what 
chapter three discussed as the “long labor” that gives rise to a collective will (Gramsci, 1971). 
Indeed, the dynamics discussed in the present chapter involved comparatively little of the 
organic intellectual and organizational activity required to develop coherent conceptions of 
the world, let alone a revolutionary strategy. As such, the level of articulation reached here 
clearly falls short of giving rise to a project in a more developed form, which ‘posits the social 
totality as the object of challenge and transformation’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, p. 83). In 
ASYIAN, no specification is given as to what exactly “the regime” is, who is included in “the 
people”, let alone for how social relations, political and civil society, and the economy are to 
be transformed. Forged in the heat of the battle and with recourse to little more ideational 
means than those supplied by good sense and popular culture, the transformation into a 
revolutionary struggle remained, as it were, “under-articulated”. Still, it marked the crucial 
‘transition to transformative politics […as] subaltern social groups, in a process of 
transformation, discover[ed] not just who they are, […] but what they want’ (Chalcraft, 
forthcoming). With these transformations, a collective will, albeit in rudimentary form, of a 
people wanting to bring down the regime was born. For the first time in the Tunisian 
revolutionary process, this would lead to mass mobilization around revolutionary demands 
on the local level. 
 
Symbolic Victory of Revolutionary Mobilization  
As this section discusses, what occurred in the aftermath of the events in Kasserine, Thala, 
and Regueb on 8 and 9 January, can indeed be understood as the passage from revolt to a 
revolutionary struggle. My interlocutors from these three localities stated that, subsequent 
to the killing of protesters, demands for hegemonic incorporation were superseded by calls 
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for the fall of Ben Ali. With the struggle involving members from all social groups, this 
transformation can be understood as the emergence of revolutionary mass mobilization, and 
thus the creation of revolutionary situations on the local level. The force of the mobilization 
that thus developed also brought a first popular victory as the regime was eventually swayed 
to withdraw the police from the interior provinces – be it only to concentrate on the trouble 
that was brewing elsewhere. As such, Majdi Gharsalli, one of the activist lawyers in Kasserine, 
suggested to me that revolutionary transformation of the struggle occurred after the killing 
of protesters. In his late thirties and a resident of the popular quarter of Hay Ennour, he was 
known, as he put it, as a “human rights defender” and had been involved in the local 
mobilization of his colleagues from December onward:  
The killings were decisive in the Tunisian revolution. If he hadn't ordered the use of the live bullets, 
Ben Ali would still be in power today […] The slogans at the beginning were very general slogans, not 
aimed at overthrowing the regime. The slogans which aimed at the overthrow of the regime came 
after the killings. 
In no uncertain terms, Majdi opines that Ben Ali’s own decisions led to his demise. The aim 
of overthrowing the regime was articulated only after orders to kill protesters had been 
given. This was correspondingly expressed by Hamza, the unemployed young man from Hay 
Ennour who had expressed his horror at the regime’s attack on the funerals above. Indeed, 
he said that: ‘After the funerals, our demands changed […] The demands for employment 
turned into an aspiration for the fall of the regime’ (Hamza Aloui). He suggests that the 
transformation of their demands meant that the local mobilization acquired a different 
quality, becoming a revolutionary effort to bring down the regime. And Arbi, who co-founded 
the local UDC, relayed that a similar transformation occurred in Regueb. He said that: ‘After 
9 January, the demands were no longer the same. At the beginning, our slogans concerned 
socio-economic rights […] But when the blood was spilled, the slogans changed. They became 
political […and expressed] a refusal of the regime’ (Arbi Kadri). He goes as far as calling the 
demands before the massacres “non-political”. Considering the suppression of dissent under 
193 
 
Ben Ali and some of the clearly political – if particularistic – slogans that circulated before, 
including those raised precisely by the unemployed movement (Beinin, 2015), I understand 
this comment as asserting the legitimacy of the previous demands in terms of common sense 
– and thus as entailing the claim of being “blameless” regarding the escalation of violence. 
My interlocutors clearly agreed that their mobilization acquired a revolutionary nature only 
after the regime started using lethal force. That this transformation entailed the emergence 
of a collective will to bring about the fall of the regime was suggested, for example, by Omar 
Saidi, who had participated in the revolution as a high school student, and Seif Hamdi, the 
unemployed road construction worker: 
After the deaths, the slogans changed. There were […] slogans directed at Ben Ali. After the people 
died, everyone mobilized, even the oldest. […] This person killed my brother, so I can't live with him 
anymore, it's very simple! We cannot live together after this massacre. Either we keep killing each 
other, or Ben Ali gets out. (Omar Saidi) 
Everyone took to the streets, girls and boys, without exceptions. In short, there we can speak of a 
revolution. After the massacre, we no longer talked about Thala, we talked about Ben Ali and his 
regime. Before the massacre, the essential demand was to release the detainees, but after blood was 
shed, the essential demand was the fall of Ben Ali. (Seif Hamdi) 
Omar and Seif relay that the emergence of a struggle aimed at the fall of the regime was 
concomitant to the beginning of a struggle that involved the entire local population 
regardless of gender or age. At this point, mobilization involving members of diverse social 
groups also, for the first time since protests had begun more than three weeks earlier, raised 
demands for radical political change. Omar drastically states that the revolutionary situation 
that ensued on a local level was perceived by him as a conflict in which only one side could 
survive, suggesting that no possible regime concession could have ended hostilities at this 
point. And Seif suggests that, having found a language to “talk about Ben Ali”, a passage from 
defensive demands occurred as people articulated the fall of the regime as the essential aim 
of their struggle.  
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Here, we can also spot the kind of determination that comes with the emergence of a 
collective will for revolutionary change. For the popular force created by the unification of 
“dispersed wills” that were now ‘welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal 
and common conception of the world’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 349), meant that the regime no 
longer confronted the same adversary. Within days of the massacres, mobilization making 
demands for incorporation by separate groups in which only the young men had openly 
confronted the police had transformed into revolutionary mass mobilization. Driven by the 
protagonism of the subaltern youth and with little recourse to (prior) organic intellectual or 
organizational labor, people in the Tunisian interior made the decisive transition to 
mobilizing around a shared conception for revolutionary change. This, then, marked the 
period in which the ‘forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their 
own destiny’ (Trotsky, 2008, p. ii) first occurred in the history of the Tunisian revolution, thus 
creating a revolutionary situation on the local level. 
The developments in Kasserine, Thala and Regueb around the weekend of 8 to 9 January, 
then, marked the emergence of a new kind of social force: mass mobilization for 
revolutionary goals. This local transformation of the struggle created a qualitatively different 
situation that began to impact on the national constellation of forces. Here, rather than 
faceless “transformative events” producing “moral shocks” (della Porta, 2016; Volpi, 2016), 
the collective agency of those struggling against the regime and the interactions this 
produced with its repressive apparatus brought about decisive transformations. As 
articulation of radical conceptions shifted mobilization from a transgressive to a 
revolutionary vector, it was the popular self-activity of a unified struggle by these 
communities for such goals that created local revolutionary situations.  
My interlocutors suggested that the will and determination which they had developed meant 
that a dangerous impasse emerged in which either the regime or their communities would 
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have to perish. With the balance of forces still clearly in favor of the former, lawyers in 
Kasserine made an attempt to deescalate the situation by convincing the president of the 
powerful National Bar Association to intervene directly with Ben Ali. This is what Maher 
Bouazzi, an activist lawyer from Kasserine in his early forties who would become the city’s 
first freely elected mayor after the revolution told me. When we spoke in his office, he 
recalled that: ‘We called [president of the Bar Association] Abderrazek Kilani. We told him 
that he had to do something to stop the massacre […] We asked that the police of Ben Ali 
leave. It was the only possible solution’ (Maher Bouazzi). This account was confirmed in my 
conversation with Abderrazek Kilani. Having since withdrawn from politics, he received me 
in the Tunis-based law firm which he now runs and said that, on 10 January: 
I found colleagues in my office who told me there is a massacre. They handed over a call live from 
Kasserine, and I heard the sound of ambulances and people shouting [...] I called Ben Ali [...] I told him 
[...:] “Colleagues from Kasserine tell me that there is a solution to stop all this, if the police withdraw 
and are replaced by the army.” […] He said: “Okay, I'm going to give the instructions.” […] After several 
hours, my colleagues from Kasserine called me again and told me that the police were beginning to 
withdraw and that the army was taking its place. 
As the police forces gradually withdrew from Kasserine and other localities in the interior, 
leaving the region completely on 12 January, the intervention of the lawyers appears to have 
been decisive in preventing further bloodshed there. It will probably remain unknown what 
ultimately swayed Ben Ali to give these orders. The regime may have been contemplating 
another shift in tactics and simply sought a pause in fighting to regroup its forces on the 
ground. More likely, as the next chapter will discuss, was that Ben Ali had become aware of 
a meeting by the national UGTT leadership that day at which the head of the powerful union 
branch in Sfax had been announcing his intention to call for a general strike. This, as well as 
the beginning of mobilization in the popular quarters of the capital from 11 January onwards, 
certainly factored into the decision to withdraw police forces from the interior and 
concentrate them in these strategically much more vital cities. What was evident is that the 
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balance of forces on the national level was beginning to shift based on the new situation 
created by the struggle of the people in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb. For them, these 
developments came as a relief. This was expressed by Hsan Jamli, the butcher from Thala 
who had lost his son in the fighting. He stressed the importance of the developments in Sfax 
in leading to the withdrawal of the police: 
The demonstration in Sfax on the 12th [of January] forced them to transfer their agents. When the 
UGTT started organizing this demonstration, we were relieved here, and the pressure dropped a lot. 
On the 12th, there was no longer any police at Thala. 
For the people in the interior, the shifts that began to occur at the national level were felt 
instantly as the police pressure on their communities dropped. From the day of the general 
strike in Sfax on 12 January, according to Hsan, the police had disappeared from Thala. These 
developments were interpreted by many in the communities of the interior as an important 
achievement. Indeed, my interlocutors stated that withdrawal of the police led a gasp of 
relief as local mobilization calmed down. This was expressed by Ali Rebah, for instance, a 
musician in his late thirties who had been unemployed under Ben Ali and founded the city’s 
first independent radio station after the revolution. One of the local tech-savvy young men, 
he had been filming and posting online information about the local mobilization and recalled: 
‘the absence of the police changed everything, people became calm […] Life basically 
returned to normal’ (Ali Rebah).  
Others went further and framed the situation in a way that suggested that at least some of 
their aspirations had been met. As such, Mongi Zorbi, a worker from Kasserine’s Hay Ennour 
in his sixties who had lived through the bread riots under Bourguiba stated that he had felt 
liberated: ‘Personally, I felt freedom on the 12th [of January]. Did he [Ben Ali] flee? No. But 
for the first time I have my freedom. […] When you walked around in the market, you were 
free, you were your own boss’ (Mongi Zorbi). Looking at me smilingly when he said those 
words, Mongi conveyed how intensely the lives of subalterns in the interior had been marked 
197 
 
by the repressive presence of the police. While he suggested that the struggle was not over 
yet, the disappearance of this immediate face of oppression apparently allowed him to feel 
a sense of freedom he had never known. 
Mongi’s words recall comments by my interlocutors cited in chapter four who suggested that 
the police were the principal manifestation of the state in the lives of subalterns. Indeed, 
several of my subaltern interlocutors in the interior experienced police withdrawal as a 
victory despite the radicalization of the struggle that had occurred. This brings out the under-
specification of the demand for the overthrow of the regime. It suggests that, to many, the 
latter may have remained coterminous with the police, pointing to a possibility for a 
collective will forged in the heat of battle to fracture equally quickly. Indeed, after Mongi had 
given the above comment, his friend Fadhel Bouzidi, the carpenter in whose workshop we 
were sitting all together, made a statement that pointed towards such a reading. He said 
that: ‘Here in Kasserine, we gained our independence on 12 January. The army was 
circulating, and no one was governing us. We created neighborhood committees. We did not 
have a regime anymore’ (Fadhel Bouzidi). Fadhel describes here an experience of self-
governance through local committees that were created in communities across the country 
to guarantee local security once the police had been withdrawn (Berry-Chikhaoui, 2011). 
While these have importantly been analyzed as politicizing experiences for members of 
subaltern groups (Allal, 2012b), Fadhel’s comment also suggests another reading. For, 
together with the strong identification between the repressive forces and the regime, they 
were interpreted by some as indications that the regime had, as far as their local conditions 
were concerned, been brought down. That this was understood by some as an effective end 
to the revolutionary process was suggested by Bassem Hajji, the young NGO-founder from 
Thala, who remarked that: ‘On 12 January, the revolution in Thala was over. We went home’ 
(Bassem Hajji). While this opinion sounds drastic and was certainly not shared by many of my 
interlocutors, it points to persistent differences in political interpretation. 
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As far as the situation in the communities of the interior on the eve of 12 January was 
concerned, feelings of relief and achievement were mixed with uncertainty and fear. For, a 
sense of liberation notwithstanding, people were of course aware that Ben Ali remained very 
much in power. Many surmised that the withdrawal of the police might have meant no more 
than a respite from repression. Such a cautious tone was struck by Walid Abidi, the history 
graduate and unemployed activist from Regueb who said that: ‘Of course, we were happy 
because the military came, and the police left. But we were also conscious that we had only 
achieved a symbolic victory’ (Walid Abidi). Walid states that the victory which the people in 
the interior had won was but a symbolic one, suggesting that people still considered their 
position vulnerable.  
Indeed, in the suspense that was created between the beginning of the police withdrawal 
and the 12 January general strike in Sfax, rumors about an impending bombardment of the 
rebelling communities began to circulate. Tounsi Nasri, owner of a small corner store in the 
city center of Kasserine who was among the wounded of the previous days, for instance, said 
that: ‘Without Sfax, Kasserine would have been reduced to nothing. Because Ben Ali wanted 
to bomb Kasserine. Until the day when Sfax went on a demonstration’ (Tounsi Nasri). Like 
Tounsi, many of my interlocutors from subaltern groups emphasized the importance of the 
Sfax general strike as a turning point in the revolutionary process. This was suggested by 
Karim Bouzidi, older brother of Raouf, the first martyr from Hay Ennour, who had been 
working in a factory in Tunis at the time of the revolution and returned to Kasserine after the 
news of his brother’s death. He recalled: ‘For us in Kasserine, it was a story of planes and 
bombing that they were preparing for us! People were scared. It changed when Sfax made 
the decisive demonstration of the revolution’ (Karim Bouzidi). Both men state that people in 
Kasserine feared the regime would move to eliminate their entire community and that this 
existential worry only abated after it became clear that people in Sfax were beginning to 
mobilize. With that latter development, the center of the revolutionary process would shift 
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towards the coastal regions. The next chapter discusses these stages of the revolution and 
how my interlocutors in the interior as well as other members of subaltern groups inserted 
themselves in them.  
 
Conclusion  
A momentous development occurred during the short period of a few days in the rebellious 
communities of Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb in the Tunisian interior. Struggles which had 
waxed and waned over the preceding weeks, and in which different vectors of mobilization 
had, amid interaction and partial reinforcement, remained largely separate, now 
transformed themselves, creating revolutionary situations on the local level. Here, a decisive 
shift was made from a mainly defensive bid for incorporation to the articulation of radical 
political demands for the fall of the regime around which diverse struggles united. This 
coalescing of vectors into revolutionary mass mobilization was achieved by the people in the 
interior in an active response to the qualitatively new situation created by the interactions 
between the self-activity of the subaltern youth and the repressive apparatus. As these 
escalated into the killing of protesters, possibilities for a peaceful resolution through 
concessions in the form of hegemonic incorporation seemed demonstrably exhausted. The 
calamitous actions of the regime were interpreted by people in the local communities as its 
delegitimization, creating a situation of hegemonic collapse in which the people rearticulated 
their understanding of self and the aims of their struggle in revolutionary terms. Around 
these new articulations, a collective will for the overthrow of the regime formed for the first 
time in the Tunisian revolutionary process. Through popular self-change, or “self-
constitution” (Tripp, 2014), and in response to a situation created by the struggles of the 
subaltern youth, the collective subject of “the people” had been born. This unification and 
revolutionary transformation of struggles subsequently began to shift the balance of forces 
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on the national level and prepared the ground for a revolutionary process that had thus far 
been pushed forward by the agency of people in the interior to finally reach the coastal cities.  
The discussion in this chapter showed that these decisive developments are insufficiently 
grasped by the concept of transformative events. While accounts from this perspective have 
stressed the importance of events that were discussed here, they do not offer an 
understanding how the agency of people in Kasserine and elsewhere created both the events 
themselves and subsequent changes. As such, they attribute revolutionary transformation of 
the struggle either to emotional dynamics (della Porta, 2016), or to media discourses around 
events (Volpi, 2016), both understood as occurring on an abstract national level. Through 
such accounts, creative agency and processes of learning in struggle, including importantly 
by members of subaltern groups, are obscured and assimilated into “the event” which is 
understood primarily in terms of “regime violence” and emotional reactions to it. The latter 
two aspects were undoubtedly important in the developments discussed here. However, and 
while “hope” was often in scarce supply, emotions went beyond “outrage”, involving rather 
the mustering of courage and bravery (Kurzman, 2012), in which feelings of loyalty to 
deceased friends and good sense conceptions of history including “memories of revolt” 
(Swedenburg, 2003) were crucial.  
Over and beyond these dimensions, there were processes of active reinterpretation as 
people involved in these events both deconstructed the legitimacy of the regime and 
constructed a new, revolutionary reading of their struggle. These rearticulations, rather than 
merely “shocking news”, decisively influenced the constellation of social forces in the country 
going forward. In the account given here, then, revolutionary transformation becomes 
intelligible as an achievement of popular critical self-activity which is, quite literally, effaced 
by “eventful” perspectives on the Tunisian revolution. It thus suggests that, rather than 
through a “transformative event” (Badiou, 2012; Sewell, 2005), decisive changes in the 
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Tunisian revolutionary process were brought about by processes of unification, 
interpretation, and articulation in which subaltern agency was the key motive force. 
The chapter argued that these transformations are best understood in terms of popular 
critical self-activity producing a break with common sense and articulating new conceptions 
of the struggle in terms of revolutionary demands around which a collective will for the 
overthrow of the regime coalesced. In this process, changes in collectivities and 
consciousness stood in a dialectical relationship, whereby the emergence of “the people” 
and of revolutionary goals were mutually constitutive. In many ways, the dynamics at hand 
resembled those of a “popular learning in struggle” discussed in the previous chapters, where 
experience of social contradictions and changed situations enables people to create good 
sense knowledge and solidarities. However, what occurred at this stage was more than an 
accumulation of learning, but a situation in which such “molecular processes” produced a 
shift and “quantity became quality” (Engels, 2017, chap. 12). For as a situation still 
understandable as revolt intensified with the falling of the martyrs, people considered the 
legitimacy of the regime to have been demonstrably reversed and an enfeebled hegemony 
effectively collapsed. This condition of hegemonic collapse, long prepared by contractions 
and subaltern struggles, led to an active search for a new political language which could give 
expression to and point a way out of the contradictions which people experienced. Here, 
experiences of martyrdom and shared suffering were interpreted by developing 
“oppositional readings” (Hall, 2006) of good sense conceptions of history sedimented in the 
fissures of hegemony. People constructed equivalences between the legitimate revolts of 
their ancestors against colonial rule and their own situation. This made it possible to conceive 
of the regime as an external oppressor, of the people as an integral community with claims 
to embodying the true nation, and of the two sides as locked in an existential conflict. As 
popular critical self-activity thus drew together experiential and historical good sense, this 
knowledge was rendered “more unitary and coherent” (Gramsci, 1971) and allowed for a 
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new conception of the world to be organically articulated: the people were engaged in a 
struggle to bring down the regime.   
Recalling the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, activist agencies credited in the 
literature on the Tunisian revolution with politically radicalizing, organizing, and leading 
mobilization, notably trade unionists (Hmed, 2012; Yousfi, 2015a), were, although not 
absent, far from a driving force behind the developments discussed in this chapter. What 
occurred is best understood as a unification of the vector under which diverse members of 
the local communities mobilized, including activists and lawyers, with a transgressive vector 
of mobilization spearheaded by the subaltern youth. This coalescing took place under 
conditions that were principally created by the latter, and the dynamics of joint revolutionary 
mobilization which ensued crucially drew on knowledge and solidarities created by subaltern 
self-activity, making it the leading force from which revolutionary mass mobilization 
developed in the communities in the Tunisian interior. Indeed what occurred can be 
understood as ‘the articulation of previously tacit knowledge in struggle’ (Cox, 2014, p. 965) 
with an “infinity of traces” in the form of good sense conceptions of history (Gramsci, 1971) 
into an organic new conception of the world.  
Largely absent, however, were organic intellectuals engaged in processes of “popular 
education” (Cox, 2019; Cox and Nilsen, 2014) and the forms of organized pedagogy that could 
have allowed this knowledge to be articulated more abstractly and coherently (Cox, 2014; 
Motta, 2017). Consequently, the new conceptions and the collective will which formed 
around them remained under-articulated, under-specified, and fragile in many ways. Rather 
than emerging from the “long labor” of a counter-hegemonic project, they appear to have 
been created by a “spontaneous” form of ‘auto-reflection on the part of the people - an inner 
reasoning worked out in the popular consciousness’ (1971, pp. 126–7). The limitations this 
entailed notwithstanding, a collective will for the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime emerged 
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from these processes which transformed localized, sectorized, and defensive struggles into 
revolutionary mass mobilization. Occurring first in the rebelling communities of the interior, 
this “birth of a revolution”, as one of my interlocutors had put it above, was felt across the 
country. As the next chapter discusses, it factored decisively in a realignment of forces on the 
national level that would spell the end of Ben Ali’s rule.  
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VII. Coalescence and Divergence in the Revolutionary Process  
 
This last empirical chapter of the thesis focusses on the later stages of the revolutionary 
process and primarily discusses developments that occurred on a national level. It argues 
that, until 12 January, mobilizations by trade unionists and other activists in coastal regions 
had remained small, episodic, and without decisive effects. Subsequent to the massacres in 
Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb, and the attendant articulation of a collective will for the 
downfall of the regime, however, UGTT structures began calling general strikes that escalated 
into revolutionary mass mobilization, notably in Sfax and Tunis. In this context, a national-
popular collective will for the end of the Ben Ali regime coalesced, showing that UGTT as the 
hegemonic vector of mobilization remained essential for bringing about changes at the 
national level. The chapter also discusses how members of subaltern groups, particularly in 
the interior of the country, felt side-lined by the attempts of formal structures and 
counterrevolutionary forces to determine the political process after the departure of Ben Ali. 
In a response suggesting how profoundly the struggles of the previous weeks had 
transformed political subjectivities, a significant number, mostly of subaltern youth, left their 
home regions to occupy the Kasbah, the central government square in the capital. The 
chapter argues that their bid to reassert popular control over the revolutionary process 
succeeded in winning important concessions that put the country on a path of transition 
towards electoral democracy. However, this also closed possibilities for a deeper 
transformation of Tunisian society, thus effectively ending the revolutionary process in the 
more immediate sense that is of concern to this thesis.  
The discussion of these historical developments is structured into five sections. Section one 
describes the development of the 12 January general strike in Sfax, arguing that this marked 
the beginning of a decisive role for UGTT in the revolutionary process. The second section 
shows that mobilization in Tunis had been limited before that point, and the third section 
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argues that UGTT as a vector of mobilization became essential for the creation of mass 
mobilization in the core of the hegemonic formation. Section four discusses the occupation 
of the Kasbah and the more specific content of demands that were articulated there as the 
highpoint of subaltern self-activity in the revolutionary process, while the final section argues 
that a lack of leadership and organizational resources kept radical impulses from developing 
into a counter-hegemonic project. 
 
A Turnaround of UGTT in Sfax 
As the closing scenes of the previous chapter unfolded and the people of Kasserine, Regueb, 
and Thala cautiously celebrated the withdrawal of the police from their communities, the 
center of revolutionary development shifted to the city of Sfax. Scholars have argued that 
the 12 January general strike which the regional UGTT organized in this second city of Tunisia 
constituted a turning-point at which the revolutionary process reached a nation level  
(Salmon, 2016; e.g. Zemni, 2015a). As my interlocutors in the interior stated, it was only with 
the mobilization in Sfax, often referred to as the country’s economic capital, that their 
isolation was broken. Featuring concentrations of industry, the largest port in the country, 
and a highly productive agricultural hinterland, the city is also home to the largest and most 
powerful regional branch of UGTT (Feltrin, 2018a; Yousfi, 2015a). As Ghassen Besbes told me, 
however, the presence of this commanding trade union had at first been an obstacle to the 
mobilizing efforts by local activists. A grassroots trade unionist and lawyer from Sfax in his 
early forties, who had been active with the banned communist party, we met in the lobby of 
a colonial era hotel close to the law office where he now works in downtown Tunis. He 
recounted the events in Sfax prior to the general strike: 
The first activity was on 25 December. We were about thirty people maximum [in front of the regional 
UGTT]. We were opposed by the regional union leadership […] They sent their security service to 
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assault the demonstrators […] On 1 January, there was also another rally which was larger […] Us 
activists were desperately trying to force the regional union to organize a demonstration. I now see 
that this was an erroneous approach. We did not engage in any awareness raising activity that tried to 
mobilize the people. It was restricted to intellectuals, trade unionists, etc. 
This comment provides a valuable glimpse of the variable role played by official trade union 
structures and regional leaderships. Not unlike what had occurred in Kasserine, the regional 
UGTT denied any support to mobilizations by local activists. Going even further, the Sfax 
union leadership apparently even tried to suppress demonstrations. As Ghassen indicates, 
though, lack of union support was only one reason why no significant mobilization occurred 
in Sfax prior to 12 January. Indeed, he opines that the grassroots activists’ “desperate” focus 
on UGTT was itself part of the problem. This suggests that UGTT’s effective monopoly on the 
limited political activity in the country (Yousfi, 2015a; also see chapter 4) – in other words its 
function as the hegemonic vector of mobilization – powerfully circumscribed the political 
imagination of activists. In seeking to organize demonstrations, they could not conceive of a 
way other than going through UGTT. Despite the prominence of subaltern self-activity in the 
mobilization in the interior, Ghassen states that activists like him did not attempt to reach 
out to the broader masses. Indeed, the situation in Sfax only changed after the events 
discussed in the previous chapter caused the regional union leadership to reconsider its 
position. This was suggested to me by Moncef Guebsi, a professor of sociology at Sfax 
university and secretary general of the local higher education union. He participated in 
meetings of the union leadership at the time of the revolution and freely shared his 
impressions as we sat over tea in a café close to his house: 
The grassroots trade unionists asked leaders to take a firm stance and to issue a press release. The 
position that everyone expected was a call to end the massacre […] Mohamed Chaabane made a 
turnaround. He is very intelligent. At the beginning, he was against all mobilizations […But then] he 
called a meeting of the regional administrative commission in Sfax on 9 January where the [general] 
strike of the 12th was decided. 
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Moncef states that the massacre of 8 and 9 January in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb led to a 
reversal in the position of the UGTT leadership in Sfax, most notably of Mohamed Chaabane, 
the regional secretary general at the time. Moncef’s statement also corresponds to findings 
in the scholarship that it was the mounting pressure by grassroots trade unionists subsequent 
to these events which swayed union leaders (Feltrin, 2018a; Yousfi, 2015a). Evocatively, 
Ghassen designates the “turnaround” made by the regional secretary general as evidencing 
his “intelligence” rather than, say, moral integrity or compassion, possibly indicating that 
union leaders perceived that the balance of forces in the country had begun to shift to the 
disadvantage of the regime. Whatever his reasons, Mohamed Chaabane took one of the most 
consequential individual decisions in the revolutionary process when, on 9 January, he called 
a meeting of the UGTT leadership in Sfax and informed them of his intention to call a regional 
general strike. As the preparations for the strike began in secrecy the following day, 
Mohamed Chaabane headed for Tunis to join a meeting of the national UGTT leadership 
where, as he told me, he tried to convince other union leaders to follow suit.40 Sitting in the 
courtyard of his estate on the outskirts of Sfax, to which he had since retired, he explained  
to me his reasoning at the time: 
After the events of Thala and Kasserine, the general atmosphere showed that there was concrete 
solidarity, there were people who wanted to mobilize […] So I announced the general strike, whatever 
the opinion of the national executive committee […] On January 10, there was a meeting of the 
extended executive committee. I showed the union leaders that it was illogical for UGTT to remain 
silent about the massacres that took place in [the governorates of] Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine, and that 
Sfax had decided to go on general strike on 12 January [ …] And yet, they did not decide a [national] 
general strike […] Hence, the decision of the general strike [in Sfax] was historic and brave [...] 
Historically, Sfax has always led the way [...] We organized general strikes before independence, in the 
fight against French colonialism. 
 
40 This 10 January meeting in Tunis was not called to deliberate the current events in the country but 
was ‘scheduled long before to talk about the topic of social protection and welfare in the country’ 
(Interview Mohamed Chaabane). 
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Mohamed relates his decision to call a general strike to what he termed an “atmosphere of 
solidarity”, suggesting that he indeed felt that popular sentiment was changing in the 
aftermath of the massacres. As other trade unionists intimated, pressure from the union base 
in Sfax had concomitantly been building. Mohamed certainly took a serious gamble by 
exposing his intentions to a national UGTT leadership that was firmly loyal to Ben Ali. And 
indeed, as he describes it, he failed to convince the rest of the leadership to call for a national 
general strike and the press release that was issued went no further than condemning the 
use of live ammunition.41 While the 10 January meeting conceded that individual union 
branches could call strikes, and some did so on 13 and 14 January (Feltrin, 2018a; Yousfi, 
2015b), the burden of the first mover thus fell on Sfax. Interestingly, Mohamed framed the 
decision to go ahead with the scheduled action in terms of historical agency and obligation, 
which he derived from the history of resistance by the people of Sfax against French 
colonialism. Through this, he expressed a mode of sense-making of the conditions which he 
faced through historical embedding that strongly resembled that which people in Kasserine 
and elsewhere deployed. And just as in those localities, claiming such historical agency did 
come at a cost. It seems likely that the redeployment of police forces to Sfax which now 
occurred was a response to knowledge about the looming general strike relayed to the 
authorities by regime loyalists present at the 10 January UGTT committee meeting.  
Indeed, on 12 January, the people of Sfax woke up to an intense police presence across the 
city. Regardless, an unexpected number of people heeded the call for strike and gathered in 
front of the UGTT building, France 24 reported 30,000 (France 24, 2011a). While the first 
 
41 The statement of the national UGTT issued on 11 January reads as follows: ‘[The UGTT] : 1- 
Condemns the use of live ammunition fired at demonstrators, shots which killed many citizens in a 
number of interior regions, more precisely in Tala, Kasserine and Regueb, and denounces the blockade 
of the Regional Labor Union of Kasserine as well as the ransacking of its goods and documents; 2- 
Requests the setting up of a commission of inquiry with a view to elucidating the conditions under 
which live rounds were fired on the demonstrators in the regions mentioned and to determine those 
responsible; 3- Urges the withdrawal of the army contingents from the cities and their main arteries 
and the lifting of the siege of certain interior regions by the forces of order.’ (quoted in Allal and Geisser 
2011, p. 68).  
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mass mobilization outside the interior did occur under the hegemonic vector of UGTT, it 
nevertheless tapped into mobilizing dynamics which went beyond its intentions. This is clear 
in Mohamed Chaabane’s attempt to diffuse the situation by telling protesters that the strike 
had succeeded, and that they should return to their homes by midday (Le Temps, 2011a). 
But as Ghassen, the trade unionist and lawyer from Sfax, told me, the dynamics set in motion 
had gone beyond the ability of the union leaders to control. He began to fidget on his seat 
and gestured expressively as he described the developments on that historic day: 
It even exceeded the mobilizing capacity of the Sfax UGTT […] There were people from all walks of life, 
sectors, and ideologies […] There was a huge feeling of mourning after the events of Thala and 
Kasserine, there was bitterness but also an enormous hostility […] The general indifference was 
replaced by anger towards this regime. 12 January was the first time that the slogan “The people want 
to overthrow the regime!” was raised in Sfax [...] The leadership [of UGTT] tried to control the crowd 
and keep them satisfied with this gathering. But things far exceeded their attempts and the crowd 
pushed towards a demonstration [...] Suddenly we found ourselves facing tear gas and we heard 
shouts about a martyr [...] And there, the youth of the popular quarters went mad and did not take 
any precautions. Because there were still women and children in the demonstration. […] The young 
men were determined, they made metal shields and obstacles and set police cars ablaze. 
What had been intended as an orderly general strike in the form of a rally in front the UGTT 
premises quickly transformed into revolutionary mass mobilization. The bloodshed of the 
previous days, Ghassen implies, pushed far more numerous and diverse protesters into the 
streets than the union would have had the capacity to mobilize. Here, dynamics akin to the 
popular mobilization which had formed in the interior of the country were surging to the 
surface. Just like in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb a few days earlier, there were not just large 
numbers, but a unity in a collective will as protesters repeated the new revolutionary slogan: 
“The people want to overthrow the regime!”. A people expressing fundamental hostility to 
the regime was clearly manifesting itself on the streets of Sfax this day.  
When police attacked the protesters, young men from popular quarters were at the front 
lines of the battle once again. Ghassen suggests that they felt compelled to act as the 
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defenders of their community, notably of the women and children present in the 
demonstration. Unlike in the communities of the interior, however, the young men who 
fought the police in Sfax were lacking the experience of several days of struggle that had 
hardened their peers when they got to that juncture. Meanwhile, the unification across class 
and ideological divides and around revolutionary demands that had coalesced over several 
weeks in the localities of the interior appears to have occurred much more rapidly in Sfax. 
This hints at the possibility that people recognized themselves in the organic revolutionary 
conception and collective will which had been articulated from forms of popular 
consciousness, adopting them as a language that gave expression to and pointed a way out 
of the contradictions which they similarly experienced.42 
The developments in Sfax brought about two important and related changes in the 
revolutionary process. On the one hand, 12 January marked the first appearance of mass 
mobilization in a major coastal city,43 and so in regions and among populations that were part 
of the regime’s historical bloc. On the other hand, and unlike in the interior of the country, 
the mobilization in Sfax occurred principally through UGTT, even though its dynamics 
escaped union control. This suggests that UGTT as a hegemonic vector of mobilization began 
to play a more important role precisely at the juncture when the center of the revolutionary 
process shifted from the periphery to the core of the hegemonic formation. However, 
subaltern and popular self-activity remained important, notably in terms of contributing 
radicalization and revolutionary demands. As the discussion in the following sections argues, 
this pattern was even more pronounced in the development of mobilization in the capital.  
 
42 Chalcraft (2017) makes the case that this was suggested by the rapid adoption of a “Tunisian model” 
for popular mass action and slogans such as ASYIAN in countries across the region. 
43 The only prior instances of mass mobilization were confrontations in the Hay Ettadhamen 
neighborhood of Tunis the night before, discussed below. Larger daytime protests of students had also 
occurred for the first time in several localities on 6,7, and 10 January, including in Tunis (Al-Chourouk, 
2011a; “Al-Jazeera TV 07.01.”, 2011). However, that latter development was effectively countered by 
the regime which closed all educational institutions in the country on Monday, 10 January (Salmon, 
2016). 
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Contained Activism in the Capital 
The streets of Tunis had remained largely calm until the night of 11 January, when residents 
in its popular quarters began to mobilize. Prior protest events organized by Tunis-based 
activists have received more than their fair share of scholarly attention (see chapter two) and 
will be discussed in what follows in order to bring out the interactions between them and the 
hegemonic mobilizing vector of UGTT as well as with subaltern self-activity. The very first 
demonstration in the capital took place on 25 December 2010. It was held in front of the 
national headquarters of UGTT on Place Mohamed Ali in the central Lafayette neighborhood, 
and drew several hundred protesters (“Al-Jazeera TV 25.12.”, 2010). Preparations for the 
event involved opposition party activists and grassroots trade unionists, as well as bloggers 
who helped spread information about it online (Salmon, 2016). Organizing activities were 
carried out in great secrecy, as two of my interlocutors in Tunis told me. Wissem Sghaier, 
aged 28, was a student activist with the legal opposition Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), 
whose Al-Mawquif publication he co-edited. Cherif Khraifi, three years older than Wissem, 
was a history student, a member of the banned communist party, and involved in 
unemployed activism. They described the activities of their parties in the following manner: 
On 21 December, we decided to hold a meeting in a closed corner of the medina [old city]. We thought 
of bringing the mobilizations from Bouzid to other regions […] We said that we need to do a rally in 
front of the UGTT [building…] On the 25th, we were surprised by the number. We did not think that so 
many people would participate. (Wissem Sghraier) 
The party asked us to struggle discreetly, because there were many arrests and therefore, we did not 
want to lose more activists […] So, we tried to lead a small demonstration without being exposed to 
the arrests and to withdraw quickly afterwards […] We do not have enough potential to lead large-
scale mobilizations. (Cherif Khraifi) 
Two patterns already observed in other localities come through in these comments. First, the 
limited mobilizing capacity of opposition parties – discussed in chapter four for the interior 
of the country – was apparently true in the capital as well. This is suggested by the fact that, 
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even though Tunis was the center of their activities, a joint effort of activists from various 
backgrounds resulted in no more than several hundred protesters heading their call for 
mobilization. Indeed, activists were aware of their limited capacities and they considered 
even this small number of protesters a success. As Cherif’s comment conveys, the 
overarching concern at this stage was not to achieve broader mobilization at all costs but to 
protect activists from being arrested.44 The second pattern is that demonstrations organized 
by activists remained centered on UGTT, both spatially as well as in terms of the intention to 
put pressure on the union leadership to adopt a more supportive position.  
As Ghassen Besbes had put it for the case of Sfax, this focus on UGTT as the sine qua non for 
achieving popular mobilization apparently came at the expense of mobilizing efforts among 
the broader population. This indicates how strongly the hegemonic formation limited the 
imaginary for oppositional politics in the capital, including for the relatively new and 
supposedly more radical cyber-activists. Indeed, one of the tactics for mobilization was to 
circulate a call for protest online that included a fake UGTT logo. This was what Lina Ben 
Mhenni, one of the most prominent bloggers in the country, told me. An energetic woman 
in her mid-thirties, I met her at the office of a Tunis-based human rights NGO where she is 
now in charge of media and communications: 
After 25 December, there was a fake press release from UGTT [calling for a demonstration on the 
27th…] It was cyber-activists who falsified this document to convince people to come. And there were 
trade unionists who came, believing that it was an UGTT event […On the 27th,] the majority were 
activists whom I knew […] We weren't many, but all the media talked about this mobilization […] 
Regarding UGTT, they put on music through loudspeakers so that our voices were not heard too much. 
On 27 December, the second demonstration which activists organized in front of the Tunis 
UGTT headquarters was attended by somewhere between 500 (France 24, 2010) and 1,000 
 
44 This is not to suggest that opposition parties and activists in Tunis did not engage in other activities 
such as holding meetings, issuing communiques, talking to the media, and otherwise sharing and 
spreading information. However, those activities, extensively discussed in the literature, appear not 
to have impacted directly on the genealogy of revolutionary mass mobilization.   
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(The Guardian, 2010) people. As Lina suggests, those that assembled were by and large 
activists who knew each other. Emphasizing its close allegiance with the regime, she recounts 
that the union leadership did its best to silence the voices of the protesters. But media 
attention around this second protest, including reporting in Tunisian print media, as well as 
the large police presence, meant that many people took note of the event. The following day, 
UGTT issued a press statement distancing itself from the demonstration (Le Temps, 2010a). 
With their attempts at getting mobilization off the ground by winning the support of UGTT 
checked, as well as protests in the interior of the country calming down around the new year, 
activists in the capital did not embark on any major actions until events in Thala produced a 
new momentum. After that, students first protested in Tunis on 6 January, although their 
actions were largely confined to campuses. This was relayed to me by Ahmed Sassi, a 33-
year-old philosophy graduate and former member of the communist party. Having been at 
university during the revolution, he was actively involved in the mobilizations on campus, but 
said that the most significant action of Tunis-based activists in terms of reaching out to the 
broader population in the capital was a flash mob in Passage, the main metro interchange of 
central Tunis, on 7 January: 
Mohamed Ali Square [in front of UGTT headquarters] was something like a safe space where activists 
could meet. So, the Passage [action] was something else. It meant going beyond the classic 
frameworks of trade unionism and the university [for organizing demonstrations]. We went a lot closer 
to the citizens. It meant going where you can reach people. 
Ahmed implies here that “going where you can reach people” was a radical and daring move 
for the Tunis-based activist community whose activities were heavily policed. The action on 
7 January, he suggested, marked their first attempt to step outside the established pattern 
of seeking out UGTT support and staying close to its localities as well as on university 
campuses which, although offering a measure of protection, also limited their outreach. 
There was, then, an awareness building among the Tunis activists regarding the limited 
effectiveness of their actions in working towards broadening the mobilization in the country. 
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Yet, the Passage action remained the only one of its kind, and no significant progress was 
made in mobilizing broader segments of the population in the capital. The degree to which 
activist communities were able to support the unfolding mobilization in the interior of the 
country by organizing demonstrations in the capital was thus clearly limited. Operating as 
they were in the center of the hegemonic formation, they confronted a staunch opposition 
by central UGTT structures loyal to the regime, and their principal role in the development 
of the revolutionary process was the creation of media attention.  
As the previous chapter suggested, one notable intersection between dynamics in the capital 
and the interior occurred through the national Bar Association. Scholars have argued that 
legal professionals managed to safeguard and even slightly expand their political 
independence under Ben Ali, and were the only organized sector to call for demonstrations 
in Tunis prior to 14 January (Gobe, 2013, 2016; Salmon, 2016). On 28 December, leading 
lawyers in the capital held a protest in solidarity with the people of Sidi Bouzid that was 
attended by no less than 300 people (Le Temps, 2010b). As a group that had historically been 
protected from state violence, the arrests which occurred at that protest were denounced 
by the Bar Association in a press conference the following day (Al-Chourouk, 2010). Its 
president, Abderrazek Kilani, recalled that their next demonstration resulted in open 
confrontations with the police: 
On 31 December 2010, the lawyers decided to organize a day of support in solidarity with the 
disadvantaged regions. Ben Ali sent the police, and there were confrontations between lawyers and 
police […] We planned a general strike on 6 January to denounce the violence suffered by the lawyers. 
In the international media, Abderrazek found even clearer words on 31 December when he 
said: ‘We cannot keep silent. This [violence against lawyers] has never happened before in 
Tunisia’ (“Al-Jazeera TV 31.12.”, 2010). These developments, as well as the subsequent 
national-level general strike of the lawyers on 6 January, likely contributed to Abderrazek’s 
intervention on behalf of the people in Kasserine on 10 January. Beyond this, the lawyers 
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would also become a highly visible group in the 14 January Tunis demonstration, as well as 
an important actor to intervene in the subsequent occupation of the Kasbah and in the post-
Ben Ali political developments more broadly. Still, as with the political activists, the Bar 
Association did not have significant mobilizing capacity. While the efforts of Tunis-based 
activist communities doubtlessly contributed to an overall atmosphere of mounting pressure 
on the regime, their agency in the development of the revolutionary process is over-
represented in the literature compared to that of subaltern social groups. As this section 
showed, they were unable to mount larger demonstrations in the streets of the capital. 
Instead, mass mobilization occurred here through the intersection of those vectors which 
had enabled it in the interior of the country. Subsequent to the massacres in Kasserine, Thala, 
and Regueb, residents of Tunis’ popular quarters began to engage in self-activity and, under 
pressure from the general strike in Sfax, UGTT structures in the capital finally organized 
demonstrations.45  
 
The People Bring Down the Dictator  
Members of subaltern groups in the capital began to mobilize in several popular quarters, 
such as Le Kram, Hammamet-Lif, and Beb Jdid, in the days immediately preceding the 14th of 
January (Allal, 2012b, 2013). The first instances of mass mobilization in the capital, however, 
occurred in Hay Ettadhamen, the biggest popular quarter of Tunis with a total population of 
above 180,000 (INST, 2015). Most of its inhabitants are migrants from Kasserine and Sidi 
 
45 The only exception to this, as footnoted above, were the demonstrations by university students on 
6,7, and 10 January (8 and 9 January having been a weekend) which, at least partially, could be argued 
to have been mass demonstrations. However, these protests remained largely confined to the 
university campuses and stopped after the regime closed educational institutions across the country 
on 10 January. 
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Bouzid living in the capital for a generation or less (Lamloum and Ben Zina, 2015). It was here 
that mass protests first occurred during the night of 11 to 12 January (Reuters, 2011).  
That the geographical origin of its residents played a role in the local mobilization was 
suggested by Yassine Hamzaoui, a music teacher and resident of Hay Ettadhamen in his mid-
forties who had migrated from Kasserine at the age of 24 in search of employment. He said 
that: ‘When they brought the wounded from Kasserine to hospitals in Tunis, the nurses came 
down here and started to scream: "Get moving, Kasserine, it's over, the country is over." 
Afterwards, the people here were ready, and it was that night that things exploded’ (Yassine 
Hamzaoui). He states that the residents of Hay Ettadhamen were mobilized by the immediate 
confrontation with signs of violence in Kasserine. This news, as well as a relationship with the 
police that in many ways paralleled that of members of subaltern groups in the interior, was 
mentioned by Ahmed Riahi from Hay Ettadhamen as the motivation for the local young men 
to take to the streets. In his mid-thirties and now a public servant, Ahmed had been 
unemployed under Ben Ali. He was something of a local “strongman” and helped us make 
contacts among the people of the quarter. As we sat in a popular café, he recounted:  
ACAB [All Cops Are Bastards], this was our slogan. We all hated the police. We can't love them. If you 
humiliate me, do you want me to love you? In short, we were ready for a fight. […] In addition, people 
fired each other up with stories about what was happening in Kasserine and elsewhere. 
Hatred of the police was as strong an initial reason for mobilization in the popular quarters 
of the capital as it had been in the interior, suggesting important structural parallels in the 
living conditions of subalterns throughout the country. Moreover, Ahmed suggests that 
subaltern youth in Hay Ettadhamen felt inspired by the mobilization of their peers in the 
popular quarters and towns in the interior. Mobilizing dynamics among subalterns in the 
capital resembled those discussed in the previous chapters on other levels as well. This was 
suggested by Rami Cherif, an unemployed resident of the quarter in his late twenties, and 
Anis, an older man who preferred to remain anonymous. Called up by Ahmed, they joined us 
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at the café and described to me how the confrontations between police and the people of 
Hay Ettadhamen developed. Rami recalled that: ‘The first night, the youth threw Molotov 
[cocktails...] The next day there was a curfew [...] A taxi driver named Majdi, someone shot 
him […] The next day, the people burned down the [police] station’ (Rami Cherif). Anis added: 
‘It became a matter of life and death, a fight for survival [...] Your neighbor was shot dead, 
you had to fight. You had no choice [...] Our numbers tripled’ (Anis). The regime imposed a 
curfew after the first night of confrontations on 11 January, for which it officially blamed 
“leftist and religious movements” who were allegedly “sowing disorder” (La Presse, 2011a). 
According to Rami, as the curfew came into effect, a taxi driver returning to his house close 
to the police station of Hay Ettadhamen was shot dead. The comments of both men suggest 
that the pattern observed in the previous chapters, whereby the deployment of lethal force 
led to an intensification of the mobilization, occurred in Hay Ettadhamen as well.  
While none of my interlocutors from subaltern groups in the capital mentioned the 
development of radical political demands – indeed some said that there were no slogans at 
all – the dynamics of mobilization in Hay Ettadhamen otherwise appeared similar to those in 
the interior: they were principally motivated by experiences of police humiliation, drew on 
local structures of solidarity, and were intensified rather than dispersed by the regime’s 
killing of protesters. And again, just like in the communities of the interior, trans-local 
solidarity would not in itself bring about significant degrees of mobilization. It was only in 
response to local events, particularly police violence, that protests escalated. Ezzedine Aloui, 
a factory worker in his fifties, opined that the latter constituted the most important factor in 
the local mobilization. He had migrated to the capital ten years earlier, settling in Hay 
Ettadhamen and quickly developing strong ties there, including to his neighbor Majdi, the 
taxi driver who was shot by the police:  
There were things in Kasserine, Thala, Sidi Bouzid. But here – nothing […] On the 12th [of January], two 
were killed, Majdi and someone else, and it started […] Maybe if there had not been the death of these 
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two, none of this would have happened here […] On the 14th, they were buried. Then people went to 
the Ministry of the Interior [at Avenue Bourguiba] to protest. 
In a development parallel to those in the popular quarters and provincial towns of the 
interior, funeral marches were turned into protest events by members of subaltern groups 
in the capital. As Ezzedine recounts, it was in this context that, despite ostensibly lacking 
political demands, the people of Hay Ettadhamen directed themselves on 14 January towards 
the institutional source of the violent repression which they experienced, the Ministry of 
Interior. Located on the central Avenue Bourguiba, it was there that their self-activity would 
merge with a broader cross-section of the capital’s population who turned out in protest for 
the very first time that day. Until that point, most people in Tunis had stayed at home. And 
members of social groups forming part of the regime’s historical bloc, notably the 
bourgeoisie of the capital, as well as key social forces of the hegemonic formation, such as 
the national UGTT leadership, that had previously shown no signs of defecting. Indeed, the 
latter was not to falter. UGTT Secretary General Abdessalem Jarred had visited the 
presidential palace on 13 January and spoke of a “constructive dialogue” with Ben Ali (Al-
Chourouk, 2011b). But, as the blogger Lina Ben Mhenni told me, developments in the popular 
quarters of Tunis, the general strike in Sfax, and mobilizations in other coastal cities were 
creating the impression that the regime was finally losing control: 
Before, there was the fear barrier in Tunis, it was the same activists who mobilized all the time. But 
now it was the popular quarters that were moving […] For me, that was the end of the regime. We are 
talking about more than a million inhabitants in [Hay] Ettadhamen. And people mobilized in Sfax and 
Sousse, where there had been nothing so far.  
What experienced political activists in the capital had not been able to do, namely break the 
barrier of fear, was achieved by subaltern self-activity in the popular quarters as well as by 
the mobilizations in other coastal cities. However, this alone might not have sufficed to 
convince members of the bourgeoisie who were not already politically active to take to the 
streets. Pointing to its key role for achieving mass mobilization in the heart of the hegemonic 
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formation, it was only the call for a general strike on the 14th of January by the regional UGTT 
in Tunis46 which broke these core social groups out of the regime’s historical bloc. This was 
suggested to me by Zied Lakhdar, a member of Choukri Belaid’s Democratic Patriots' 
Movement, and secretary general of the party subsequent to Belaid’s assassination. Now an 
elected legislator, he received me in the buildings of the Tunisian parliament, and told me of 
the UGTT meeting that decided the strike and in which he participated:  
On the 12th [of January], there was the administrative committee meeting of the regional union which 
took the decision of the general strike in Tunis, encouraged, of course, by the success of the general 
strike in Sfax. White-collar workers and the bourgeoisie were freed by this strike.  
This comment suggests that the regional general strike of 14 January was instrumental in 
bringing the middle classes of Tunis onto the streets. Thus, the mobilizing vector of UGTT was 
particularly important in mobilizing those groups that formed the core of the regime’s 
historical bloc. This was also suggested by what Hajer Dargouth told me. A close friend of 
mine who comes from an old bourgeois family in Tunis, she had been studying agricultural 
engineering in Sousse and returned to the capital only after the universities had been closed 
by the regime. She said that people like her had not been engaged in mobilizations before: 
The only time we went out on the street [to protest] was on 14 January [...] On the evening of the 13th, 
my mother, who worked at a bank and was a union member, received a call from the UGTT. They told 
us that there was a general strike and that everyone should come to the UGTT headquarters […] We 
called our neighbors and friends to get the message out. 
The first-time protesters that followed the call of UGTT, such as Hajer, congregated on 
Mohamed Ali Square in front of the UGTT headquarters on 14 January. As they moved out of 
the protective vicinity of the union premises and onto Avenue Bourguiba to confront the 
regime at its institutional manifestation of the Ministry of Interior, the middle classes were 
 
46 UGTT is structed into regional branches, including one for Greater Tunis, meaning that the capital 
not only houses the national union headquarters but also a regional one. It was the latter who called 
for the strike on 14 January. The national UGTT leadership stayed loyal to Ben Ali until the end. 
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joined by the people of the popular quarters. This was relayed to me by Henda Chennaoui, 
an activist from Tunis in her mid-thirties who was part of the blogger scene under Ben Ali and 
worked for a popular private radio station at the time of the revolution. Coming from a family 
of artists, she had studied journalism and got involved with opposition parties at university. 
After the revolution, she became a freelance journalist affiliated with the Tunisian blogger-
network turned thinktank and e-zine Nawaat. As we spoke in the kitchen of her flat in 
downtown Tunis, she described the events of 14 January to me:  
It was only on 14 January that we saw the Boubous [the bourgeoisie] of Tunis and La Marsa, not before. 
I had zero hope that the numbers would be like this. I think it was thanks to the bourgeoisie of Tunis. 
They strengthened the mobilization and gave it legitimacy, even abroad. […] And then, there was the 
moment when the youth of Hay Ettadhamen arrived who were carrying a coffin. All these moments 
were touching, it was a dream […] There were all the social classes from the poorest to the bourgeoisie. 
This transformed things, it became a popular revolution where everyone was represented. 
Images of the protests in Tunis that day were mediatized throughout the world and, as Henda 
concludes, it was this mobilization that greatly aided in bestowing, at home and abroad, the 
legitimacy of bourgeois participation upon a process that had begun among the country’s 
subaltern groups. Her example also highlights that there had been doubts among many until 
the day that Ben Ali would flee the country. Indeed, most of my interviewees voiced deep 
concerns that the final speech which he gave the day before, in which he made significant 
concessions, would calm down the protests. But when the crowd grew and people began to 
push out of the space which UGTT had designated for the protest that day onto Avenue 
Bourguiba, there was finally the convergence of the different social groups of the capital in 
one space. From subalterns living in the city’s popular quarters to the residents of affluent 
neighborhoods like La Marsa, “the people” as a whole had come together. And as they now 
gathered in front of the once feared Ministry of Interior on the capital’s main avenue, they 
defiantly shouted one clear message: “Ben Ali – get out!”. In the afternoon hours of 14 
January, and after street battles had raged for several hours again, the man who had ruled 
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Tunisia with an iron fist for 23 years secretly boarded a plane, never to return. On this 
historical day, then, a national-popular collective will of the people constituted itself and 
succeeded in bringing down this dictator.  
The discussion in this section showed that this collective will coalesced in the capital and 
coastal cities at the intersection of two vectors of mobilization resembling those which had 
first created it in the interior of the country. On the one hand, there was independent 
subaltern mobilization in the popular quarters. On the other, local branches of UGTT issued 
calls for protest. However, a key difference stands out regarding the relative importance of 
and relationship between subaltern- and union-organized mobilization. Whether with the 
support of local trade unionists and UGTT structures (Thala and Regueb), or largely without 
them (Kasserine), subaltern youth had been the main motive force behind mass mobilization 
in the interior and created the conditions in which revolutionary demands were first 
articulated. In these cases, a largely independent vector of subaltern politics intersected with 
and drove the mobilization by activists and trade unionists in important ways. In Sfax and 
Tunis, however, that relationship was reversed. Here, the vector of formally organized 
politics provided the key impulses, as mass mobilization only ensued once UGTT issued calls 
for protests.47 In other words, it was the official support by union structures which enabled 
the revolutionary process to reach the heart of the hegemonic formation, both spatially and 
in terms of social groups. While local processes of interaction between the two vectors were 
limited by the relatively short duration of the mobilization in Sfax and Tunis, UGTT still 
responded in important ways to the situation created by popular mobilization in the interior, 
and members of subaltern groups contributed radicalizing impulses on the level of demands. 
 
47 This was true for most cities along the coast where protests commenced, depending on the location, 
between 12 and 13 January 2011, by which point local UGTT branches had mostly issued mobilizing 
calls. 
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Thus, the defection by (parts of) the UGTT leadership was instrumental in creating a 
revolutionary situation on the national level, yes, but it responded to – and was in many ways 
influenced by – subaltern mobilization and demands. At the same time, however, the greater 
role of this hegemonic vector – and of the middle-class groups mobilized trough it – was 
associated with a moderation of demands. For the historical 14 January demonstration on 
Avenue Bourguiba articulated as its key aim the departure of Ben Ali, thus narrowing down 
the more comprehensive goal of bringing down the regime. Here, a national-popular 
collective will was both concretized and deradicalized in a context of increased involvement 
by social forces and groups that had been central in the old hegemonic formation. And 
indeed, as the next section discusses, such forces with more reformist inclinations as well as 
straight-out counterrevolutionary ones would move quickly to assert themselves in the 
aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure.  This, as well as an awareness that their demand for a fall 
of the regime had by no means been met, led many of my subaltern interlocutors to 
contemplate new ways of inserting themselves into political developments on the national 
level. The next section turns to the responses by different social forces in the country to the 
“crisis of authority” that the country had now entered.  
 
Culmination of the Revolutionary Process 
On 17 January, three days after the departure of Ben Ali, Prime Minister and RCD member 
Mohamed Ghannouchi formed an interim government that included several opposition 
parties, civil society activist and members of UGTT (The Economist, 2011).48 Ghannouchi 
made it clear that ‘re-establishing public order’ was ‘the absolute priority’ (France 24, 2011b), 
and the national UGTT leadership issued a similarly-worded call for people to go back to work 
 
48 Ghannouchi had initially assumed the presidency himself but was replaced within 24 hours by the 
speaker of parliament. 
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(La Presse, 2011b). Yet, protest continued throughout the country under the key demand for 
the government and the RCD to be dissolved (La Presse, 2011c). Under this pressure, UGTT 
members eventually withdrew from the government whose remaining members quit the 
RCD symbolically and dissolved its central committee (ibid; France 24, 2011c). As key 
developments of the revolutionary process were now occurring in the capital where forces 
of the old regime and members of its historical bloc were trying to manage a transition in 
their favor, many of my subaltern interlocutors felt that they were being side-lined. This 
section discusses how they and some members of the activist community in Tunis responded 
to this challenge by trying to reassert popular control over the revolutionary process.  
With RCD figures still ruling from Tunis, some of those who, in the process of their struggle, 
had come to understand the whole regime as their enemy were reconsidering their options. 
The radical idea that some of them came up with, and which would gain traction among many 
of the subaltern youth in the interior of the country, evidenced the substantial 
transformation of political subjectivity over the preceding weeks. First articulated among 
youth from Menzel Bouzaiane (France 24, 2011d), Safuan Bouazizi, an unemployed graduate, 
and Ala Hidri, still in high school at the time, were present at the meeting where it was 
discussed and described the thought process in the following terms: 
The idea came from a young man named Mounir Hamdi, he's my cousin. He said that we must do 
something new […] He said: “We are going to Tunis and we are seizing power!” We concretized the 
idea. We said that we are going to go to the Kasbah [central government square in Tunis], the seat of 
power. (Safuan Bouazizi)  
We said: “We made the revolution, but they are next to the ministries and can speak. And we, because 
we are far away, we cannot express ourselves” […] We understood that, to matter, you really must go 
there, to the capital. (Ala Hidri)  
These statements suggest that my interlocutors’ understanding of what the regime was and 
where it was located had developed dramatically over preceding weeks. Whereas many 
young subaltern men had, at the beginning of the revolutionary process, seen the local police 
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as essentially identical with the regime, they now understood the latter as a whole system of 
government located far away in Tunis. Thus, they decided that, in order to “take power”, or 
at least to “express themselves” – the significant difference being indicative of persistent 
equivocality regarding ultimate aims, or “under-articulation” – they would need to go to the 
seat of power. Here, vividly expressed, was the learning and new political subjectivities which 
had been achieved. That this was not an isolated development in the town of Menzel 
Bouzaiane was evident through how the idea of occupying the Kasbah, the central 
government square in downtown Tunis, caught on among the youth in the interior. Amine 
Abidi, a farm worker who had fought the police in Regueb, and Hamza Aloui, one of the 
unemployed young men who had done the same in Kasserine, described how they came to 
join qawāfil al-ḥurriyya (The Caravan of Liberation), as it was called (As-sabah, 2011):  
The people from Meknessi, Regueb and such, we got together and talked. Everyone gave their opinion 
and the majority wanted to go close to the power: the Kasbah, where all ministries are and everything. 
(Amine Abidi) 
There were Facebook pages that discussed the program for the sit-in at the Kasbah […] We went [to 
the Kasbah] to correct the process of the revolution. A revolution against the RCD must remain against 
the RCD. We went from all the governorates. (Hamza Aloui) 
These comments point to the rich processes of learning, making new connections, 
exchanging opinions, and exercises in democratic decision-making which took place among 
subaltern youth in the interior. The informal political discussions, in person and online, 
through which Amine and Hamza made their decision to partake in the occupation of the 
Kasbah were a novelty in the lives of these two young men and, as Hamza’s statement 
implies, allowed participants to concretize their own ideas and goals. For him, this was to 
reassert control over the revolutionary process and to bring down the RCD. These goals were 
shared by many who took part in the Kasbah occupation. On 23 January, the convoy that had 
set out from the Sidi Bouzid governorate was the first to arrive in Tunis, with groups from 
other governorates joining over the next two days. When the people from the interior 
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arrived, they tore down the barbed wire in front of the Prime Minister’s office, overwhelming 
the security forces stationed there, and occupied the central government square (Al-Jazeera, 
2011a). They chanted “ash-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-ḥukūma” (the people want to bring down the 
government) and called for the dissolution of the RCD (As-sabah, 2011).  
For several days, the momentum was on the side of the (mostly young) revolutionaries. 
Likeminded people from Tunis joined, locals donated food and mattresses to sustain the 
occupation, and the army felt compelled to make its first public announcement in support of 
the revolution, thus barring police forces from attacking the sit-in (France 24, 2011e; NYT, 
2011). Over the week-long occupation of the Kasbah, important achievements were made, 
not the smallest of which was the creation of unity between Tunisians from different regions 
and social groups. Indeed, it appears that “the people”, whose collective will had been 
articulated as wanting to overthrow the regime, “self-constituted” (Tripp, 2014) during the 
Kasbah sit-in as a collective subject on the national level for the first time. This new encounter 
and process of unification among Tunisians from different class and regional backgrounds 
was described by Amine from Regueb and Lina, the cyber-activist from Tunis: 
In the beginning, we were organized by governorate. But then we made representative assemblies. 
Someone from Regueb, someone from Kasserine, someone from the student union […] We were no 
longer governorates. We were united. […] And we saw strange things that we never experienced 
before. Like a girl sleeping right next to you on the street. (Amine Abidi) 
People who did not know each other became a family. Little by little, we started to have rituals, to 
greet the flag at 7 am, to do cleaning together, the sit-in kitchen […] And we spent the nights debating, 
discussing, it was a bit festive. (Lina Ben Mhenni) 
These statements bring out how the occupiers constructed a sense of unity by developing 
organizational structures and rituals. Some of these drew on overtly nationalist registers. 
Others suggested experimentation with new cultural codes emphasizing a greater degree of 
equality, not just along class but also gender lines, such as regarding the joint responsibility 
for “domestic tasks” of caring and food preparation that had been strongly gendered during 
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the mobilization in the interior. This also brought experiences that, as Amine suggests, were 
clearly confusing to the young men from the interior, like sleeping in one space with women 
whom they did not know. Beyond the opening-up of cultural norms, the Kasbah occupiers 
also experimented with a new popular politics akin to forms of direct democracy and 
assembly-style decision-making. Here, we can clearly spot the unfolding, within a context of 
popular mobilization, of ‘activities of mutual learning and development of self-
understanding’ through which people were creating ‘conceptions that resonate across 
difference’ (Cox and Nilsen, 2014, p. 79).  
Amid the joy and festive atmosphere that Lina relays, then, people demonstrated a 
willingness to question received values, a desire to learn and get to know one another, and 
of finding ‘new ways of constructing what was held in common’ (Chalcraft, 2017, p. 53), as 
they turned the occupied square into a “mini republic”. The processes of communal learning 
were strongly emphasized by my young, male interlocutors from subaltern groups. This was 
expressed by Mohamed Kadri, for example, a 30-year-old from Regueb without a university 
degree who had been unemployed under Ben Ali and did not engage in any kind of political 
activity before the revolution. A talented football player, he was known among the youth of 
his town as a tough guy and a bully. He wore a tracksuit and spoke in an engaged tone as we 
sat in a small corner café in his neighborhood and described how, during the Kasbah, he and 
others developed a thirst for knowledge that he had not known before:   
It helped to build consciousness. At the Kasbah, people started to make speeches and people started 
to understand. In the morning, you have newspapers coming and you read La Presse, etc. […] At the 
Kasbah, I started to read. (Mohamed Lazher Kadri)  
Mohamed vividly expresses the intensity of political learning experiences, as many of the 
occupiers for the first time started to engage with formal political discourses and tried to get 
informed by reading newspapers. And yet, Mohamed’s comment implies that the collective 
learning experiences which unfolded on the Kasbah square were not free of power 
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differentials, especially when it came to developing the political content of their occupation. 
He states that others delivered the speeches that people like him listened to and wrote the 
articles that he would read. Here, those with higher degrees of formal education and other 
forms of cultural or symbolic capital were better able to make their voices heard. Their 
contributions weighed disproportionately on the demands which were articulated in the 
nominally direct-democratic assemblies that the occupiers of the Kasbah had formed. 
In other words, the mini republic of the Kasbah did not correspond to a Habermasian ideal 
speech situation. Lawyers, for example, had an influential presence. Amine hinted at this 
when he said: ‘The Bar Association was there too. They talk to us. There was one 
representative from each governorate, from each region. Then, there was the idea of the 
constituent assembly’ (Amine Abidi). Amine states that a key demand, namely for the 
election of a constituent assembly, was developed in discussions of the representative 
assembly of the Kasbah to which lawyers contributed. The extent of their involvement was 
expressed by the president of the National Bar Association, Abderrazek Kilani: 
There were groups of lawyers who went to educate the protesters on the Kasbah, particularly on the 
question of objectives. Because, when we talked about the constituent assembly, people did not 
understand […] There was a problem at the institutional level, there was a certain vacuum and 
therefore it was necessary to open a dialogue on the objectives […] Afterwards, there was the “Council 
of the Revolution” which took the first steps to pass to the elections of the constituent assembly. 
The imperfections and power differentials of the occupation aside, Amine and Abderrazek’s 
account show that the process of deliberation on the Kasbah did result in the articulation of 
the most concrete and consequential demand to come out of the Tunisian revolutionary 
process. Finding this common ground through popular deliberation was certainly no small 
achievement considering the diversity of “the people” constituting itself in the occupation 
and the previous “under-articulation” of the national-popular collective will. Indeed, as the 
comment by Abderrazek suggests, this was achieved through something akin to a “systematic 
educational activity” (Gramsci, 1971), or a more formal setting of “popular education” (Cox, 
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2019; Cox and Nilsen, 2014), in which lawyers played a leading role. Their specialist 
knowledge on questions of political transition was instrumental in articulating this key 
demand – as well as implementing it later which, as Abderrazek adds, became the task of a 
formal Council of the Revolution.49  
However, the strong role of the lawyers, and thus of traditional rather than  organic 
intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 5-23), clearly resulted in “reformist” demands that were not 
necessarily adequate to the radical ideas latently developed in the subaltern and popular 
politics of the revolutionary process. Moreover, this was the most visible instance of 
intellectual labor inserting itself into these politics – thereby highlighting once more the 
degree to which its organic forms had remained underdeveloped. Still, the process of popular 
education in the Kasbah occupation resulted in a degree of specification of demands that had 
not been achieved before. This was suggested by the comments of Ghassan Aljane, a media 
and communications student in his early thirties who had come from Gabes, far in the south, 
to join the Kasbah occupation, and Walid Abidi, the history graduate and UDC co-founder 
from Regueb: 
We had discussions with a lot of interesting people and gained knowledge. You met activists, citizens 
who do not have the same social position or mentality, but with whom you can discuss. And we 
managed to develop a common objective. […] The demand became: “The people want a constituent 
assembly”. (Ghassen Aljane) 
Thus, people started to understand what they wanted: We demanded the constituent assembly and 
the resignation of Ghannouchi’s government. (Walid Abidi) 
Ghassan emphasizes that the discussions on the Kasbah were a novel experience for 
subaltern youth like him, which brought them into contact with new ideas and people from 
diverse social groups. Learning from and with each other and overcoming their differences, 
 
49 This was a body comprising opposition parties, civil society groups, and UGTT that was formed after 
the dissolution of the Ghannouchi government, charged with organizing the elections for the 
constituent assembly (Le Monde, 2011). 
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the people who assembled on the Kasbah were able to articulate their common demand for 
a new constitution. And Walid said that this goal reflected a process of learning through 
which the people had come to understand what they wanted, as did the second core demand 
which would come out of the Kasbah, namely the dismissal of the Prime Minister and his 
government. A significant achievement, “the people” on the Kasbah went through a process 
not only of unification that constituted them as such, but also of learning and articulation 
that concretized their goals. In other words, this constituted a process in which, through a 
collective will, ‘a subject, a will immediate to itself and acting for itself, is forged […thus 
marking] the transition to transformative politics […as] subaltern social groups, in a process 
of transformation, discover […] what they want’ (Chalcraft, forthcoming).  
And yet, once the will of the people had emerged with such greater clarity, it had also moved 
away from the vague and under-specified notions of “seizing power” or “bringing down the 
regime” that had been articulated before the Kasbah. On the one hand, then, the process of 
learning and development on the Kasbah set in motion a formal process of transformative 
politics that put the country on a path towards electoral democracy. On the other, and for 
the first time involving more noticeably contributions by (mostly traditional and, thus, 
reformist) intellectuals, it also led to a distancing from those demands and goals open to 
more radical interpretations. Here, a potential for popular politics to articulate a more 
revolutionary collective will may have been cut short. Indeed, some of the occupiers felt that 
the mini republic of the Kasbah was being exposed to countervailing forces intent on ensuring 
that the looming danger of popular counterhegemony would not last. This was expressed by 
Henda, who during the revolution grew disillusioned with established leftist politics and 
became one of the few journalists in the country devoted to covering the situation of 
subaltern youth in the interior:  
What we did not see coming was that the counterrevolution organized itself with its old methods - 
media, army, police. And they were much more effective than us. Thus, they managed to isolate the 
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occupation from its environment, from popular support, with a discourse around stability being 
important, etc. […] Then, they infiltrated the occupation itself. An infiltration led by the reformist UGTT 
and the political parties, which expected to have their share of power and to have new political weight 
after 14 January. And the others, who should normally and politically support and protect the youth 
from the interior, they withdrew. 
In her assessment, counterrevolutionary forces succeeded in undermining popular support 
for the continuing occupation of the Kasbah – and for the revolutionary process more 
broadly. Indeed, the national media, while initially enthusiastic, began carrying a string of 
negative commentary on the disruptive effects of continued street actions and 
demonstrations on the country’s political and economic future at least from 25 January 
onwards. Aside from these public pressures, Henda suggests that many of the country’s 
formal political structures, including the “reformist UGTT”, viz. the union leadership (Yousfi, 
2015a), worked to secure their share of power in the post-Ben Ali order by pushing for an 
electoral transition process which they could more readily control. Finally, she points out that 
the forces of the radical left abandoned or at least offered insufficient support to the 
subaltern youth who had been driving the revolutionary process. In all these regards, this 
description of the situation in Tunisia subsequent to the flight of Ben Ali recalls Gramsci’s 
understanding of the dangers that arise in a “crisis of authority”. He wrote that:  
The various strata of the population are not all capable of orienting themselves equally swiftly, or of 
reorganizing with the same rhythm. The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, 
changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subordinate classes, 
reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp. Perhaps it may make sacrifices, and expose 
itself to an uncertain future by demagogic promises; but it retains power, reinforces it for the time 
being, and uses it to crush its adversary (1971, pp. 210–11). 
Indeed, counterrevolutionary forces organized more quickly and were able to prevent the 
experiment with popular politics on the Kasbah from developing into a more coherent force 
by ending the occupation. On 28 January, after the lawyers had tried in vain to convince 
protesters to leave peacefully, the army stepped to the side and allowed police forces to 
forcefully clear out the sit-in (La Presse, 2011d; Le Temps, 2011b). Partial concessions were 
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also offered, and the square had gone up in a cheer of success when, the day before, a 
government reshuffle was announced that excluded RCD party members and the Prime 
Minister promised to resign after elections had been held (Al-Jazeera, 2011b; France 24, 
2011f). Ongoing street protest and a second occupation of the Kasbah in February would 
succeed in pressing for the demands articulated on the Kasbah: between late February and 
early March 2011, the Ghannouchi government stepped down, the RCD was dissolved, and 
elections for a Constituent Assembly were announced that would eventually be held on 23 
October that year (Hmed, 2016; Nawaat, 2015).  
While these developments set Tunisia onto a path of transition towards electoral democracy, 
and thus constituted real gains from and concessions won through revolutionary struggle, 
we can also read them with Gramsci’s above words as constituting a counterrevolutionary 
success whereby old elites largely secured power for themselves. Indeed, scholars have 
argued that the dynamics of national politics from here on can be understood as a formal 
“democratic consensus” (Murphy, 2013b), rather than driven by the disruptive impulses of 
subaltern politics and revolutionary mobilization that concern this thesis. While episodes of 
popular mobilization continued to play into national politics, notably during the 2013 
impasse in the constitution-drafting process (Zemni, 2015b), Tunisian governments since the 
first parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014 were led by Nidaa Tounes, a party 
representing Ben Ali-era business elites, and the Islamist Ennahda. These have been 
described by critical scholars as the “two forces of the old regime” (Boubekeur, 2016; 
Krichen, 2015), and their rule is argued to have reduced popular mobilization (Antonakis-
Nashif, 2016), negatively affecting for instance feminist movements and struggles for socio-
economic rights (Debuysere, 2016, 2018; Fortier, 2015; Merone, 2015). The following section 
concludes this chapter by discussing my interlocutors’ reflections on the achievements and 
shortcomings of the Tunisian revolutionary process.  
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Subaltern Incorporation and Radical Impulses 
The achievements of the revolutionary process were evaluated differentially by my 
interlocutors from subaltern groups. As this final section discusses, many of them perceived 
that their situation improved in important ways under the new political order. Others, 
notably those who had developed more radical political aspirations, felt that the 
revolutionary process had been cut short. Their differing assessments suggest that 
participation in the revolutionary struggle that brought down Ben Ali did not constitute a 
unidirectional process of learning and transformation of political subjectivity. And, just as 
with processes of hegemonic contraction before, dynamics of incorporation through new or 
restructured hegemonic processes apparently went a long way in structuring subaltern 
experience of post-revolutionary society. As such, some found that their position in the new 
hegemonic formation had improved and offered their consent to the reformed political 
system. This was the case, for instance, for many holding (moderate) Islamist beliefs who 
were being included in the political process for the first time, as was suggested by Hajer 
Assoudi, the young woman from Kasserine who now teaches Islamic education. Before the 
revolution, she had experienced strong discrimination for wearing the ḥijāb and gave an 
overall positive assessment of current conditions: 
The opposition parties came to life and got together, and elections were held. Everyone guarded the 
democratic process, and the revolution succeeded more or less. It is true that, in Kasserine, not much 
happened in terms of what we wanted to achieve, but we organized ourselves in civil society, we did 
higher education, and things are all right. 
From Hajer’s perspective, the electoral democratic process brought real political inclusion, 
especially for the Islamist Ennahda party of which she became a member. And while she 
states that local conditions did not improve much in terms of economic development, she 
felt content with other achievements, such as her ability to pursue higher education and 
organize through civil society –  which, under Ben Ali, would have been almost impossible for 
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someone of her convictions. Though not necessarily in the form of systematically addressing 
regional inequalities, subaltern incorporation also selectively occurred in the economic field. 
Spending from the National Employment Fund (Fonds National de l’Emploi), one of the Ben 
Ali years’ key mechanisms for hegemonic incorporation through job-allocation, was 
redirected to benefit subalterns in the interior, rather than middle-class youth as had been 
the case before (Weipert-Fenner and Hamdi, 2017). Indeed, post-Ben Ali governments 
specifically brought into public sector employment those who had been wounded during the 
revolution, identifying them as a particularly restive population (Tsourapas, 2013; Weipert-
Fenner and Hamdi, 2017). In fact, almost all my interviewees from that category were in some 
form of public employment at the time I spoke to them. In addition, the government decided 
to pay one-off compensations of roughly $2,000 to those who had been wounded in the 
revolution (Andrieu, 2016; Lachenal, 2019). That these measures remained not without 
effect was suggested by Haythem Gharsalli, a man without tertiary education in his early 
thirties from one of Kasserine’s popular quarters. Unemployed under Ben Ali, he had received 
a gunshot wound when attacking a police station. As someone who benefitted from 
compensation and incorporation through employment, he expressed satisfaction with his 
current situation when he spoke to us in a popular café of his neighborhood:  
I had nothing. Suddenly, I have a house, I have a job. I have a salary and I have been able to take many 
privileges from the state. So, things are going very well. […] I got my right […] If there is another 
revolution, I will not participate in it. What for, to have a second job? The “revolution of dignity”, we 
already did it. 
This suggests that, even for some of those who had participated in the frontlines of the 
struggle, the aims of the revolution remained socio-economic in nature, and that dynamics 
of learning and development of political subjectivities among members of subaltern groups 
were far from uniform. Haythem’s overall assessment was that the revolution had achieved 
its most important goal of bringing a dignified life – to him at least. This key grievance, which 
had been related by many of my interlocuters to the oppressive policing of their everyday 
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lives under Ben Ali, was mentioned as one regarding which the revolution had brought 
palpable gains. Indeed, there appears to have been a marked change in policing strategy: in 
many communities where police stations had been burned down during the revolution, 
including towns like Thala or Menzel Bouzaiane and popular quarters like Hay Ennour in 
Kasserine, there was no police presence when I conducted my fieldwork. According to my 
interlocutors, this brought feelings of local autonomy and freedom. Even more important 
was that the inevitable encounters with the police were playing out very differently. This was 
suggested by Helmi, one of the young men from Kasserine who had been targeting their local 
RCD office before the revolution: 
Now, you are on an equal footing with the police. If he insults you, you insult him. Before, he insulted 
your mother and you could do nothing. Afterwards, he couldn't do it anymore. […] Now, when you 
burn a tire you don't run away. The police come to talk to you, they take you to negotiate with the 
governor, etc. [laughs] 
Being treated with a greater degree of respect by the police and having easier access to 
officials certainly changed the lives of those young men who were experiencing a “social 
death” under Ben Ali. Given how strongly determinate those experiences had been for their 
engagement in the revolutionary process, Helmi’s statement expresses a significant 
improvement regarding some of the most important grievances of subaltern youth in the 
interior. As such, partial extension of economic and political incorporation as well as changes 
in policing went some way towards winning the new political order a measure of consent 
among members of subaltern groups. However, this was not true for those who had come to 
desire more profound transformations of Tunisian society. This was the case notably for 
those who had participated in the Kasbah occupation. My interlocutors who experienced the 
forms of popular politics that developed there, as well as their limitations, reflected more 
critically upon their own role in the revolutionary process. Such was the case for Ala Hidri, 
the youth from Menzel Bouzaiane who had joined the Kasbah as a high school student, and 
his co-occupier Abderraouf Abidi, the architect and civil society activist from Regueb in his 
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late thirties. They expressed disappointment with what had been achieved and a desire for a 
more radical transformation of society: 
We don't know how to do politics; we are not politicians. After the change of government, we 
returned. It was an abandonment. (Ala Hidri) 
There were six soldiers in front of the government door [Prime Minister’s office]. So, the people were 
there, and the seat of power was empty. We could have taken power! […] There could have been a 
radical change […] We could have said that we were the national council of the revolution. But it was 
the lack of political experience. It could have been a very different scenario. (Abderraouf Abidi) 
From these statements, we get a clear impression that some of the subaltern youth felt they 
did not follow through with the possibilities for revolutionary change which they had helped 
to create in bringing down Ben Ali and occupying the Kasbah. Neither of the two young men 
expressed concrete ideas regarding what these potentialities might have come to; at least 
not beyond the notion of seizing power and declaring a people’s council of the revolution as 
an alternative government. However, they agree in their diagnosis regarding the source of 
what they saw as their strategic blunder, as both relate it to a lack of political experience. 
Here, we can see a recognition of the limitations incurred by a subaltern-driven revolutionary 
process that was lacking significant organic organizational and intellectual resources – and 
that, hence, took a reformist trajectory as other organizations and traditional intellectuals 
got involved. These pertained to the articulation of more developed conceptions for political, 
economic, and social transformation, as well as to revolutionary strategies and tactics to 
achieve them. Lack of formal political knowledge and strategy was also mentioned by several 
of my interlocutors, particularly the absence of leadership by more experienced political 
forces. Amine, the farm worker from Regueb, related this to his experiences at the Kasbah, 
and Choukri Slougui, an unemployed graduate from Kasserine with an experience in activism 
at university, spoke about the revolutionary process more broadly: 
We rejected all the politicians. [Opposition leaders] Moncef Marzouki and Hamma Hammemi were 
slapped [at the Kasbah]. For us, there was no real opposition in Tunisia. But maybe it was a mistake. 
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We did not create a leader to take power. There was no substitution in power. […] We have not 
overturned the regime, and we are still paying the price. (Amine Abidi) 
The political parties in power have betrayed the mobilizations and the youth. I would have wanted 
there to be people who offered leadership. […] The lack of leadership meant that we chose elections. 
We did not continue the revolutionary process until the end. (Choukri Slougui) 
In their evaluations, Amine and Choukri relate the shortcomings of the revolutionary forces 
in terms of strategy and a capacity to take control of political developments in the country to 
a lack of (organic) leadership. They mistrusted the organized opposition parties and felt that 
they had not been capable to offer the kind of guidance which would have been required in 
this situation. But Amine also said that the rejection of these leaders might have been a 
mistake given that subalterns did not manage – and, we may add: did not have enough time 
– to organize sufficiently and develop their own organic forms of leadership. They both hold 
that this meant the revolutionary process was cut short and the broader structures of the 
regime remained in place. This suggests that a revolutionary process in which radical 
impulses had developed rapidly out of subaltern self-activity, while sufficient for creating a 
force and historical protagonism that led to the downfall of Ben Ali, reached its limitations 
when it came to developing more constructive ideas for a post-revolutionary society. As such, 
the political subject which it was able to give rise to remained largely at the level of 
antagonism, of “power against”, rather than “power for” (Modonesi, 2015). That a lack in 
revolutionary leadership prevented a deeper transformation of society was also suggested 
by some of my interlocutors from the organized left, who engaged in auto-critique 
considering this failure. This was articulated, for example, by Ghassen Besbes, the lawyer and 
grassroots trade unionist from Sfax, as well as by Zied Lakhdar, the member of parliament 
and leader of a radical leftist party: 
All activists of the time were surprised by the result of the revolutionary movement. There were no 
answers, no structures, no plans. That’s why they were secondary contributors to the March 2011 
process, which was a purely political process that marginalized economic and social transformation. 
(Ghassen Besbes) 
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The radical left was not ready. If you are not ready on the organizational level, you cannot lead the 
movement, you cannot provide for its needs. […] We did not find the tactical means necessary to 
accomplish the revolutionary process. (Zied Lakhdar) 
According to Ghassen, activists like him had missed their moment to influence the 
revolutionary process, which in March 2011 resulted in the Council of the Revolution under 
the auspices of UGTT and the main opposition parties. Lack of preparation and of capacity on 
both organizational and ideational levels was a key problem faced by political tendencies 
which saw themselves as the natural allies of revolutionary mobilization and resulted in their 
inability to provide it with outside support and leadership. Ghassen and Zied opine that this 
was the principal reason why revolutionary forces did not manage to develop a project for 
deeper cultural, social, and economic transformation of society. As such, a process of auto-
critique appeared to take place among (some) leftists and activists in Tunisia. More 
importantly, some of my young subaltern interlocutors developed a sense of historical 
agency and an even stronger capacity for self-activity based on their learning in the 
revolutionary process. Mohamed Kadri, who had previously confined his life to the popular 
quarter in Regueb, and Choukri Slougui, the young graduate from Kasserine, articulated this 
transformed sense of agency:  
We demand at least that history does us justice, that people say: “Thank you, sons of Kasserine. Thank 
you, sons of Thala, of Hay Ennour, of Hay Ezzouhour.” The least of things, thanksgivings. Because we 
liberated you. We ended your exile. We allowed you to live freely in your country. (Choukri Slougui) 
Ben Ali fled thanks to us. The first and second government [of Ghannouchi] fell thanks to us. But then 
we left power to others. We did something, and then we gave up […] We had no political thought 
before the revolution. Afterwards, perhaps we won that, the possibility of participating in politics, with 
an idea, a debate, a party. There are dominant parties. But the youth, we are not going to vote for 
them in municipal elections. We can't find someone who represents us. Thus, some of us started to 
create independent lists. (Mohamed Kadri) 
Here, powerfully articulated, is the degree to which some of the young subaltern men 
overcame their subordination which, as Gramsci tells us, is marked by a condition in which 
‘it never occurs to them that their history might have some possible importance’ (1971, p. 
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196). As these two state, they considered themselves as having accomplished a “historical 
act” for which they were owed gratitude, especially from those who benefitted more from it 
than them. And Mohamed gives us an impression that those who had seen their sense of 
agency transformed in this way were continuously reflecting on their role in the revolutionary 
process and its shortcomings, learning from their mistakes, and developing new forms of self-
activity in response to it. This refers us back to the “molecular processes” which transform 
society beneath the surface.  
Indeed, as Mohamed states, some of the young revolutionaries were beginning to partake 
more directly in the democratic politics which their struggles had helped bring about. Over 
the period when I carried out my fieldwork in 2018, several of my young subaltern 
interlocutors were standing as independent candidates in the municipal elections of May that 
year. With independent candidates making up more than a third of all electoral lists, winning 
more seats in many regions of the interior than Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes combined, a 
record of 37% of those elected under the age of 35, and almost half the new delegates 
women, the 2018 municipal elections point to the continuing potential for political change in 
the country (Carnegie, 2018). Indeed, the 2019 national elections seem to point in a similar 
direction, as the presidency was won by an independent lawyer. While the future of 
revolutionary struggle in Tunisia remains uncertain, these developments show, at the very 
least, that remnants of the old regime can be voted out of office and that even members of 
subaltern groups are inserting themselves into formal politics in unprecedented ways. The 
freedoms which these possibilities are built on, Choukri reminds his compatriots above, were 
won through a struggle in which young subaltern men from the interior played a key role. It 
is my modest hope that this thesis contributes to the historical acknowledgement of their 
agency which he demands. 
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Conclusion  
Over the final three days of Ben Ali’s rule, the revolutionary situation created in the interior 
of the country developed at the national level. What had begun as a struggle driven by the 
self-activity of subaltern youth in the periphery finally reached the core of the hegemonic 
formation. The organic conceptions articulated through this struggle, and around which a 
collective will coalesced, constituted the main social force behind the new form of historical 
protagonism of a people wanting to overthrow the regime. However, the development of a 
national-popular collective will capable of bringing down Ben Ali was only possible because 
formally organized agencies came to play a larger role. Revolutionary mass mobilization in 
large cities along the coast was precipitated through calls for general strike by UGTT rather 
than subaltern self-activity, although decisions for the former were in part motivated by the 
latter. Still, the relative importance of the two main vectors of mobilization identified in this 
thesis had been reversed compared with the development of the revolutionary process in 
the interior. While subaltern self-activity continued to provide important impulses and 
increased numbers in the streets, the mobilizing force of central union structures alone 
proved capable of breaking out of the regime’s historical bloc those groups upon which its 
hegemonic processes had been focused, notably the coastal middle classes. In the 
determining last stages of the revolutionary process, it was thus UGTT which brought about 
a crisis of authority on the national level. 
This did not suddenly turn an organization that had been integrated into the hegemonic 
formation since the end of colonial rule into a revolutionary force. This chapter has shown 
that the greater role of UGTT, alongside political opposition parties and social groups 
defecting from the regime’ historical bloc, was concomitant to a moderation in popular 
demands. Indeed, most of the formally organized agencies, as well as remnants of the old 
regime, quickly engaged in concerted efforts to limit revolutionary changes to the very top 
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of the political system. Against this, a new form of popular mobilization, driven again by the 
agency of subaltern groups, developed on the Kasbah and articulated important 
specifications of revolutionary demands. This initiative evidenced the degree to which 
processes of learning and development in struggle had changed political subjectivities but 
also showed the limitations of a revolutionary process in which radical impulses had mainly 
come from subaltern self-activity. For, while the Kasbah entailed experiments with direct 
democratic processes, a lack of organic leadership and organizational resources – and of the 
time necessary to develop them – meant that popular forces remained unable to devise a 
comprehensive counter-hegemonic project and push for deeper revolutionary 
transformation. Nevertheless, they managed to wrest important concessions from political 
elites, including the beginning of a constitution-drafting process which would eventually set 
Tunisia on the path to becoming a democracy. Thus, it was not so much the absence of 
revolutionaries (Bayat, 2017), clearly present among members of subaltern social groups, but 
the wider constellation of forces in the country that produced an outcome largely 
understandable in terms of reform rather than revolution. This chapter has shown, too, that 
many who had engaged in the struggle developed aspirations of a more radical nature – even 
if these, in lieu of processes of organic intellectual labor and popular education, remained 
under-articulated. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
The discussion in the previous chapters developed two key contributions of the thesis, one 
empirical and one theoretical, that constitute its main conclusions. The empirical 
contribution pertains to the scholarship on the Tunisian revolution. The thesis showed that 
the self-activity of subalterns, especially young men from the interior, was instrumental in 
creating a revolutionary situation. It thus complements and partially corrects the existing 
scholarship which has focused on an alleged leadership role of activist communities, middle-
class agencies, and UGTT. Subalterns figured in the Tunisian revolution not just as masses to 
be led or in images of regime violence that spurred more elevated social classes into action. 
Rather, their agency produced crucial transformations all along the revolutionary process.  
The theoretical contribution of the thesis relates to our understanding of how subalterns 
were able to do so. It emphasizes dynamics of learning and development in struggle as well 
as the possibilities and limitations for subaltern self-emancipation in the contexts of a 
contemporary hegemonic formation. Here, the thesis showed that a Gramscian theoretical 
optic can make sense of many developments in the Tunisian revolutionary process. This 
importantly includes the limitations regarding resilience and emancipatory depth of a 
national-popular collective will that developed largely from spontaneous and defensive 
forms of subaltern self-activity. Its “under-articulation” regarding systemic structures of 
subordination, its lack of formal organization and organic leadership, and the presence of 
powerful counter-revolutionary forces contributed to a reformist outcome of the 
revolutionary process. However, the degree of learning, articulation, and will-formation 
which subaltern agency produced without significant organizational and organic intellectual 
resources also points to a third set of more speculative conclusions. These pertain to our 
historical understanding of the Arab Uprisings and the degree to which they can inform 
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conceptions of revolutionary politics. This concluding chapter elaborates the three 
contributions in this order.  
 
Subaltern Politics in the Tunisian Revolution 
The first, empirical conclusion of the thesis is that subaltern agency, and especially the 
mobilization of young, unemployed men in the interior of the country, played a crucial role 
in the development of the revolutionary process in Tunisia. Indeed, their spontaneous – in 
the profound, Gramscian sense – self-activity was the main social force that led to the 
creation of revolutionary mass mobilization. Developing from an insurgent into a 
transgressive vector of mobilization, driving as well as finally coalescing with other social 
groups and more formally organized agencies, it contributed decisively to the 
transformations which gave rise to a revolutionary situation. Through this, the thesis showed 
that there is an important and understudied subaltern politics of the Tunisian revolution. 
Here, it contributes to rescuing ‘from the enormous condescension of posterity’ (Thompson, 
1963, pp. 12–3) the agency of subaltern social groups in the Tunisian revolution, making a 
modest effort in this direction in the form of a partial history focused on young men in the 
interior. Signaled throughout the thesis was the fact that this focus came at the expense of 
studying the self-activity of other subaltern groups, most notably women. The thesis, then, 
only scratches the surface of what is clearly a rich subaltern history and politics in the context 
of the Tunisian revolution. Despite its limited reach, the thesis contributes important insights. 
Building on a perspective on hegemony “from below”, it adds a largely under-researched 
account which showed that the self-activity by members of subaltern social groups mattered 
decisively along the entire revolutionary process. This section first recalls and sharpens the 
main empirical findings and then spells out their contribution to the literature on the Tunisian 
revolution. 
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Well before the events of December 2010, an active subaltern politics contributed to the 
accumulation of struggles that laid the ground for the revolution. It signaled an increasing 
withdrawal of consent to a regime beset by a slow-burning crisis of hegemony. This crisis was 
felt particularly acutely by subalterns in the interior of the country who bore the brunt of 
hegemonic contractions regarding not just their economic, but political and cultural, 
integration. Among them, young men, largely excluded from the strongly suppressed formal 
political organizations and civil society activism centered on the capital, engaged in various 
forms of self-activity to confront this disincorporation. The unemployed experimented with 
new ways of making their grievances heard, interacting but also circumventing an UGTT 
increasingly unable to deliver economic inclusion for them. Other youth in the popular 
quarters and provincial towns mounted less visible forms of resistance against an oppressive 
police presence in their daily lives with which the Ben Ali regime sought to control the 
populations left behind by its promises of a neoliberal economic miracle. Seeing their 
economic conditions deteriorating and having their sense of dignity violated by the 
securitization and exclusion of their lifeworld from a modernist national identity, subalterns 
were, thus, far from acquiescent and passive. With these findings, the thesis adds to a 
developing scholarship showing a rich history of politics and resistance in Tunisia before the 
revolution. This importantly diversifies earlier accounts on society’s “political death” (Camau 
and Geisser, 2003) and “voluntary servitude” (Hibou, 2006) under Ben Ali. It shows that, while 
Tunisia may not have seen a “decade of struggle in civil society” heralding the revolution 
comparable to that of Egypt, the final years of Ben Ali were certainly politically eventful. By 
adding that this included important subaltern struggles, the thesis points to under-
researched pre-histories of the revolution which call for further research. 
The thesis’ most important empirical contribution is to the scholarship on the Tunisian 
revolution more narrowly speaking. Here, the conclusion is that subaltern self-activity 
interacted with and influenced other agencies in important ways and originated dynamics 
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that were instrumental for creating a revolutionary situation. This entailed the 
transformation of relatively isolated, sectorized, and defensive struggles into mass 
mobilization for regime change which first emerged between 9 and 11 January in 
communities of the interior that were then centers of subaltern self-activity. The struggle 
had, by that time, developed into a mobilization, mostly by young men, for the defense of 
residential neighborhoods that took the shape of nocturnal confrontations with the police. 
Amid differences and over a period of limited mutual reinforcement, these struggles 
expanded local solidarities, forged new ones in struggle, and eroded the barrier of fear by 
successfully fighting back the police, thus building resilience and determination. Parallel to 
this, trade unionists, lawyers, and other activists organized largely peaceful daytime 
demonstrations in various localities of the interior and the capital. While interacting in many 
ways, the two vectors of mobilization remained largely separate in terms of coordination and 
participants, with those who joined during the day being mainly members of the middle 
classes, women, and children. On the local level, the latter vector also entailed negotiations 
with the authorities and articulating demands on behalf of the entire community. These 
demands remained decidedly defensive, ranging from regional economic development and 
end of police violence to the release of prisoners.  
The joining of the two struggles on the local level and their transformation into community-
wide mobilization for revolutionary goals occurred only after regime forces shot dead up to 
50 protesters in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb between 8 and 9 January. Through the killing 
of the young men defending their residential quarters, and as bullets started to rain down 
indiscriminately, it was made palpable to the whole of the local communities that seeking 
inclusion no longer made sense as the regime clearly had nothing to offer them but death. 
This realization finally led to the collapse of an affeebled hegemony, and thus to a crisis of 
authority on the local level. With their spirits hardened by the preceding clashes, the young 
subaltern men fought on and the people of their communities were forced to reinterpret the 
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situation and the goals of their struggle. In this context, and drawing on popular culture 
including local memories of revolt and conceptions of legitimate opposition to an unjust 
political order, they articulated and united around demands for the fall of the Ben Ali regime. 
Revolutionary transformation of the struggle, then, first occurred on the local level and was 
crucially driven by spontaneous subaltern self-activity and processes of popular learning. 
More formally organized agencies, including trade unionists, interacted with, supported, and 
formed part of local struggles, but they did not produce a dynamic which led to community-
wide mobilization to bring down the regime.  
However, the rebelling communities might have been wiped out by the regime, had it not 
been for important interactions between these local developments and trans-local activist 
agencies that spread information and organized their own demonstrations. This built 
pressure not only on the regime but on the national leaderships of organizations like the Bar 
Association and, most importantly, UGTT as the second power center in the country. In the 
wake of the killings in Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb, these powerful national forces moved 
towards increasing defiance of the regime. The National Bar Association intervened directly 
with the presidency, contributing to the withdrawal of the police from Kasserine and other 
localities, and the Sfax UGTT, the union’s most influential regional branch, called a general 
strike. Within days of its decision to deploy lethal force against the centers of subaltern self-
activity, the regime’s tactics backfired. Instead of subduing the rebellious communities of the 
interior, the massacres contributed to pushing the entire country into a revolutionary 
situation when mass mobilization, from 12 January onwards, engulfed the previously largely 
quiet coastal cities.  
While a vector of subaltern self-activity drove mobilizations up until this point, it now became 
superseded by trade unionist and activist organizing, and especially by formal interventions 
of UGTT. Popular currents kept articulating radical demands for the fall of the regime in Sfax 
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and elsewhere, but the demand which ultimately came from the UGTT-mobilized and more 
middle-class crowd that protested on the capital’s avenue Bourguiba was the narrower Ben 
Ali, dégage! As this goal was accomplished, counter-revolutionary forces quickly deployed 
their far superior resources to take control of a post Ben-Ali politics. Members of subaltern 
social groups, having only just made their first forceful and highly consequential move ‘into 
the realm of rulership over their own destiny’ (Trotsky, 2008, p. ii), were quickly 
outmaneuvered. Evidencing how rapidly political subjectivities had been transformed, 
however, many among them did not relent so easily. In a bit to assert themselves on the 
national level, subaltern youth from the interior and their supporters mounted two 
occupations of the Kasbah. The occupations managed to articulate and press for concrete 
demands including the dismissal of the transition government, the dissolution of the RCD, 
and the election of a constituent assembly. And yet, with the end of the Kasbah occupations, 
this would be the extent to which the goal of “overthrowing the regime” was specified and 
achieved by subalterns against counter-revolutionary and reformist forces, including the 
national UGTT leadership.  
This subaltern perspective on the Tunisian revolution complements, corrects, and questions 
existing scholarship in several ways. Demonstrating that subalterns were neither the 
playthings of structural forces nor pushed forward by the leadership of activist networks and 
transformative events, the findings of the thesis complicate and pluralize our understanding 
of the agencies and developments that created a revolutionary situation in Tunisia. Far from 
being “other-directed”, members of subaltern social groups engaged in self-activity that 
mattered all along the revolutionary process. Their struggles contributed to an accumulation 
which laid the ground for the revolution and their self-activity puts into question accounts 
which hold that the initial events in Sidi Bouzid radiated outwards as they were organized, 
gradually intensified, and radicalized primarily by trans-local activist networks and agencies 
(e.g. Hmed, 2012; Lim, 2013; Yousfi, 2015a; Zemni, 2015a). While subaltern self-activity alone 
247 
 
would not have been able to create a revolutionary situation on the national level, neither 
were these other agencies. Rather, the thesis found that two vectors of mobilization: one 
driven by the actions of subaltern youth, and the other by some of the activist agencies 
mentioned in the scholarship. These two vectors interacted continuously, but subaltern self-
activity contributed decisively to the transformation of localized, sectorized, and defensive 
struggles into revolutionary mass mobilization.  
Here, the thesis also showed that transformative dynamics were not brought about by 
faceless events and regime actions (e.g. della Porta, 2016; Volpi, 2016). Rather, they were 
produced by “constellations of forces” in which subaltern agency – including momentous 
courage and sacrifice – featured prominently. Emphasizing this complex interaction of 
historical processes and conditionings as well as creative agency in the Tunisian revolution, 
the thesis draws attention away from “the revolutionary event” (Badiou, 2012; Sewell, 2005). 
Instead, it showed that subaltern agency contributed to a drawn-out process of 
transformations that cumulatively led to the downfall of Ben Ali. Supplying a partial history 
of subaltern politics in the Tunisian revolution that focused on the self-activity of young, 
marginalized men from the country’s interior, the thesis only scratched the surface of these 
historical developments. It thus serves as an invitation for future scholarship to continue 
research along these lines. This includes studying the role of women in the (formal and 
informal) politics of provincial towns and popular quarters, exploring in greater detail how 
developments in the interior affected subaltern self-activity in the coastal cities, and the 
interactions between subaltern politics and political parties in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s 
departure. This would yield further insights on the achievements and limitations of subaltern 
politics in the revolutionary process that will be discussed next. 
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Potentials and Limits of Subaltern Self-Emancipation  
The second main conclusion of this thesis is that a subaltern politics framework emphasizing 
hegemony as well as learning and development in struggle allows us to understand 
achievements and limitations of subaltern self-emancipation in the Tunisian revolution. This 
also pertains to a debate on limitations of the revolutionary process regarding outcomes of 
political, economic, and social transformation. The vital insight here is that, through 
processes of learning in struggle, subaltern self-activity was capable of moving beyond 
defensive mobilization, create new conceptions around which a national-popular collective 
will for the end of the Ben Ali regime coalesced, and thus contributed centrally to developing 
a new historical protagonism of “the people”. However, the collective will which thus took 
shape did not develop significantly beyond a project against the status quo as the process of 
popular education which was emerging on the Kasbah was cut short and no vision for the 
transformation of broader political, social, and economic structures of domination was 
articulated. As such, the collective will which had rudimentarily been formed was not carried 
over into a sustained project but fractured quickly. The forces of subaltern self-emancipation, 
then, had been strong enough to break the existing hegemony and remove parts of the 
dominant group, but had neither the time nor the intellectual and organizational resources 
to work out the goals and strategies necessary to form a historical bloc capable of pushing 
for deeper revolutionary transformations. From this it is concluded that subaltern self-
emancipation as a process of learning in struggle achieved much but was also crucially 
limited.  
The achievements of subaltern self-emancipation in the Tunisian revolution can be 
understood in terms of a process of popular learning in struggle. It was based on defensive 
mobilizations against the hegemonic contractions that took place under the Ben Ali regime. 
Subaltern youth engaged in self-activity in response to growing contradictions between, on 
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the one hand, common sense discourses of economic and social progress as well as popular 
notions of a dignified life and, on the other, an experience of increasing marginalization and 
coercion. Engagement in these struggles created new knowledge for dealing with these 
contradictions, drawing on and furthering good sense, such as by acting outside of 
hegemonic sites like UGTT and developing capacities to resist oppressive policing. This 
furnished local rationalities of resistance which informed self-activity of the youth in 
response to acts of aggression directed against their communities that marked the beginning 
of transgressive mobilization in different localities. A shift towards revolt occurred in several 
localities when young men who had made different experiences of struggle mobilized 
collectively to defend their residential neighborhoods. Here was a development of militant 
particularisms which expanded collectivities from circles of friends to the level of quarters 
and towns, developed defensive techniques, and led to new experiences of open 
confrontation with authorities. These developments, signaling the withdrawal of consent, 
also began to weaken common sense and built resilience. Fissures of hegemony were 
exploited as good sense notions of legitimate resistance, notably in the form of local histories 
of revolt and references to the Palestinian struggle, gained traction and the barrier of fear 
was eroded by successes in pushing back the police. 
However, popular learning in struggle also went beyond these cumulative developments and 
produced a qualitative shift from defensive to revolutionary struggle. Here, the attacks on 
the funeral marches made a significant difference as they meant that not just the young men 
but the entirety of the local communities experienced indiscriminate, lethal violence. This 
experience of dominance without hegemony meant that contradictions between common 
sense and experience became irreconcilable. For the people of Kasserine, Thala, and Regueb, 
hegemony, long undermined by contractions and subaltern struggles, finally collapsed when 
the legitimacy of the regime was demonstrably reversed. Thus, the situation could only be 
made sense of with qualitatively new conceptions. Critical self-reflection now made legible 
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good sense notions of legitimate resistance as interpretive foils for present experience. 
Drawing together new and old good sense, or current experience and popular culture, 
resulted in the articulation of a new conception that was deeply organic: “The people want 
to bring down the regime”. This novel conception articulated the relevant collectivities in 
qualitatively different terms, recasting the rebelling communities and their adversary as “the 
people” and “the regime”. It also formulated a way forward – bringing down the regime – 
around which a revolutionary collective will could coalesce.  
The revolutionary struggle that was thus created was adopted by subaltern social groups 
across the country, including in Sfax and Tunis, as it pointed to a way out of contradictions 
which they, too, were experiencing. It also laid the ground for a wider collapse of the 
hegemonic formation as UGTT, one of the most important sites of hegemonic inclusion, 
partially adopted the struggle and succeeded inbreaking the coastal middle-classes out of the 
regime’s historical bloc. These developments converged in a national-popular collective will 
that would bring about the fall of Ben Ali. In a process of self-emancipation, subaltern 
struggles had created a conception, will, and the main force in the historical protagonism 
wanting to bring down the regime – developments which provided a powerful new model of 
popular politics that inspired people across the region and beyond.   
Notwithstanding achievements of historical proportions, the fact that revolutionary 
developments in Tunisia were driven largely by dynamics of subaltern self-emancipation that 
unfolded rapidly and without significant organizational and organic intellectual resources 
also helps us understand important shortcomings in terms of transformative change. As 
cross-class mobilization reached the core of the hegemonic formation, the goal to “bring 
down the regime” was notably diluted into a much less radical demand for the departure of 
Ben Ali. This signaled a shift from a revolutionary trajectory to one which Bayat (2017) 
described as “refo-lution”, revolutionary mobilization leading to reform rather than 
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overcoming of existing power relations. In a Gramscian optic, the problem was that a 
collective will which had formed spontaneously, viz. without ‘systematic educational activity 
on the part of an already conscious leading group’ (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 198–9), rather than 
through a “long labor” (ibid, p. 194), remained under-articulated. It did not include any 
conception for how existing structures of domination would be overcome, social, political, 
and economic relations transformed, or even specifications of who “the regime” and “the 
people” were. Regarding the latter, the fact that subaltern self-activity in the interior of the 
country was rooted in conceptions of masculinity meant that this protagonism was not aimed 
at female emancipation. Emerging out of quests for economic inclusion through the state, 
neither was transforming a capitalist economic system in any straightforward way part of the 
revolutionary agenda. The “agora of the Kasbah” and the dynamics of popular education it 
entailed made some progress towards such issues and produced limited specifications of 
revolutionary goals. But even the collective will that slowly matured there did not develop a 
political (let alone cultural or economic) project but remained largely at the level of 
antagonism or “power against” (Modonesi, 2015). Thus, and while sufficient to destabilize 
and force reforms of the hegemonic formation, it did not lead to the formation of a new 
historical bloc of forces building an emancipatory project capable of overcoming the relations 
of domination enshrined by the old hegemony.  
A Gramscian perspective points to two sets of reasons for the limitations which subaltern 
self-emancipation faced. First are the contextual constraints of the hegemonic formation, 
and second the limitations given through the pathway of revolutionary developments 
themselves. Regarding the first, the thesis found that subaltern self-emancipation was 
limited by counter-revolutionary forces. These worked tirelessly to put an end to popular 
mobilization, including defaming and eventually clearing the Kasbah sit-ins, and to set the 
country onto a path of “orderly transition” to electoral democracy. While this required 
sacrifices and new alliances on the part of the dominant groups, such as with the Islamist 
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Ennahda party, it did not fundamentally challenge their hold on power, most notably of the 
coastal business elites. With UGTT in a leading capacity, a “quartet” of civil society 
organizations mediated the transition phase. Far from a postcolonial regime ruling through 
“dominance without hegemony” (Guha, 1997), the political context was clearly one of a 
developed hegemonic formation in which power relations operated through and were 
protected by “fortresses and earthworks” in civil society (Gramsci, 1971, p. 238). The 
situation after the departure of Ben Ali can indeed be likened to what Gramsci called a “crisis 
of authority” in which the superior capacities of a hegemonic ruling class precisely become 
visible as it ‘changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the 
subordinate classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp. Perhaps it may 
make sacrifices […] but it retains power […and] uses it to crush its adversary and disperse his 
leading cadres, who cannot be very numerous or highly trained’ (ibid, pp. 210-11). Thus, an 
outcome in terms of reform rather than revolution (Bayat, 2017) becomes understandable 
less through the absence of revolutionaries but the wider constellation of forces. However, 
Gramsci also points to possible challenges faced by those struggling against hegemony not 
only in the form of counter-revolutionary forces but through their own weaknesses of 
organization and leadership.  
This second set of reasons for the limitation of subaltern self-emancipation was clearly at 
play in the Tunisian revolution. Organic leadership and forms of organization among the 
revolutionary forces spearheaded by subalterns never had the time to develop beyond the 
“rudimentary elements” characteristic of spontaneous mobilization (Gramsci, 1971, p. 197). 
This internal weakness – recognized by some among the subaltern youth – had profound 
consequences for the durability and depth of the revolutionary process as it imposed 
constraints on developing a collective will, and thus of a project for of social, political, and 
economic transformation. This point is made by Gramsci in the context of arguing against 
“spontaneist” strategies of the general strike. He suggestively remarks that such mass 
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mobilization constituted ‘a collective will, but [only] in its practical action’ and that it was ‘an 
activity which does not envisage an "active and constructive" phase of its own’ (ibid., p. 127). 
The question, Gramsci tells us, then becomes: ‘Will not that collective will, with so 
rudimentary a formation, at once cease to exist, scattering into an infinity of individual wills 
which in the positive phase then follow separate and conflicting paths?’ (ibid., pp. 128-9).  
Gramsci here expresses the limitation of a spontaneously created collective will to a “power 
against” – the very limitation that also characterized the Tunisian revolutionary process. 
What this process lacked, then, was a constructive or “positive” phase: the development of 
a project for revolutionary transformation entailing cultural critique, conceptions for future 
society, strategies for how to achieve it, and the formation of a new historical bloc of social 
forces willing and capable of bringing it about. These are exactly the achievements which, for 
Gramsci, require organic organizational and intellectual labor which he understood in terms 
of the “modern prince” and the philosophy of praxis. Thus, limitations for subaltern self-
emancipation present in the Tunisian revolutionary process included not just the counter-
revolutionary forces of a developed hegemonic formation, but the fact that its primary force 
was subaltern self-activity that developed spontaneously – in the Gramscian sense – and thus 
had only very limited organic intellectual or organizational resources at its disposal.    
Having applied a subaltern politics framework emphasizing hegemony as well as learning and 
development in struggle, the thesis was able to bring out important achievements and 
limitations of subaltern self-emancipation in the Tunisian revolution. The former entailed 
producing a constellation of forces that led to the fall of Ben Ali. Subaltern self-activity 
constituted the main vector that created revolutionary mass mobilization as dynamics of 
learning in struggle produced a break with common sense and a collective will to bring down 
the regime. Significantly, these achievements were attained by subalterns without much 
organic intellectual and organizational resources. For those same reasons, however, the 
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collective will which thus took shape remained rudimentary and did not develop to the level 
of a project for revolutionary transformation of society. This, as well as the cutting short of 
the revolutionary process by powerful counter-revolutionary forces, imposed limitations to 
the degree of self-emancipation which subalterns were able to attain. Rather than resulting 
in deeper social transformations, the Tunisian revolution thus ultimately took a reformist 
trajectory. 
 
Revolution and the Arab Uprisings  
To what extent, then, do the contributions of this thesis inform our understanding of the 
Arab Uprisings and the question of revolution in the contemporary world? Many of the above 
conclusions broadly resonate with those reached by critical scholars regarding the uprisings 
in Egypt and across the region. Popular mobilization was rooted in subaltern experiences of 
hegemonic contractions, marginalization, and securitization, all unfolding in the context of 
neoliberal policies. It also featured strong degrees of spontaneity and creativity, little 
hierarchy, organizing that remained limited and informal, was full of situated leadership, and 
was ideologically “light” and uncommitted to more organized opposition groups. While these 
factors did not hamper – and in many cases facilitated – mobilization, the lack of formal 
organization, revolutionary strategy and organic leadership turned into a serious obstacle 
once dictators were pushed out and questions of transforming social relations arose (e.g. 
Abdelrahman, 2015; Bayat, 2017; Ismail, 2013). Because the forces which had produced mass 
mobilization proved insufficiently developed to implement a revolutionary politics, remnants 
of the old regime seized the day. In Egypt, this would lead to the reinstatement of 
dictatorship as a “Caesarist” force was present in the form of the army (Achcar, 2016; De 
Smet, 2016). Here, Tunisians were a lot luckier. For even if counter-revolutionary forces 
prevailed, they took the shape not of autocratic generals but of union leaders, Islamists, and 
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social elites, none of whom able to monopolize power, and all to various degrees committed 
at least to reform and to safeguarding political rights. However, the findings of this thesis 
point towards a third conclusion suggesting that the scholarship has insufficiently 
appreciated what was revolutionary about the Tunisian revolution.  
Indeed, the main reason why it should be referred to as a revolution and not (just) an uprising 
is that it pushes against the limits of the theoretical optics used here. For where 
developments in Tunisia stand out is regarding the degree of self-emancipation that (some) 
members of subaltern social groups were able to achieve despite lacking organic leadership 
and formal organization. In the conceptual framework that this thesis draws on, these are 
prerequisites not just for revolutionary transformations, or outcomes, but for getting to the 
point of breaking with common sense and articulating a revolutionary conception in the first 
place. To accomplish these, Gramsci held that organic intellectuals and modes of organizing 
in civil society were of central importance. This emphasis is shared in perspectives on learning 
in struggle by thinking towards the formalization and abstraction of “grassroots knowledge” 
gained in struggle through various forms of popular education and pedagogy, organizational 
settings that enable exchange and the forging of new connections, and organic intellectual 
labor (Chalcraft, forthcoming; Cox, 2014; Cox and Nilsen, 2014; De Smet, 2015; Motta, 2017; 
Motta and Nilsen, 2011). In a similar vein, it has been argued that even the limited successes 
of the Egyptian uprising were enabled by modes of horizontalist organizing that facilitated 
the forging of new connections across divides of class or ideology (Abdelrahman, 2015; 
Chalcraft, 2012). By contrast, mobilizing subalterns in Tunisian were not able to draw on any 
significant organizational and organic intellectual resources of this kind.  
While these absences posed important limitations, I submit that pointing only to them is to 
miss the key historical development of the Tunisian revolution: in the context of a relatively 
advanced hegemonic formation, members of subaltern social groups were capable to make 
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the shift from defensive to revolutionary mobilization through a process of learning in 
struggle without significant organic intellectual or organizational resources. Here, the key is 
in a shift of emphasis that runs counter to that proposed by Bayat (2017). In Tunisia, the key 
“anomaly” was not the lack of “revolution as outcome” – entirely understandable through 
the weaknesses discussed above – but the achievements made in the context of “revolution 
as movement”. Thus, focusing on the formation of a collective will as an organizationally 
embedded “long labour” (Chalcraft, forthcoming), or to deficiencies in terms of ideology and 
well-developed projects for revolutionary transformations among activists (Bayat, 2017), 
draws scholarly attention away from trying to understand the degrees of self-emancipation 
reached by members of subaltern groups despite these shortcomings. Indeed, such a focus 
might lead exactly to the conclusion that, not only was this for lack of outcomes no 
revolution, but that the main reason for this was the “absence of revolutionaries” (ibid). Such 
assessments render historically insignificant the experience and agency of subaltern 
protagonists not exhibiting clear “revolutionary consciousness”. In this, they run the risk of 
moving away from engaged understanding and into a mode of trans-historical judgement 
that confines to the dustbin of history the subaltern revolutionaries of whom this thesis gave 
testimony. 
Emphasizing the achievements of subaltern self-emancipation, then, is of crucial importance 
not just for reasons of historical justice. In the wake of postmodernism, critical scholarship 
has sought to locate possibilities for revolutionary politics in new “multitudes of immaterial 
laborers” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2005) or in a project for constructing a “populist 
antagonism” (Laclau, 2006; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). If, as this thesis argued, achieving a 
force comparable to the latter was possible in the context of the Tunisian revolution primarily 
through the self-activity of subaltern social groups, then our conceptions of revolutionary 
politics in the contemporary world stand to learn a great deal from these protagonists. It is 
here that too strong an analytical focus on organization and intellectual labor might not just 
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lead to historical injustice but can obstruct an important task of scholars committed to 
furthering emancipatory struggles: identifying the fissures and weaknesses in systems of 
domination and understanding how challenges to those systems can be developed. This is 
why the Gramscian imperative to seize on “every trace of subaltern initiative” is so vitally 
important. For, much more than our conceptions – enmeshed as they are in “traditional 
knowledge” – it is subaltern struggles that point out and manage to widen fissures of 
hegemony. This is not a call for historical forgetting. We are not to develop from the “scratch 
of subaltern struggles” entirely new theories. But, just as Marx and Gramsci in their time, we 
can only hope to advance subaltern struggles by staying as close to them as possible, learning 
from their every surprise, and informing our conceptions through them. Here, the thesis 
points out a “theoretical surprise” of the Tunisian revolution that inspires hope for 
emancipatory politics and “deserves to be made more coherent”: the self-activity of 
subalterns groups far removed from the developmental frontiers of contemporary capitalist 
society, and drawing on little more than their good sense, created the historical protagonism 
of a revolutionary mobilization that inspired struggles around the globe. 
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Abderraouf Abidi, 37, architect and PDP activist, Regueb, 10.05.2018 
Abderrazek Kilani, 58, lawyer, Tunis, 16.07.2018 
Achref Sloughi, 34, worker, Thala, 19.06.2018 
Ahmed Riahi, 34, unemployed youth, Tunis, 05.11.2018 
Ahmed Sassi, 33, POCT activist, Tunis, 20.07.2018 
Ala Hidri, 26, high school student, Menzel Bouzaiane, 13.05.2018 
Ali Rebah, 37, media activist, Kasserine, 25.02.2018 
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Anis, 47, unemployed youth, Tunis, 07.11.2018 
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Badreddine Masoudi, 58, UGTT member, Regueb, 08.05.2018 
Bassem Hajji, 28, unemployed youth, Thala, 14.04.2018 
Bilel Rebai, 33, seasonal worker, Sidi Bouzid, 05.07.2018 
Bouderbala Nsiri, 62, medical doctor, LTDH activist, Sidi Bouzid, 04.07.2018 
Cherif Khraifi, 38, POCT activist, UDC co-founder, Tunis, 18.07.2018 
Choukri Hayouni, 56, high school teacher and UGTT member, Kasserine, 05.04.2018 
Choukri Slougui, 34, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 16.03.2018 
Ezzeddine Aloui, 55, worker, Tunis, 07.11.2018 
Ezzeddine Negrichi, 62, UGTT local secretary general, Thala, 16.04.2018 
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Hamza Aloui, 29, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 23.03.2018 
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Hassan Nasri, 45, worker, Kasserine, 22.03.2018 
Haythem El-Mekki, 35, blogger, Tunis, 15.02.2018 
Haythem Gharsalli, 30, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 06.04.2018 
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Helmi, 25, high school student, Kasserine, 08.03.2018 
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Houssem Allali, 34, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 08.03.2018 
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Lina Ben Mhenni, 35, blogger, Tunis, 20.02.2018 
Maher Bouazzi, 43, lawyer, Kasserine, 27.02.2018 
Maher Khadhraoui, 26, high school student, Kasserine, 13.04.2018 
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Mohamed Chaabane, 71, UGTT regional secretary general, Sfax, 06.07.2018 
Mohamed El-Arby Ennaguezi, 58, worker, Tunis, 05.11.2018 
Mohamed Fahem Arbaoui, 48, high school teacher and UGTT member, Thala, 07.04.2018 
Mohamed Gharsalli, 43, lawyer, Kasserine, 16.03.2018 
Mohamed Habib Belhaj, 56, POCT activist and UGTT member, Tunis, 19.07.2018 
Mohamed Kadri, 39, PDP activist, LTDH member, Regueb, 11.05.2018 
Mohamed Lazher Gammoudi, 60, UGTT regional secretary general, Sidi Bouzid, 04.07.2018 
Mohamed Lazher Kadri, 30, unemployed youth, Regueb, 11.05.2018 
Mohamed Nasri, 32, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 23.02.2018 
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Mohamed Taher Khadraoui, 50, PDP activist, Kasserine, 07.03.2018 
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281 
 
Nasser Zribi, 62, UGTT local secretary general, Regueb, 08.05.2018 
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Omar Mokhtar Saidi, 26, high school student, Thala, 18.06.2018 
Rami Cherif, 27, unemployed youth, Tunis, 02.11.2018 
Rebh Briki, 58, mother of martyr Slah Mtir, Kasserine, 09.03.2018 
Ridha Bazine, 58, UGTT member, Sfax, 07.07.2018 
Safuan Bouazizi, 35, unemployed youth, Menzel Bouzaiane, 14.05.2018 
Saif Seyhi, 24, high school student, Thala, 17.04.2018 
Salam Shini, 38, worker, Tunis, 07.11.2018 
Sariha Hayouni, 43, high school teacher, Kasserine, 13.04.2018 
Sassi Bouallagui, 62, POCT local leader, Kasserine, 26.02.2018 
Sayeh Abdelsalem, 33, unemployed youth, Regueb, 08.05.2018 
Seif Abadi, 38, unemployed youth, Regueb, 11.05.2018 
Seif Eddine Abadi, 24, high school student, Kasserine, 12.04.2018 
Seif Hamdi, 28, unemployed youth, Thala, 19.06.2018 
Shady Rebhy, 27, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 24.02.2018 
Souhaiel Aidoudi, 33, unemployed youth, Tunis, 17.07.2018 
Taha Zorgui, 26, high school student, Kasserine, 12.04.2018 
Tarik Aidoudi, 27, high school student, Kasserine, 04.04.2018 
Tounsi Ben Taieb Nasri, 33, worker, Kasserine, 13.04.2018 
Wael, 25, high school student, Tunis, 02.11.2018 
Wael Karrafi, 26, high school student, Kasserine, 09.03.2018 
Wajdi Khadhraoui, 38, unemployed youth, Kasserine, 25.02.2018 
Walid Abidi, 40, unemployed youth, Regueb, 10.05.2018 
Wissem Sghraier, 35, PDP activist, Tunis, 15.02.2018 
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Yassine Hamzaoui, 44, artist, Tunis, 05.11.2018 
Yesser Mabrouki, 25, high school student, Thala, 18.06.2018 
Youssef Torjmen, 33, university student, Tunis, 12.12.2017 
Zied Lakhdar, 56, activist, Tunis, 17.07.2018 
 
